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1011 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION ENFORCEMENT 
COSTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TEXTUALISM 
VERSUS CONTEXTUALISM CONDUCTED VIA 
THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM  
Joshua M. Silverstein* 
This Article sets forth an empirical study of a central issue in the 
judicial and academic debate over the optimal method of contract 
interpretation: Whether “textualism” or “contextualism” best minimizes 
contract enforcement costs. The study measured enforcement costs in 
twelve ways. Under each of those measures, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the level of interpretation litigation between 
textualist and contextualist regimes. Accordingly, the study finds no 
support for either the textualist hypothesis that contextualism has higher 
enforcement costs or the contextualist counter-hypothesis that textualism 
has higher enforcement costs. 
The study herein was conducted via the West Key Number System. 
It is the second study of contract interpretation enforcement costs that I 
have completed employing that tool. In a prior article, I presented the 
first study and discussed how to use the Key Number System for 
empirical research generally. This paper expands on the analysis of the 
Key Number System from the earlier article. It also addresses how the 
complexity and confusion in the interpretation caselaw create challenges 
for empirical work concerning contract interpretation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Contract interpretation is one of the most important topics in 
commercial law.1 It lies at the heart of contract doctrine, which contains 
numerous rules designed to address the construction of agreements.2 
And interpretive disputes constitute the largest source of contract 
litigation.3 In fact, contractual meaning may be the most frequently 
contested issue in civil cases generally.4 The significance of contract 
interpretation explains why the field has received extensive academic 
attention since the turn of the century.5 And the subject is recognized as 
“the least settled, most contentious area of contemporary contract 
doctrine and scholarship.”6 
The central policy issue in contract interpretation is the role of 
extrinsic evidence in the interpretive process.7 The rules regarding such 
                                                          
 1. See STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009) (“Issues of 
contract interpretation are important in American law.”). 
 2. See Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 3, 68 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“The problem of contract 
interpretation thus provides a central backdrop for the law of contracts, which contains many rules 
and principles that are designed to address it.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in 
Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1994) (“The 
issue of interpretation is central to contract law, because a major goal of that body of law is to 
facilitate the power of self-governing parties to further their shared objectives through contracting.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 3. Hermalin et al., supra note 2, at 68 (“Probably the most common source of contractual 
disputes is differences in interpretation . . . .”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 & n.3 (2010) (“[C]ontract interpretation remains the 
largest single source of contract litigation between business firms.”) (collecting authorities). 
 4. See BURTON, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5. See Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott 
on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 339, 340 & n.8 (2013) (“After decades of relative neglect, 
contract interpretation became a hot topic of scholarly debate after 2003.”) (collecting authorities); 
David McLauchlan, Contract Interpretation: What Is It About?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 5 & n.1 
(2009) (“In recent times contract interpretation has become one of the most contentious areas of the 
law of contract.”). 
 6. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25 (2014). 
 7. Hermalin et al., supra note 2, at 88-89 (“The key policy question underlying contract 
interpretation is how thorough the interpretive process should be; and this question is commonly 
articulated in terms of the dichotomy of form and substance.”); accord PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY 
OF CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 152-53 (2011) (“The parol or 
extrinsic evidence tension in contract is fundamental; it concerns the very foundations of 
agreement . . . .”); GERARD MCMEEL, THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION, 
IMPLICATION, AND RECTIFICATION § 5.01, at 162 (2d ed. 2011) (“One of the most controversial 
areas in the principles governing the interpretation of contracts is the question of what materials are 
admissible to assist the court in carrying out the task.”); id. at 162-65 (focusing on contract 
interpretation in jurisdictions outside the United States, particularly England and other common law 
nations); Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract 
Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 74 (2013) (“When and what kinds of extrinsic 
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evidence can influence virtually every aspect of the parties’ contractual 
relationship.8 As a result, numerous factors are relevant in deciding the 
optimal interpretive regime.9 It should thus not be surprising that there is 
fierce debate among courts and scholars over the proper approach to 
extrinsic evidence.10 
The disputants are organized into two basic camps. “Textualist” 
judges and commentators argue that the interpretation of contracts 
should focus primarily on the language contained within the four corners 
of written agreements. According to this view, extrinsic evidence—such 
as preliminary negotiations, the surrounding commercial circumstances, 
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade—is of 
secondary importance, and many contracts can and should be interpreted 
without these materials. “Contextualists,” in contrast, believe that courts 
generally ought to examine both the language of the parties’ agreement 
and extrinsic evidence when determining contractual meaning.11 
The textualist/contextualist controversy cannot be resolved in the 
abstract. It raises dozens of questions about the real world that are 
answerable only via observation and statistical analysis.12 Unfortunately, 
empirical evidence bearing on this debate is sorely lacking.13 Data-
driven research is beyond the province of the judicial process. The 
responsibility for completing such work thus falls principally to 
academics. But scholarship concerning contract interpretation is almost 
                                                          
evidence should courts admit in order to interpret the meaning of a contract? . . . [T]he answer has 
profound implications for whether courts achieve the goals of predictability and fairness that 
motivate the law of contracts.”); William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law 
Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 931, 939 (“The great 
issue in [parol evidence rule] scholarship, debated endlessly over the years, and with ample case law 
available to support all points of view, is how a court should determine whether a writing is 
ambiguous or incomplete.”). 
 8. Hermalin et al., supra note 2, at 90 (“The regime of contract interpretation will influence 
contracting parties’ behavior in many respects: with regard to decisions to breach, to take advance 
precautions, to mitigate damages, to gather and communicate information, to allocate risk, to make 
reliance investments, to behave opportunistically, and to spend resources in litigation, and so on.”). 
 9. Id. (“The considerations that determine the optimal approach to contract interpretation are 
thus quite broad-ranging.”); see id. at 90-91 (setting forth a list of some of the key considerations). 
 10. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of 
Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 54 (2007) 
(“Scholars have fiercely debated the proper approach for courts to take in interpreting contracts.”); 
McLauchlan, supra note 5, at 5 (“There are fundamental divisions among commentators, 
practitioners and judges . . . as to the nature of the task and the permissible aids to interpretation.”). 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. Joshua M. Silverstein, Using the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and 
Coding Device for Empirical Legal Scholarship: Demonstrating the Method Via a Study of Contract 
Interpretation, 34 J.L. & COM. 203, 283-84 (2016); id. at 284 n.437 (collecting authorities that have 
reached the same conclusion). 
 13. Id. at 284 & n.438. 
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always theoretical in nature. As a result, there are exceptionally few 
empirical studies of interpretive issues.14 This Article contains such a 
study. The Article is actually the second of two pieces setting forth 
empirical research regarding the textualist/contextualist debate. 
Perhaps the signature claim advanced by textualists in defense of 
their position is that contextualism results in more litigation over the 
meaning of contracts than textualism. In other words, enforcement costs 
are higher in a contextualist regime. Many contextualists disagree; they 
maintain that enforcement costs are actually larger under textualism.15 
My first article concerned this debate and it set forth an empirical study 
designed to test which side is correct.16 The study compared the level of 
interpretation litigation in a group of textualist states to the level in a 
group of contextualist states using fourteen distinct measures.17 Under 
one measure, there was more litigation in the textualist group by a 
statistically significant amount.18 But under the other thirteen measures, 
there was no statistically significant difference between the textualist 
and contextualist jurisdictions.19 I thus concluded that my study provided 
no support for the textualist hypothesis that enforcement costs are 
greater under contextualism, and very little support for the contextualist 
counter-hypothesis that textualism has higher enforcement costs.20 
This study was actually part of a broader project. The primary 
purpose of my first article (which I shall refer to as “Article One”) was 
to explain how researchers can use the West Key Number System to 
dramatically streamline the process of data collection and coding that is 
central to most empirical work.21 Collecting and coding data is normally 
a resource-intensive process, requiring expenditures of time and money 
that go well beyond what is necessary for doctrinal and theoretical 
scholarship.22 Any tool capable of reducing these outlays holds 
considerable value. My principal goal in Article One was to set forth an 
argument that West’s Key Number System is one such tool. 
Accordingly, a substantial portion of the paper focused on the 
methodological questions raised by employing the Key Number System 
as a data collection and coding device.23 The empirical study of 
                                                          
 14. Id. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 253-300. 
 17. See id. at 284-300. 
 18. Id. at 298-99, app. 2 at 317, 320-21 tbl.6. 
 19. Id. at 295-300, app. 2 at 317-24. 
 20. Id. at 299-300. 
 21. Id. at 207. 
 22. Id. at 210-11, 210 n.27 (collecting authorities). 
 23. See id. at 209-53, 286-94. 
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interpretation enforcement costs was intended both to serve as a 
demonstration of the Key Number System in action and contribute to the 
empirical literature regarding contract law.24 
In the concluding section of Article One, I discussed four potential 
follow-up studies that would also utilize the Key Number System to 
compare litigation levels under textualism and contextualism.25 Each 
project had the potential to (1) add to the body of evidence regarding 
which approach to contract interpretation best minimizes enforcement 
costs, and (2) further illustrate how to use the Key Number System for 
empirical research.26 This Article concerns those four studies.27 
After considerable analysis, I determined that three of the proposed 
studies are subject to fatal feasibility issues. The decisive problem for 
two projects is that the contract interpretation caselaw appears too 
convoluted to classify the requisite number of states as either textualist 
or contextualist.28 A third project suffers from critical logistical  
and technical challenges—challenges that many researchers will face  
when attempting to conduct empirical research using the Key  
Number System.29 
I was able to complete the fourth study.30 In that project, there was 
no statistically significant difference between textualism and 
contextualism with respect to the quantity of contract interpretation 
litigation under any of the twelve measures employed.31 Therefore, the 
findings presented in this Article do not support either the textualist 
hypothesis or the contextualist counter-hypothesis. 
As with the study in Article One, the protocol I used for the project 
in this paper has important methodological limitations.32 But the results 
of the study conducted here nonetheless constitute important evidence 
regarding the debate over the optimal method of contract interpretation. 
And the description below of the issues I faced in attempting to complete 
each of the four proposed studies33 should (1) provide important 
guidance to future researchers conducting empirical work, whether they 
choose to utilize the Key Number System for data collection and coding  
 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 207-08, 283-84, 308. 
 25. See id. at 308-10. 
 26. See id. at 308-12. 
 27. See infra Parts V, VI. 
 28. See infra Parts V.A, V.D. 
 29. See infra Part V.B. 
 30. See infra Parts V.C, VI. 
 31. See infra Part VI.A. 
 32. See infra Parts III, V.C, VI. 
 33. See infra Parts V, VI. 
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or deploy an alternative technique, such as manual coding, and (2) 
clarify several aspects of the contract interpretation caselaw. 
Part II of this Article briefly describes the textualist and 
contextualist approaches to contract interpretation and summarizes the 
policy debate over which approach best minimizes enforcement costs.34 
Part III reviews the advantages and disadvantages of using the Key 
Number System as a data collection and coding device that were 
discussed in Article One.35 Part IV contains a synopsis of the empirical 
study set forth in my prior article.36 Part V describes the four additional 
proposed studies and explains why I did not finish three of the projects.37 
Part VI discusses the specific methodology and results of the completed 
study.38 Finally, Part VII contains some closing thoughts.39 
II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
A. The Textualist and Contextualist Approaches 
The purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intentions 
of the parties at the time the agreement was formed.40 To accomplish this 
goal, textualist courts follow what is called the “plain meaning rule” or 
“four-corners rule.” That rule sets forth a two-stage process. During the 
first stage, the court assesses whether the contract is ambiguous. An 
ambiguity exists when the relevant contractual language is “reasonably 
susceptible” to more than one meaning. The ambiguity determination is 
a question of law for the judge. In making that determination, the judge 
may consider only the contract itself; the investigation is restricted to the 
“four corners” of the document. If the court concludes that the contract 
is unambiguous, it simply applies the unambiguous, “plain meaning” of 
the language to the facts of the case. The judge never reviews any 
extrinsic evidence. If the court decides that the contract is ambiguous, 
then the case moves to the second stage—resolving the ambiguity. At 
that stage, interpretation is a question of fact and extrinsic evidence 
regarding the intent of the parties may be considered. When the parties 
                                                          
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
 37. See infra Part V. 
 38. See infra Part VI. 
 39. See infra Part VII. 
 40. This subpart is an abbreviated version of the overview of the contract interpretation 
caselaw set forth in Article One. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 253-61. The description of 
interpretation doctrine in that article is more detailed and contains extensive citations to primary and 
secondary authority. See id. 
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do not submit any extrinsic evidence, or when the evidence presented is 
so one-sided that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
contract’s meaning, then the judge resolves the ambiguity, typically via 
summary judgment. If the parties submit extrinsic evidence and a 
reasonable jury could rule for either side, then the jury resolves the 
ambiguity at trial.41 
Contextualism generally involves the same two-stage process. But 
the contextualist approach differs in the method used to establish 
whether a contract is ambiguous. According to this view, both the 
language of the agreement and extrinsic evidence are relevant in 
deciding if an ambiguity exists. In other words, at stage one, the judge 
must consider extrinsic evidence proffered by the parties, something 
prohibited by textualism. However, the ambiguity issue is still a question 
of law for the judge.42 
Both textualist and contextualist courts consider all extrinsic 
evidence at stage two once a contract is determined to be ambiguous. 
The touchstone of their disagreement is whether evidence may be 
considered during stage one in making the ambiguity determination: 
Textualism only recognizes patent ambiguities (also known as facial or 
intrinsic ambiguities), which are ambiguities that appear within the four 
corners of a written agreement; contextualism recognizes both patent 
and latent (or extrinsic) ambiguities, the latter of which become apparent 
only upon the review of extrinsic evidence.43 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 255-56. 
 42. Id. at 256-57. 
 43. Id. at 257-58. While this is generally an apt explanation, there is an important 
qualification. Textualist courts do recognize one type of latent ambiguity—what one might call 
“subject-matter latent ambiguities.” These are ambiguities that result when the language of the 
contract is applied to the real world—typically, to the subject matter of the agreement: “Latent 
ambiguity can arise where language, clear on its face, fails to resolve an uncertainty when 
juxtaposed with circumstances in the world that the language is supposed to govern.” Charter Oil 
Co. v. Am. Emp’rs’ Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1995); accord Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 259 P.3d 595, 601 (Idaho 2011) (“A latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear 
on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the facts as they exist.”). 
  The paradigms of subject-matter latent ambiguity are where language in a contract is 
intended to identify a single item in the world, but instead: (1) two or more items fit the description; 
or (2) nothing in the world fits the description. See University City v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
114 F.2d 288, 295-96 (8th Cir. 1940) (“A latent ambiguity may be one in which the description of 
the property is clear upon the face of the instrument, but it turns out that there is more than one 
estate to which the description applies; or it may be one where the property is imperfectly or in 
some respects erroneously described, so as not to refer with precision to any particular object.”); see 
also Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 245 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Idaho 1952) (“Where a writing 
contains a reference to an object or thing, . . . and it is shown by extrinsic evidence that there are 
two or more things or objects . . . to which [the writing] might properly apply, a latent ambiguity 
arises.” (citations omitted)). The classic example is the case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1916) 159 
Eng. Rep. 375. There, the parties’ contract provided, in perfectly clear terms, that certain cotton 
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would arrive on the ship “Peerless.” Id. at 375-76. But there were two ships with that name, creating 
an ambiguity that only became apparent when the language of the agreement was applied to the 
subject matter of the contract—the cotton on the ship “Peerless.” Id. 
  There is a compelling conceptual argument that textualist jurisdictions have no choice but 
to allow for subject-matter latent ambiguities. Judge Posner explains: “The contract’s words point 
out to the real world, and the real world may contain features that make seemingly clear words, 
sentences, and even entire documents ambiguous.” Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of 
Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1597-98 (2005) (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 
Eng. Rep.). Not surprisingly then, numerous authorities from textualist states recognize this type of 
latent ambiguity. See, e.g., Eureka Water Co. v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., 690 F.3d 1139, 1152-
53 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying Oklahoma law and explaining that subject-matter latent ambiguities 
are an exception to the general rule that extrinsic evidence may not be used to interpret a facially 
unambiguous contract); Knipe Land Co., 259 P.3d at 601 (“Although parol evidence generally 
cannot be submitted to contradict, vary, add or subtract from the terms of a written agreement that is 
deemed unambiguous on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a [subject-matter] 
latent ambiguity appears.”); Teig v. Suffolk Oral Surgery Assocs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (App. 
Div. 2003) (“Even where an agreement seems clear on its face, a ‘latent ambiguity’ may exist by 
reason of ‘the ambiguous or obscure state of extrinsic circumstances to which the words of the 
instrument refer.’” (quoting Lerner v. Lerner, 508 N.Y.S.2d 191, 194 (App. Div. 1986))); 
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. McDade + Co., 926 S.W.2d 280, 282-83 (Tex. 1996) (“A latent ambiguity 
exists when a contract is unambiguous on its face, but fails by reason of some collateral matter 
when it is applied to the subject matter with which it deals.”). And subject-matter latent ambiguities 
frequently arise with respect to contracts that contain real estate descriptions. See, e.g., Emerald 
Pointe, L.L.C. v. Jonak, 202 S.W.3d 652, 659 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“Where an uncertainty in the 
description of land conveyed does not appear upon the face of the deed but evidence discloses that 
the description applies equally to two or more parcels, a latent ambiguity is said to exist and 
extrinsic evidence or parol evidence is admissible to show which tract or parcel of land was 
intended.” (quoting Wolf v. Miravalle, 372 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo. 1963))); Meyer v. Stout, 914 
N.Y.S.2d 834, 836-37 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that a deed for the sale of land contained a latent 
ambiguity because an easement description set forth in the deed improperly referenced property that 
the seller did not actually own); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 
517, 520 n.4 (Tex. 1995) (setting forth the following hypothetical to illustrate the concept of a latent 
ambiguity: “if a contract called for goods to be delivered to ‘the green house on Pecan Street,’ and 
there were in fact two green houses on the street, it would be latently ambiguous”).  
  Non-subject-matter latent ambiguities—the type that should be recognized only by 
contextualist jurisdictions—typically occur when the contracting parties use a word or phrase in an 
unconventional way, such as when they employ a special industry dialect. See RICHARD LORD, 12 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 34:1, at 8-9 (4th ed. 2012) (“Indeed, often terms that are unambiguous 
on their face may be ambiguous or have a different meaning as a matter of fact, as when the terms 
have both an ordinary meaning and a special trade meaning.”). This second category of latent 
ambiguities might usefully be described as “non-standard-meaning latent ambiguities.” To illustrate, 
in Western States Construction Co. v. United States, the issue was whether a contract provision 
concerning “metallic pipes” applied to pipes made of cast iron. 26 Cl. Ct. 818, 819-20 (1992). The 
court explained that while the “dictionary definition of ‘metallic pipes’ would embrace [pipes made 
of cast iron],” a latent ambiguity was established by extrinsic evidence of an industry trade usage 
that the phrase “metallic pipes” excludes pipe made of cast iron. Id. at 826. 
  Note that “subject-matter latent ambiguity” and “non-standard-meaning latent ambiguity” 
are phrases that I created to provide greater conceptual clarity. They are not employed in the 
caselaw or the secondary literature. In part, that is because many courts, especially those in 
contextualist jurisdictions, do not carefully distinguish between the different categories of latent 
ambiguity. And even courts that do draw such a line sometimes conflate subject-matter and non-
standard-meaning latent ambiguities. See, e.g., Mind & Motion Utah Invs., L.L.C. v. Celtic Bank 
Corp., 367 P.3d 994, 1004-05 (Utah 2016) (defining a latent ambiguity as an ambiguity that results 
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It is important to keep in mind that this basic framework is a 
considerable oversimplification of the caselaw. Both contextualism and 
textualism can be subdivided in various ways. And the law of contract 
interpretation is extraordinarily convoluted.44 As a result, most states fall 
on a spectrum between pure textualism and pure contextualism, rather 
than firmly on one side or the other.45 
Like the courts, contracts scholars can also generally be split into 
textualist and contextualist camps, with a clear majority falling into the 
latter group. But commentators have also proposed positions that do not 
fit precisely into the textualist-contextualist continuum. For example, 
some believe that different interpretive approaches should be applied to 
different types of contracts, often distinguishing commercial agreements 
between businesses from consumer and employment agreements.46 
B. The Enforcement Costs Policy Debate 
Judges and commentators have advanced a wide array of 
conceptual, theoretical, and empirical arguments in support of textualism 
and contextualism. But the debate has focused on three basic topics: (1) 
interpretive accuracy; (2) transaction costs; and (3) enforcement costs.47 
For example, on the issue of which approach results in more accurate 
interpretations, textualists assert that the express terms of a contract are 
the best evidence of contractual intent. This follows, in part, from their 
claim that extrinsic evidence is often unreliable, contradictory, and/or 
vague. Therefore, reducing the role of extrinsic evidence in the 
interpretive process heightens accuracy. Contextualists counter that 
meaning can only be determined by considering the context in which 
                                                          
when a contract is “applied or executed,” but then stating that a latent ambiguity can exist when 
evidence of “trade usage, course of dealing, or some other linguistic particularity” demonstrates that 
the terms of the contract “fail to reflect the parties’ intentions”). 
  Finally, as should be expected, the distinction between the two classes of latent ambiguity 
blurs on the margins. In re Soper’s Estate is a case that probably could be placed into either 
category. See 264 N.W. 427, 428-29, 431-33 (Minn. 1935) (A contract provided that the benefits of 
an insurance policy were to be paid to the “wife” of one party if the party died; the party had 
previously deserted his wife, had pretended suicide, and was bigamously married to a second 
woman at the time the contract was executed; the court held that the party intended to make the 
second woman the beneficiary, even though legally the first woman was clearly his “wife.”). 
 44. As Professor Eric Posner described it, “[i]n virtually every jurisdiction, one finds 
irreconcilable cases, frequent changes in doctrine, confusion, and cries of despair.” Eric A. Posner, 
The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contract Interpretation, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998). 
 45. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 258-60. 
 46. Id. at 261. 
 47. Id. at 262-63. As with Part II.A, this Subpart is an abbreviated version of the summary of 
the interpretation policy debate contained in Article One. See id. at 261-84. Once again, I have 
removed considerable detail and most citations to supporting authority. 
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language is used. Extrinsic evidence is thus essential to reaching the 
proper construction of an agreement.48 The rest of this Subpart focuses 
on the debate over enforcement costs because that is the subject of the 
empirical studies in both Article One and this Article. 
Textualist courts and scholars have regularly pressed the argument 
that litigation expenses are higher under contextualism. The claim has 
two components: Enforcement costs are greater in a contextualist regime 
because (1) there are more lawsuits, and (2) the lawsuits that are filed 
last longer.49 
Start by recalling that a much broader range of material is relevant 
in deciding whether a contract is ambiguous under contextualism. 
Textualism recognizes only patent ambiguities. Thus, when attempting 
to convince a textualist court that a contract is reasonably susceptible to 
more than one meaning, a party may rely solely upon the language 
within the four corners of the agreement. The judge is barred from 
considering any other evidence.50 Contextualism recognizes both patent 
and latent ambiguities. Accordingly, a party appearing before a 
contextualist court may use the language of the agreement as well as the 
various types of extrinsic evidence in attempting to establish the 
existence of an ambiguity.51 Next, remember that textualists maintain 
that extrinsic evidence is frequently unreliable, contradictory, and/or 
vague.52 This means that contextualism both dramatically increases the 
quantity of relevant interpretive material that courts must consider at the 
ambiguity stage and reduces the quality of the material that goes into the 
ambiguity determination. These two features of contextualism raise 
enforcement costs from the textualist baseline through five pathways.53 
First, textualism incentivizes parties to write good contracts—
contracts that contain few gaps and employ precise language. That is 
because in any post-execution dispute over the agreement’s meaning, the 
                                                          
 48. For more on the issue of accuracy, see id. at 263-68. For my discussion of transaction 
costs, see id. at 268-70; see also id. at 278-83 (setting forth additional policy arguments that do not 
fit squarely into the accuracy/transaction costs/enforcement costs framework). 
 49. Id. at 270. As used here, “last longer” denotes more than the mere passage of time. Rather, 
it means moving into later stages of the litigation process, with each stage requiring new activities 
that entail the expenditure of resources. Note also that the number of lawsuits filed and the length of 
those suits are only indirect measures of enforcement costs. Directly quantifying such costs would 
require analyzing party and court expenditures on items like attorney’s fees, taxable costs, filing 
fees, and time spent by the judiciary addressing interpretation disputes. Nonetheless, there appears 
to be almost universal agreement that the number of actions brought and how long those actions last 
are sufficient proxies. Id. at 270 n.378.  
 50. See supra Part II.A. 
 51. See supra Part II.A. 
 52. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 53. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 270-71. 
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judge will look no further than the four corners of the document at the 
first stage of the interpretive process. If the court finds the contract to be 
facially unambiguous, any understandings of the parties not expressly 
reduced to writing will be inoperative since the parties may not present 
extrinsic evidence to explain, supplement, or qualify a clear agreement. 
Contextualism has the opposite effect. It encourages parties to draft poor 
contracts—contracts with more open terms and ambiguities—because 
the parties know that should a dispute arise over construction, they can 
submit extrinsic evidence to address the issue. A badly written contract 
raises the likelihood of an interpretive disagreement that can result in a 
lawsuit. And it also increases the chances that the judge will find the 
contract to be ambiguous if a case is filed, requiring that the action 
proceed to stage two of the interpretation process. Accordingly, 
contextualism increases both the number of lawsuits that are commenced 
and the length of those proceedings in comparison to textualism.54 
Second, it is much more difficult for contextualist courts to decide 
contract interpretation cases on the pleadings. Since a party is entitled to 
argue that an agreement is ambiguous via extrinsic evidence, the court 
generally must permit discovery so that such evidence can be gathered. 
Therefore, the ambiguity determination typically can be made no earlier 
than at the summary judgment stage. Third, it is easier to establish that a 
contract is ambiguous when extrinsic evidence is available because the 
parties have more material out of which to craft reasonable constructions 
of the operative language. And contextualism motivates parties to invest 
heavily in the search for evidence that can support their preferred 
construction of the contract. Given the second and third points, lawsuits 
will usually last longer when courts employ contextualist methodology; 
more cases will reach discovery, summary judgment, and trial. In 
addition, the parties are more likely to file a lawsuit to begin with since 
those challenging the apparently clear terms of a contract stand a better 
chance of surviving the ambiguity stage and making it to a jury than if 
the courts use textualism.55 
Fourth, the quantity and quality of the extrinsic evidence available 
under contextualism make it more difficult to predict how judges will 
resolve the ambiguity question. Parties do not know which contractual 
language or other evidence the court is likely to find dispositive. And, if 
no lawsuit has been filed yet, neither party will even have access to all of 
the materials the judge is going to consider since discovery will not have 
started. Fifth, as noted in the previous paragraph, interpretation cases are 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 269-74. 
 55. Id. at 271-72. 
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more likely to reach trial under contextualism than under textualism. 
Jury trials are considered notoriously difficult to predict. It is generally 
accepted that adjudicative uncertainty increases litigation. Therefore, the 
uncertainty contextualism creates at the ambiguity stage (pathway four) 
and through the greater number of trials (pathway five) increases the 
likelihood that parties will file a lawsuit. In addition, because uncertainty 
reduces the probability of settlement, contextualism tends to lengthen 
any interpretation litigation that is commenced.56 
Some contextualists disagree with the above analysis and contend 
instead that textualism has higher enforcement costs.57 They offer the 
following arguments in defense of their position. First, because 
textualism prohibits the review of extrinsic evidence when determining 
whether an agreement is ambiguous, the principal inputs at stage one are 
(1) the contract, and (2) the judge. But judges have varying backgrounds 
and fields of experience. Such differences can lead them to reach 
disparate conclusions regarding the same contractual language. Indeed, 
one commentator contends that “[a]ppellate courts’ reviews of four 
corner determinations are often arbitrary and extremely subjective.”58 
Critically, the parties will not know which trial judge is going to 
interpret their contract until a lawsuit is filed. Nor will they know which 
appellate judges are going to be assigned to the case if the dispute 
subsequently reaches a higher court. This makes it immensely difficult 
for parties to predict the results of ambiguity decisions in textualist 
jurisdictions. Such uncertainty increases the number of lawsuits and 
hinders settlements.59 
Second, in many cases, extrinsic evidence can show that a contract 
that appears ambiguous on its face is actually perfectly clear. “[M]ost 
words have several meanings in the abstract (acontextually). With a 
[little] context, we may know easily which meaning is apt.”60 As a result, 
contextualism may well decrease the number of lawsuits in which the 
court finds the contract to be ambiguous, reducing the length of these 
actions and promoting greater certainty.61 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 272-74. 
 57. Id. at 276. 
 58. 6 PETER LINZER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.14[B] at 163 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. 
ed. 2010). 
 59. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 276. 
 60. BURTON, supra note 1, at 210. 
 61. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 277. In hindsight, I now think that this argument is clearly 
incorrect, at least as applied to textualism and contextualism in their pure forms. Let me explain. 
The argument presumes that the court is faced with a patently ambiguous agreement. Once a 
textualist court determines that a contract is ambiguous on its face at the pleading stage, the case 
proceeds to discovery and then motions for summary judgment, where all extrinsic evidence may be 
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Third, as noted above, textualism provides parties with an incentive 
to write longer, more complete contracts.62 Such agreements contain 
greater complexity, increasing the chance that terms will conflict or 
otherwise support varying interpretations. That, in turn, makes lawsuits 
concerning interpretive disputes more likely and raises the odds that the  
 
 
                                                          
considered. Contextualism (generally) skips the pleading stage (because there is no need to assess 
patent ambiguity up front), and goes straight to discovery and summary judgment, where again all 
extrinsic evidence may be considered. 
  Now, textualist courts describe summary judgment as being part of stage two—resolving 
the ambiguity—while contextualist courts describe summary judgment as being part of stage one—
the ambiguity determination. This means that, technically, contextualist courts may find a smaller 
fraction of facially ambiguous agreements to be “ambiguous.” That is because when a contextualist 
court concludes a case at the summary judgment stage, the contract is described as being 
“unambiguous” even if the contract was patently ambiguous. A textualist court, by contrast, 
describes a grant of summary judgment when extrinsic evidence is considered to be a resolution of 
the patent ambiguity that was identified at the pleadings stage. Compare Morgan Creek Prods. v. 
Franchise Pictures LLC (In re Franchise Pictures LLC), 389 B.R. 131, 144-45 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2008) (applying California law, which follows contextualism, and explaining that when a court 
grants summary judgment in a contract interpretation dispute, it has concluded that the contract is 
“unambiguous”), with 3Com Corp. v. Banco Do Brasil, S.A., 171 F.3d 739, 743, 746-47 (2d Cir. 
1999) (applying New York law, which follows textualism, and explaining that a “court may resolve 
ambiguity in contractual language as a matter ‘of law’ [upon a motion for summary judgment] if 
‘the evidence presented about the parties’ intended meaning [is] so one-sided that no reasonable 
person could decide the contrary’” (emphasis added) (quoting Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. 
Sec’y of Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 768 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1985))). 
  But summary judgment is summary judgment under both textualism and contextualism, 
regardless of how it is labeled for purposes of contract interpretation doctrine. In other words, under 
each approach, the courts are considering the same text and evidence in deciding the agreement’s 
meaning during summary judgment. Thus, when contextualists argue that their system reduces 
enforcement costs because a judge may use extrinsic evidence at the summary judgment stage to 
clear up the meaning of a patently ambiguous contract, they are not differentiating contextualism 
from textualism because the same process is followed under the latter system, albeit under a 
different label for purposes of contract law (“resolving the ambiguity”). 
  If there is a difference between the two approaches here that implicates enforcement costs, 
it is that contextualist judges (generally) do not spend time assessing whether a contract is patently 
ambiguous at the pleading stage before moving on to discovery, unlike their textualist counterparts. 
This means that contextualism probably does deal more efficiently with patently ambiguous 
agreements, reducing enforcement costs in cases involving that type of contract. But unless we 
know what percentage of contracts are patently ambiguous, the precise scope of these savings is 
unknown. And textualists can counter that their approach is much more efficient when a contract is 
unambiguous on its face because those cases may be disposed of at the pleadings stage under 
textualism, but must proceed to discovery and summary judgment under contextualism. (This is the 
second textualist pathway discussed above. See supra text accompanying note 55.) 
  Despite this analysis, I decided to present the second contextualist argument in the same 
way as I did in my prior article. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 277. That is because (1) the 
argument is often presented in the literature; (2) I wanted to explain the weaknesses of this 
argument; and (3) when textualism and contextualism are not applied in their pure forms, the 
argument may have more force. 
 62. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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judge will find the agreement to be ambiguous, lengthening any 
proceedings that are begun.63 
Fourth, the average person is often angered or even outraged when 
a counter-party insists on the strict application of unambiguous 
contractual language that appears to conflict with the prior contextual 
understanding of the parties. This is especially true when the counter-
party stated during preliminary negotiations that the relevant language 
was of no consequence or would not be relied upon should conditions 
change or a dispute arise. Such conduct may infuriate a consumer or 
business sufficiently to motivate them to sue, or to resist to the point that 
the other side is compelled to file an action. If textualism incentivizes 
parties to stand on language that is inconsistent with the other side’s 
reasonable expectations more than contextualism does—if textualism 
promotes behavior that increases the likelihood that contractual partners 
will become frustrated and accept going to court—then this may be 
another pathway through which textualism increases litigation.64 
Given all of these arguments, who is correct? Are more actions 
filed and do those actions last longer in contextualist jurisdictions? Or do 
textualist states suffer from higher levels of litigation? The question is 
one of empirical fact. Accordingly, the enforcement costs debate can be 
resolved only via empirical research. 
III. THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM  
AS A DATA COLLECTION AND CODING DEVICE65  
Over the last two decades, empirical scholarship on law has become 
an increasingly common and important type of academic work.66 
However, empirical research poses numerous critical challenges,67 
making it considerably more difficult to complete than doctrinal and 
 
                                                          
 63. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 277. 
 64. Id. at 277-78; cf. Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of 
the UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811, 870-71 (explaining that when a party switches from the 
flexible enforcement of its contracts to strict reliance on written terms, “unfairness may 
result . . . that upsets assumptions reasonably based on past practice”). 
 65. As with Part II of this Article, this Part is a streamlined version of material set forth in 
Article One. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 209-53 (containing Parts II and III of that piece). 
 66. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law 
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 151-60 (2006); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to 
the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 483-84, 488 (2009). See 
generally Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 789 
(2002); Symposium, The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (2013). 
 67. See George S. Geis, Automating Contract Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 453-54 (2008); 
Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 810-24 (1999). 
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theoretical scholarship. That helps to explain why law professors have 
produced so few empirical studies of contract interpretation. 
The most important challenge of empirical work for my purposes 
here is that the process of collecting and coding empirical data is usually 
time-consuming and expensive.68 To illustrate, consider projects that 
analyze legal materials obtained either from archives of tangible 
documents or from electronic databases. In such work, the authors or 
their research assistants typically must read and code every judicial 
opinion, contract, or other legal document gathered for the study. If the 
dataset is large, this can require exceptional levels of time and money.69 
For many empirical studies regarding law, data collection and coding 
will necessarily require such a resource-intensive approach. But in some 
circumstances, I believe that the West Key Number System can be used 
to dramatically streamline both aspects of the process, especially the 
coding of data. 
The Key Number System is used to classify headnotes by legal 
subject.70 Headnotes are descriptions of the points of law discussed in a 
judicial opinion.71 West attorneys write headnotes for all decisions  
that are published in its National Reporter System,72 and for selected 
unpublished cases.73 Every headnote is assigned one or more  
key numbers.74 
The Key Number System contains over 400 topics, each of which is 
identified by its own topic number.75 The topics are grouped into seven 
major categories: 1. Persons, 2. Property, 3. Contracts, 4. Torts, 
5. Crimes, 6. Remedies, and 7. Government.76 The topics are also 
divided into subtopics.77 Each subtopic is assigned a unique key 
number.78 “A particular point of law, then, is known by its . . . topic 
name [and number] and by its key number within that topic.”79 There are 
                                                          
 68. ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 128 (2010) (observing that 
coding archival material “can be very time consuming”); George, supra note 66, at 151 (noting that 
data collection is “time-intensive”); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical 
Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 
829 (“Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently labor-intensive and time-consuming and, 
consequently, often quite expensive.” (footnote omitted)). 
 69. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 210-14 (setting forth several examples). 
 70. Id. at 216. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 217, 229. 
 73. Id. at 229 n.149. 
 74. Id. at 217. 
 75. Id. at 216-17. 
 76. Id. at 217. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Fritz Snyder, The West Digest System: The Ninth Circuit and the Montana Supreme 
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over 100,000 distinct key numbers and, as a group, they are intended to 
cover every legal subject that could conceivably be addressed in an 
American civil or criminal action.80 
Sometimes a researcher can exploit data that a third party has 
already gathered and coded.81 Using such data in empirical work is 
called “secondary data-analysis.”82 This type of analysis saves time and 
money because “the hard work of recording the data has already been 
done.”83 The West Key Number System is essentially a scheme for 
coding American caselaw.84 When West’s staff classifies the headnotes 
in an opinion with particular key numbers, they are coding the decision 
by identifying the precise legal issues discussed by the court. This means 
that the universe of cases containing headnote and key number treatment 
is an immense, coded database ripe for mining through secondary data-
analysis.85 By crafting search queries on Westlaw,86 a researcher can 
expeditiously accumulate a massive array of data coded by West’s 
trained professionals, saving the author considerable time and money. 
However, using the Key Number System for data collection and 
coding raises numerous methodological issues. In Article One, I 
explained in detail the strengths and weaknesses of employing key 
numbers for empirical research.87 Several points from that discussion are 
worth reiterating here. 
By far the greatest strength of the Key Number System is the 
resources it saves. When an author uses key numbers for data collection 
and coding, there is no need to individually analyze the relevant judicial 
opinions. That is because West’s attorney-editors have already 
completed all or most of the required coding.88 Other advantages include 
the following. First, key numbers are assigned to cases by independent 
parties (i.e., West’s staff) who have no relationship with the researcher 
or any research hypothesis. This eliminates author bias from the coding 
process.89 Second, the considerable training West’s attorneys receive in 
                                                          
Court, 60 MONT. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1999). 
 80. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 217. 
 81. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 128. 
 82. Id. at 129 (emphasis omitted). 
 83. Id. at 130. 
 84. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 220; accord Ian Gallacher, Mapping the Social Life of the 
Law: An Alternative Approach to Legal Research, 36 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 16-18 (2008) 
(explaining that headnotes “are coded according to the master list” of topics and key numbers 
(emphasis added)). 
 85. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 220 & n.99. 
 86. WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 87. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 226-53. 
 88. Id. at 226. 
 89. Id. at 227. 
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classifying headnotes with key numbers makes them more accurate and 
consistent coders than student research assistants, and perhaps even than 
many authors.90 Third, West’s staff follows careful protocols in 
assigning key numbers to headnotes.91 And fourth, empirical  
studies conducted via the Key Number System are easy to analyze  
and replicate.92 
These benefits must be balanced against several problems with 
using key numbers in empirical scholarship. The signature limitation is 
that generally only published decisions receive key number 
classifications. Such opinions are a tiny subset of the broader 
populations that researchers typically wish to study, such as lawsuits, 
disputes, accidents, and contracts. And there is compelling evidence that 
reported cases are not a representative sample of the larger categories. 
This introduces critical selection bias into datasets created using the Key 
Number System, undercutting the generalizability of any project 
findings.93 But this weakness does not justify abandoning key  
number studies. Social science is valuable even when it is not perfect, 
and numerous, well-regarded empirical studies on law suffer from 
selection bias.94 
The most important of the remaining weaknesses are as follows. 
First, West is not always accurate or consistent in its coding work.95 
Second, judicial opinions that receive key numbers frequently suffer 
from what I call “over-coding”: Key numbers are sometimes included in 
a case even though the subject associated with the key number was not 
actually litigated. This typically happens when a topic is only discussed 
in passing by the court.96 Third, there is considerable overlap between 
many of the key number topics and subtopics. That creates room for 
judgment when West’s staff is making classification decisions. As a 
result, there are countless cases with headnotes that could have been 
classified using one key number, but which were instead classified with 
a different, related key number—either from within the same topic or 
from a completely separate topic. In Article One, I described this 
problem as “under-coding.”97 Fourth, some of the key number topics and 
                                                          
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 228. 
 92. Id. For two additional advantages, see id. at 228-29. 
 93. Id. at 229-41. 
 94. Id. at 241-46. 
 95. Id. at 246-47 (describing accuracy and consistency as two separate problems). 
 96. Id. at 247-48. 
 97. Id. at 248-49. Note also that sometimes a case involving a particular legal subject lacks 
any key numbers related to that subject. See, e.g., Braund, Inc. v. White, 486 P.2d 50, 50, 55-56 
(Alaska 1971) (involving application of the parol evidence rule under the Uniform Commercial 
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subtopics suffer from “overbreadth.” In other words, they cover 
multiple, distinct legal subjects.98 Each of these four problems can 
distort the results of Westlaw searches that are used to measure the 
prevalence of a type of litigation. Fifth, the Key Number System is not 
used to code for numerous elements of judicial opinions. When a 
headnote is classified with a given key number, all this conveys is that a 
particular legal issue was discussed by the court. Critically, many 
empirical studies of caselaw concern features that go beyond the subject 
matter of the litigation.99 Sixth, Westlaw caps the number of characters 
(including spaces) that may be included in a search of its database at 
600. That restriction will prevent scholars from using the Key Number 
System for empirical studies that necessitate including a very large 
group of key numbers in a single search.100 
As the last four paragraphs imply, whether a key number protocol is 
suitable for a particular project will depend on a variety of theoretical 
and practical factors. For example, key number studies can employ much 
larger datasets than many other types of empirical work because the 
researcher need not spend time reading the cases that make up the 
dataset. But key number classifications only capture a narrow range of 
information about judicial opinions and may lack the necessary level of 
precision due to over-coding, overbreadth, and under-coding. By 
comparison, carefully reading cases or similar materials enables a 
scholar to gather richer data and can address many precision concerns. 
But completing such work requires the expenditure of considerably more 
resources and typically entails using a much smaller sample size. In 
deciding between a key number study and an alternative methodology, 
scholars must consider these types of trade-offs. 
IV. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TEXTUALIST 
AND CONTEXTUALIST APPROACHES ON ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
Recall the policy issue my study in Article One was designed to 
address. Textualists contend that enforcement costs are lower under their 
approach to contract interpretation than under contextualism.101 
Contextualists counter that their system best minimizes litigation 
                                                          
Code (“UCC”), but not tagged with any key numbers concerning contracts, sales, or evidence; 
headnotes were only classified with procedure-related key numbers, namely Appeal and Error (topic 
30) and Judgment (topic 228)). 
 98. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 250. 
 99. Id. at 251-52. 
 100. Id. at 252. For three other weaknesses, see id. at 249-51. 
 101. Id. at 284. 
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expenses.102 There are two basic components to enforcement costs: (1) 
the number of lawsuits filed, and (2) how long those lawsuits last. Each 
side maintains that it is superior on both elements; each asserts that 
fewer actions are commenced and that those actions end more quickly 
under its approach, reducing total enforcement costs.103 
Accordingly, there are two hypotheses that merit empirical testing: 
the textualist hypothesis and the contextualist counter-hypothesis. For 
each, the causal or independent variable is the school of interpretation 
employed by the courts and the dependent variables are the quantity of 
lawsuits filed and the length of those actions. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no difference between textualism and contextualism in their 
impacts on the number of contract interpretation lawsuits commenced 
and how long those cases last. 
To conduct the original study, I began by identifying ten states 
where the caselaw appeared sufficiently clear to support including the 
jurisdiction rather firmly in either the textualist or contextualist camp.104 
I sought five states for each category.105 And the ultimate classifications 
were based upon my own review of the doctrine in each jurisdiction.106 
The textualist group contained Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New York 
and Texas.107 The contextualist group contained Arizona, California, 
Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington.108 
I turned next to the selection of key numbers for my Westlaw 
searches. There are thirty-three topics that fall under the general 
category of “Contracts,”109 and many of these topics contain key 
numbers that relate to interpretation. Examples include Sales, Insurance, 
Compromise and Settlement, and Release.110 In addition, numerous 
topics classified under the other categories—Persons, Property, Torts, 
Remedies, and Government—implicate contracts.111 To illustrate, issues 
relating to damages for breach of contract are coded almost exclusively 
under the Damages topic, which is contained in the Remedies 
                                                          
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 284-85. 
 104. Id. at 286. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 286 tbl.2. 
 108. Id. at 286 & tbl.2. (also discussing two additional standards I employed in the state 
selection process: (1) each state needed to have an intermediate appellate court, and (2) the two 
groups of states had to be of roughly comparable size in terms of population). 
 109. THOMSON REUTERS, WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, at XI (2017) [hereinafter 
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW]. 
 110. Id. at 293 (Compromise and Settlement); id. at 977-78 (Insurance); id. at 1540-41 
(Release); id. at 1558 (Sales). 
 111. See id. at IX to XIV. 
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category.112 Principally because this was my first attempt at using the 
Key Number System as a coding device, I decided to focus on the core 
key numbers relating to contracts, contract interpretation, and the parol 
evidence rule, rather than construct a dataset using all potentially 
relevant key numbers. 
The label “Contracts” is used both for the third general category 
and for a distinct topic—”95. Contracts.”113 I concentrated on that topic 
and on “157. Evidence,” which falls under the Remedies category,114 
since one section of the Evidence key numbers concerns both the parol 
evidence rule and the use of extrinsic evidence in the construction of 
contracts and other writings.115 I incorporated the key numbers that 
govern the parol evidence rule because of that rule’s extremely close 
relationship to contract interpretation. All other topics and subtopics 
were excluded from the study.116 
I then analyzed the various interpretation and parol evidence rule 
key numbers under topics 95 (Contracts) and 157 (Evidence) to identify 
precisely which key numbers should be used in my ultimate searches.117 
After completing this, I organized the selected key numbers into three 
groups: (1) contract interpretation key numbers from the Contracts topic, 
(2) contract interpretation key numbers from the Evidence topic, and (3) 
parol evidence rule key numbers from the Evidence topic.118 Using these 
groups, I constructed three search queries for each state.119 The first 
query contained only the key numbers in group (1). The second 
contained the key numbers in groups (1) and (2). And the third contained 
the key numbers in all three groups—(1), (2), and (3).120 The three 
queries were run in both the relevant state database and the relevant 
mixed state/federal database, so there were actually six searches in total 
for each jurisdiction.121 The results of the six searches served as proxies 
for the level of contract interpretation litigation in each state during the 
time period of the study—the ten-year period from January 1, 2000, 
through December 31, 2009.122 
 
                                                          
 112. Id. at XII, 568-76. 
 113. Id. at XI, XV. 
 114. Id. at XII, XVI. 
 115. Id. at 715-19 (“XI. Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings.”). 
 116. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 287. 
 117. Id. at 288. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 288, 294. 
1032 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1011 
At this juncture, there was still one piece missing. I could not 
simply compare the search results from the textualist states to those from 
the contextualist states. That is because there are far too many 
differences between the ten jurisdictions included in my study to make 
such a comparison fruitful—differences in population, business activity, 
the number of contracts executed per person, litigation culture, rules of 
procedures, opinion publishing practices, and countless others. 
Therefore, I needed to add something to the study that attempts to 
control for the differences among the ten states.123 
The control I decided to employ was a search in every relevant 
Westlaw database for all cases that use any key number from the 
Contracts topic (topic 95).124 This search served as a proxy for the total 
level of contract litigation in each state during the study time period.125 
With the addition of this query, I could compare the cases coded for 
contract interpretation to the cases coded as contract disputes generally. 
If textualism and contextualism—in relation to each other—do not 
impact how many lawsuits are filed or how long those lawsuits last, then 
one might reasonably expect the ratio of contract interpretation cases to 
general contract cases to be roughly the same in textualist and 
contextualist states. Put another way, if the ratio of cases returned by my 
three queries to the cases returned by the control search is constant for 
textualist and contextualist states, then the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Alternatively, if the fraction of contracts cases that are 
interpretation cases is higher in contextualist jurisdictions by a 
statistically significant amount, this suggests that (i) parties file more 
interpretation lawsuits in contextualist states, (ii) the interpretation 
lawsuits in those states last longer, as demonstrated by the fact that more 
reach the appellate level or otherwise result in a reported decision, or 
(iii) some combination of the two. And the reverse is true if the fraction 
is higher in textualist states by a statistically significant level.126 
I chose cases classified with a key number from topic 95 as the 
control for three reasons. First, I wanted the study to rely as much as 
possible on key number searches. Second, a control that focuses on 
reported decisions reduces the likelihood that any differences in opinion 
publishing practices across state lines will bias my results. That is 
because such differences should apply equally to contract interpretation 
cases and general contract cases. Third, numerous other factors that vary 
among the states in my study—such as population, contracts executed 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 289. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 289-90. 
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per person, and rules of procedure—probably impact the levels of 
contract interpretation litigation and general contract litigation in many 
of the same ways. Thus, comparing interpretation cases specifically to 
contract cases generally should control for a large number of differences 
between the relevant states.127 Of course, the control is far from perfect 
(as discussed more below). Nonetheless, I think it is the best candidate 
given the purposes of this project.128 
There were five additional concerns with my initial study,129 but 
only three are worth reviewing here. First, under-coding may have 
                                                          
 127. Some elaboration is in order. The control was selected in part for its ability to address 
both confounding variables and what I will describe as “measurement problems.” A confounding 
variable is “a variable omitted from a study but that does affect the phenomenon under investigation 
thereby potentially leading to a false positive result.” LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 406. In the 
context of my project, confounding variables are causal forces—other than whether the state 
employs textualism or contextualism—that impact the level of contract interpretation litigation in a 
given state. Examples include the population of the jurisdiction, the scope of business activity, rules 
of procedure, and litigation culture. To properly assess any causal relationship between interpretive 
approach (the independent variable) and the quantity of interpretation litigation (the dependent 
variable), the study protocol must “control” for such confounding variables. See id. at 30-32. Failing 
to do so undermines the “internal validity” of the study. Avani Mehta Sood, Applying Empirical 
Psychology to Inform Courtroom Adjudication—Potential Contributions and Challenges, 130 
HARV. L. REV. F. 301, 309 (2017) (“The internal validity of a study—the extent to which a variable 
of interest can be said to cause an observed effect—depends on tightly controlling for confounding 
factors that could otherwise be driving the effect.”). The primary purpose behind the control 
searches was to control for confounding variables. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27; infra 
text accompanying notes 127-28. Indeed, that is why I call them “control searches.” 
  Confounding variables must be distinguished from measurement problems. The latter are 
problems associated with measuring the level of a type of litigation by relying exclusively on the 
key number coding of judicial opinions in a given Westlaw database. Examples include (1) over-
coding, (2) overbreadth, (3) under-coding, and (4) the problem of foreign law. See supra text 
accompanying notes 96-98. To illustrate using my study, the Westlaw searches for interpretation 
decisions returned some cases that did not actually concern contract interpretation because of the 
problems of over-coding and overbreadth. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35. Likewise, the 
queries also returned some opinions that involved the law of the wrong jurisdiction. See infra notes 
136-39 and accompanying text. 
  Critically, my control searches likely controlled for certain measurement problems in 
much the same way they controlled for confounding variables. To illustrate, if state A’s courts write 
longer opinions that focus more on background principles than state B’s courts, then there will 
generally be more over-coding in state A than in state B. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 248. But 
to the extent such variations in opinion drafting practices exist, they likely apply to both 
interpretation cases and other types of contract cases. If that is so, then my control search filtered 
out any mismeasurement bias created by over-coding. That is because my study centered on 
comparing the ratio of interpretation cases to contract cases in textualist states with the ratio in 
contextualist states. See supra text accompanying notes 124-26; Silverstein, supra note 12, at 289-
91, 295 tbl.3, 296 tbl.4, 297. If interpretation cases and other contract cases suffer from comparable 
degrees of over-coding in a given state, then both the numerator and the denominator will increase 
by the same percentage, leaving the ratio of interpretation opinions to contract opinions unchanged 
in that jurisdiction despite the over-coding. 
 128. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 290-91. 
 129. Id. at 291-94. 
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impacted my study results because I (1) used only interpretation and 
parol evidence rule key numbers in topics 95 (Contracts) and 157 
(Evidence) to gather interpretation decisions, and (2) used only topic 95 
to gather contract decisions.130 Accordingly, I excluded numerous cases 
that involve interpretation specifically or contracts generally. The 
precise impact of the under-coding is unclear.131 Indeed, one of the 
purposes of the current Article is to conduct a broader study that 
addresses this under-coding concern.132 
Second, my key number searches retrieved a considerable number 
of cases for the interpretation datasets that did not actually involve 
contract construction.133 The searches did so for two reasons. First, a 
number of decisions were retrieved because of over-coding: West’s staff 
added the pertinent interpretation key numbers to the opinions even 
though the legal subjects associated with those key numbers were not 
litigated; they were merely discussed by the courts. Second, additional 
cases were included because of the problem of overbreadth: several of 
the interpretation key numbers I used in the searches concern the 
construction of both contracts and other legal documents. Thus, some of 
the opinions pulled for the datasets focused on the interpretation of 
alternative types of writings, such as wills. I ran various tests to 
determine the levels of over-coding and overbreadth. While the tests did 
not yield identical results, the outcome of the most comprehensive test 
suggests that over-coding and overbreadth probably impacted my 
interpretation datasets in substantially the same ways.134 Nonetheless, 
given the inconsistency in my test findings, it is possible that over-
coding and overbreadth distorted my results by affecting one group of 
states more than the other.135 
Third, my study addressed how a jurisdiction’s approach to 
construing contracts impacts the level of interpretation litigation in that 
territory.136 But courts located in one state often apply the law of another 
state or federal law, and my queries did not filter out such cases. 
Therefore, it is possible that the search results were corrupted by 
opinions applying foreign law. As with the problems of over-coding and 
overbreadth, I used a variety of techniques to test for the incidence of 
foreign law decisions in the interpretation datasets. These tests support 
                                                          
 130. Id. at 291. 
 131. Id. at 292. 
 132. See infra Part V.B. 
 133. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 292. 
 134. Id. at 292-93. 
 135. Id. at 293. For details regarding the most comprehensive test I ran, see id. at 293 n.475. 
 136. Id. at 293. 
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two conclusions. First, virtually every interpretation case retrieved by 
my searches that concerns foreign law was filed in federal court.137 This 
means that the study findings based solely on state court decisions were 
almost certainly not biased by the incidence of foreign law authorities in 
the interpretation datasets. Second, there were substantially more federal 
cases applying foreign law in the contextualist states than in the 
textualist states.138 Foreign law opinions may thus have biased the study 
results derived from searches for a combination of state and federal 
interpretation decisions.139 
Before turning to the results of the study, it is worth reiterating that 
I relied solely on the Key Number System for the data coding in this 
project. I did not exclude from or include in the dataset a single case 
based on my own analysis of the opinion. To construct my coded dataset 
of 8113 cases, I simply identified the correct Westlaw search queries. 
Employing the West Key Number System in this manner dramatically 
sped up my work and made the cost of the study negligible.140 
The six Westlaw searches I ran for each state returned data that I 
organized into twelve distinct comparisons of the litigation levels in the 
textualist and contextualist groups.141 My statisticians then ran t-tests on 
each of the twelve comparisons and logistic regressions on two, leading 
to a total of fourteen measures. The two logistic regressions found no 
statistically significant difference between the contextualist and 
textualist jurisdictions. And the t-tests also found no statistically 
significant difference for eleven of twelve measures. On the twelfth 
measure, there was a higher level of litigation in textualist states that was 
statistically significant at the .05 level. But since eleven of twelve t-tests 
and both logistic regressions failed to find a statistically significant 
difference, the ultimate conclusion of this study was that the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected: The study could not reject the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between textualism and 
 
                                                          
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. Let me highlight again that the tests for over-coding, overbreadth, and foreign law that 
I ran while writing Article One only concerned the interpretation datasets, not the control datasets. 
While working on the current piece, I ran some additional tests for bias in the control groups from 
my original study, focusing on the problem of foreign law cases. The results of that testing are 
mixed. On the one hand, decisions containing markers that they concerned foreign law did not 
appear with equal incidence in the contextualist and textualist control datasets. On the other hand, to 
some degree, this difference balanced out the variation between the textualist and contextualist 
interpretation datasets, limiting the biasing effect of foreign law cases. The precise searches I ran to 
conduct the tests and the results of the tests are on file with the Author. 
 140. Id. at 208-09, 294. 
 141. Id. at 295 tbl.3, 296 tbl.4, 297-98, 298 tbl.5. 
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contextualism in their impacts on the number of contract interpretation 
lawsuits filed and the length of those proceedings.142 
After setting forth these results in Article One, I discussed several 
potential explanations for the study findings.143 I began with 
methodological problems—grounds upon which one could challenge the 
validity of the study structure and thus the ultimate conclusions.144 First, 
recall the many limitations identified above regarding the use of key 
numbers for data collection and coding, such as selection bias, under-
coding, and over-coding.145 Those are all important weaknesses with my 
protocol.146 Second, because the contract interpretation caselaw is 
extremely convoluted, most states are not purely textualist or 
contextualist. They instead fall somewhere along the continuum between 
the two extremes.147 Accordingly, the states I chose for the study might 
be too similar in their interpretive practices for any differences between 
textualism and contextualism to show up in the results.148 Third, my 
control query—a search for all cases using a topic 95 (Contracts) key 
number—likely controlled for numerous differences between the 
jurisdictions in the study.149 But the query could not control for 
variations in contract law beyond the subfield of interpretation—
variations that could impact the level of general contract litigation in 
each state.150 Differences in general contract doctrine across jurisdictions 
thus might have corrupted my study findings by distorting the results of 
the control searches.151 Fourth, views about the law can influence human 
behavior in ways that make it difficult to empirically measure the 
impacts of contrasting legal standards.152 For example, suppose that 
sophisticated parties believe that enforcement costs are lower under 
textualism than under contextualism. These parties might employ 
techniques (such as choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses) that 
increase the probability that textualist rules will govern their contracts—
especially the contracts that are more likely to result in an interpretive 
dispute. That would mean that a disproportionate amount of 
                                                          
 142. Id. at 298-300, app. 2 at 317-24. 
 143. See id. at 300-07. 
 144. See id. at 300-05.  
 145. See supra notes 93-100, 123-39 and accompanying text. 
 146. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 300. 
 147. Id. at 301; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying discussion. 
 148. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 301. 
 149. Id. at 302-03. 
 150. Id. at 303. 
 151. Id.; see also infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text (discussing this problem in detail 
in the context of Study Four). 
 152. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 303. 
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interpretation litigation is commenced in textualist territories, 
complicating any efforts to accurately compare enforcement costs under 
the two interpretive approaches. If contracting persons are in fact 
changing their behavior because of their beliefs about the impacts of the 
caselaw, then it may be extremely difficult or even impossible to 
measure the actual impacts of textualism and contextualism.153 
I also examined the possibility that I did not find a statistically 
significant difference in the level of enforcement costs between 
textualism and contextualism because such costs are in fact substantially 
the same under the two systems.154 I set forth three potential 
explanations for why this might be the case. First, perhaps all of the 
enforcement cost arguments pressed by textualists and contextualists155 
are false.156 If that is so, then switching between approaches likely has 
no real impact on the number of interpretation actions brought and the 
length of those proceedings.157 Second, maybe the various enforcement 
cost arguments of each side are largely true, but the overall effects of the 
two systems essentially cancel out.158 In other words, when all of the 
possible pathways to increased (or reduced) litigation levels under one 
approach are combined together and weighed against those of the other 
approach, the countervailing forces largely offset.159 A third possibility 
is that the countless other factors that influence whether a lawsuit is filed 
and how long it lasts—such as rules of procedure and the precise 
relationship of the parties—swamp any effect resulting from the 
interpretive system in use by the courts.160 This would mean that even if 
the choice between textualism and contextualism matters to some 
degree, the impacts are too trivial to be measurable.161 
V. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL STUDIES 
The study I completed for Article One—which I shall refer to as 
“Study One”—is merely one project concerning an intricate topic. It is 
generally improper to reach definitive conclusions about complicated 
empirical questions based on a single experiment, even when the 
                                                          
 153. Id. at 303-04. 
 154. See id. at 305-07. 
 155. See supra Part II.B. 
 156. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 305. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 306. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 307. 
 161. Id.  
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research protocol used is largely free of methodological limitations.162 
And as explained in Parts III and IV,163 the protocol I employed in Study 
One has considerable methodological weaknesses. This means that the 
findings set forth in my first piece are far from the last word on the issue 
of contract interpretation enforcement costs. 
Accordingly, in the conclusion to my initial paper, I proposed four 
additional key number studies164 that might shed further light on the 
question of which school of contract construction best reduces the 
number and length of interpretation lawsuits.165 This Part outlines those 
projects (referred to as Studies Two, Three, Four, and Five) and explains 
why only one of them proved feasible. 
The proposed additional studies, as a group, have three broad 
purposes: first, to generate additional evidence regarding the debate over 
interpretation enforcement costs; second, to offer further guidance on 
how to employ the Key Number System for data collection and coding; 
and third, to provide insights regarding empirical research on law 
generally. Given these purposes—and particularly the latter two—even 
the projects that I did not complete warrant analysis here. 
Note that my discussion of Studies Two through Five in this Part is 
generally limited to (1) issues that I did not examine in Article One or in 
earlier sections of this Article, and (2) previously addressed issues that 
apply in a different way to the new projects. Let me explain why I chose 
this approach. Each study presented below is centered on the Key 
Number System. Thus, the general strengths and weaknesses of that 
system as a tool for empirical work apply to Studies Two through Five 
in essentially the same ways that they apply to Study One.166 In addition, 
all of the new projects employ a structure that is similar to my initial 
study—a comparison of the ratio of interpretation cases to general 
contract cases in textualist and contextualist jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
many of the specific advantages and disadvantages of the Study One 
                                                          
 162. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 47 (“Finally, it follows from all of this that no 
individual study will be dispositive of a given research question. It is important that research results 
be replicated.” (footnote omitted)); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study 
of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 155 
(1997) (“Of course, a single study cannot definitely resolve difficult and disputed questions, even 
empirical ones.”). 
 163. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 164. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 308-10. 
 165. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 308; see also LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 47 (“In 
addition, exploring a problem from a number of different angles and using several different methods 
is more useful and informative than is using a single method. Using a variety of approaches allows 
the studies, in combination, to balance out their respective limitations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 166. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text; Silverstein, supra note 12, at 226-53. 
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protocol also apply to the new projects.167 As a result, there is little 
reason to review either (a) the general strengths and weaknesses of the 
Key Number System, or (b) the specific advantages and disadvantages 
of the Study One structure, unless these points apply in new ways with 
respect to one or more of the proposed studies. 
A. Study Two: More States 
Study One involved only ten states—five textualist and five 
contextualist.168 In addition, the states were not selected randomly.169 It 
is thus possible that the territories I used to construct my dataset are not 
representative of all American jurisdictions.170 At the end of Article One, 
I outlined a study using a larger number of states that could partly 
correct for this weakness171—Study Two. This project involves (1) 
running the Westlaw searches from my first project in additional 
territories beyond the initial ten, (2) combining the results of these 
searches with those from Study One, and (3) statistically analyzing the 
expanded dataset. 
Study Two looked daunting from the start. Recall that the contract 
interpretation caselaw is exceptionally convoluted.172 As a result, in 
Study One, it was quite difficult to identify ten states where the doctrine 
appeared sufficiently clear to justify including the jurisdictions firmly in 
either the textualist or contextualist camp.173 Furthermore, the ten states I 
chose for the project were among the easiest to categorize. Identifying 
additional territories was thus going to be more challenging than the 
selection process for Article One. In other words, Study Two is more 
difficult to complete than Study One. Remember also that my 
classification decisions with respect to the original ten states are not 
immune from criticism.174 But as I just noted, the jurisdictions from my 
original study were part of the set that was easiest to label. Accordingly, 
any classification decisions involving new states will likely be more 
vulnerable to challenge. And therefore the results from Study Two might 
be less valid than those from Study One, even though the new project 
involves a larger number of territories. 
                                                          
 167. See supra notes 104-53 and accompanying text; Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286-94, 
300-05. 
 168. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286. 
 169. Id. app. 2 at 317. 
 170. Id. app. 2 at 317-18. 
 171. See id. at 308-09. 
 172. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; Silverstein, supra note 12, at 259-60. 
 173. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 301. 
 174. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text; Silverstein, supra note 12, at 301. 
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Despite these concerns, I spent considerable time analyzing the 
caselaw in an attempt to expand my groups of textualist and 
contextualist states. Based on this research, I identified several 
additional jurisdictions that seem to fall squarely in the textualist camp. 
But I was unable to locate any other contextualist states that meet the 
parameters of my study. Expanding only the textualist set has  
little research value. Accordingly, I determined that Study Two is  
not feasible. 
To elaborate, my research uncovered only three states beyond the 
original five that can fairly be characterized as strongly contextualist: 
Alaska, New Mexico, and Vermont. In Study One, I restricted the 
eligible territories to those with an intermediate appellate court.175 And I 
chose to employ that requirement again in this Article, thereby requiring 
the elimination of Vermont from consideration.176 I also believe that 
New Mexico and especially Alaska are too small in terms of total 
population to constitute appropriate fits for the study.177 But even if I 
thought differently with respect to those two states, increasing the 
contextualist group from five jurisdictions to seven is not a sufficient 
expansion from my original project to justify completing Study Two. 
Note that if I conducted a more extensive review of the caselaw, it 
is possible that I would find enough new contextualist states to warrant 
finishing Study Two. But the value of this project does not justify the 
level of work that would be required to complete the more thorough 
review, particularly given the real likelihood that even truly 
comprehensive research would fail to uncover a sufficient number of 
additional contextualist states. 
B. Study Three: More Key Numbers 
The next proposed study uses the same methodology employed in 
Article One,178 but includes far more key numbers in both the 
interpretation and control searches. The purpose of using such queries in 
the data-gathering process is to eliminate—or at least minimize—the 
effect of under-coding.179 
 
                                                          
 175. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286 & n.443. 
 176. Vermont does not have an intermediate appellate court. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM 
SYSTEM OF CITATION 298 tbl.T.1 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015).  
 177. For the population of these two states, see US States – Ranked by Population 2019, 
WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/states (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 178. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286-94. 
 179. For an explanation of under-coding, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text; 
Silverstein, supra note 12, at 248-49. 
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In Study One, the searches for interpretation decisions contained 
only key numbers in topics 95 (Contracts) and 157 (Evidence).180 But 
there are numerous key numbers relating to the construction of 
agreements in other topics, including Customs and Usages (topic 113),181 
Insurance (topic 217),182 Release (topic 331),183 and Vendor and 
Purchaser (topic 400).184 Likewise, my control search sought all cases 
tagged with any key number in classification 95.185 However, there are 
multiple other topics with key numbers concerning contracts. This group 
consists of classifications that focus on contract law exclusively, such as 
Release (topic 331)186 and Guaranty (topic 195),187 and topics that 
address both contracts and other fields, such as Insurance (topic 217)188 
and Damages (topic 115).189 Because the interpretation and control 
searches in Study One left out so many relevant key numbers, the 
searches failed to gather a substantial number of interpretation and 
contract opinions that otherwise met the parameters of my study. 
Therefore, under-coding may have biased the results.190 
Unlike with over-coding, overbreadth, and foreign law, there is no 
effective technique available to test for the impact of under-coding. 
Over-coding, overbreadth, and foreign law are problems that infect the 
cases within a given dataset. Once the dataset is gathered, it is possible 
to review the contents for opinions that contain markers indicating that 
they (1) were included as a result of over-coding or overbreadth, or (2) 
involve the law of another jurisdiction. Such a review can be done 
manually by reading all or a sample of the collected decisions, or via 
Westlaw searches for terms within the dataset opinions that suggest the 
                                                          
 180. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 287. 
 181. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 562-63 (most of the key 
numbers from 113k9 through 113k17 concern interpretation). 
 182. Id. at 977-78 (every key number in topic 217, section XIII.G, which is 217k1805 to 
217k1863, concerns interpretation). 
 183. Id. at 1540-41 (most of the key numbers in topic 331, section II, which is 331k25 to 
331k40, concern interpretation). 
 184. Id. at 1812 (many of the key numbers in topic 400, section II, which is 400k46 to 400k81, 
concern interpretation). 
 185. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 289. 
 186. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 1539-41. 
 187. Id. at 847-49. 
 188. Id. at 963-1006. In particular, see id. at 976-80, which contains section XIII, “Contracts 
and Policies.” 
 189. Id. at 568-76 (out of the roughly 500 key numbers contained in the Damages topic, at least 
seventy concern contract law). 
 190. For an example of the potential impact of under-coding on Study One, see Silverstein, 
supra note 12, at 291-92, 291 n.471. This example is also discussed infra in the text accompanying 
notes 280-82. 
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existence of one of the three problems.191 Under-coding is different. By 
its very nature, under-coding concerns cases that were not obtained via 
the Westlaw queries used to compile the dataset. As a result, there is 
nothing to review, manually or otherwise.192 
The only way to address under-coding is by crafting operative 
Westlaw searches that include more or all of the key numbers relevant to 
a research subject. The plan for Study Three was to do precisely that. 
My goal was to construct (a) an interpretation query that uses all or 
virtually all of the pertinent key numbers relating to contract 
interpretation, and (b) a control query that uses all or virtually all of the 
pertinent key numbers relating to contracts generally. Unfortunately, this 
study design suffers from overwhelming logistical, technical, and 
methodological challenges—challenges that resulted in my abandoning 
the project. The next three subparts explain these challenges. 
1. Logistical Challenges 
Recall that many topics and subtopics in the Key Number System 
cover multiple, distinct legal subjects. Because of this “overbreadth” 
problem,193 deciding which key numbers to include in a Westlaw search 
for a particular type of case often requires that a researcher analyze a 
representative sample of opinions classified with the key numbers that 
are candidates for the study. Such work ensures that all key numbers 
used in the data-collection queries exclusively or at least 
overwhelmingly concern the right legal topics. 
To better understand how overbreadth operates, some elaboration is 
needed regarding four basic methods of searching for cases tagged with 
relevant key numbers. First, a search may list specific key numbers that 
contain no sub-parts. For example, to find cases that discuss duress as a 
                                                          
 191. I used both manual review and Westlaw term searches in my testing for over-coding, 
overbreadth, and foreign law in Study One. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 292-93, 293 n.475. 
 192. I did run several dozen Westlaw searches during the writing of Article One and this 
Article in an attempt to develop some type of test for under-coding. But every search clearly 
suffered from fatal reliability problems. For example, I ran several searches for cases containing 
terms relating to contract interpretation in the body of the opinion, but with no headnotes classified 
with the interpretation-related key numbers I used in Studies One and Four. Unfortunately, all of the 
sufficiently broad queries retrieved numerous cases that did not involve contract interpretation. As a 
result, the only way to verify the scope of under-coding in the search results would be to actually 
read all of the decisions recovered by the queries. That would entail going through literally tens of 
thousands of cases, which is both impracticable and defeats the point of using the Key Number 
System to streamline empirical research. But cf. infra text accompanying note 453 (explaining that it 
is possible to design a study to account for under-coding when the study concerns a topic that is 
narrow in scope, as opposed to a broad subject like whether textualism or contextualism has higher 
enforcement costs). 
 193. For a discussion of overbreadth, see Silverstein, supra note 12, at 250, 292-93; supra note 
98 and accompanying text. 
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defense to the enforcement of a release, one would put the following 
language in a Westlaw query: 331k178.194 Second, a search may list 
specific key numbers that contain other key numbers as sub-parts. To 
illustrate, 331k17 concerns fraud as a defense to the enforcement of a 
release.195 But a query containing that key number will obtain all cases 
tagged with 331k17(.5) (“In general”), 331k17(1) (“Indebtedness or 
liability in general”), and 331k17(2) (“Damages for injury to person”), 
which are sub-parts of 331k17.196 To pull a narrower set of decisions, a 
researcher must use just one or two of the three key numbers that 
together constitute 331k17. 
Third, an attorney can search for all key numbers in an outline 
heading of a topic. For example, all key numbers in section II of the 
Release topic relate to the “Construction and Operation” of releases.197 
To search for cases classified with any of the twenty-six key numbers 
contained in that section, one would enter the following: to(331II). 
Fourth, and last, an attorney can search for cases marked with any of the 
key numbers that comprise a topic. To find every case classified with 
one of the ninety-four key numbers in topic 331, the query would state 
this: to(331). 
I employed all four search techniques in Study One.198 In my 
interpretation queries, I used stand-alone key numbers with no sub-parts, 
such as 95k143.5 (“Construction as a whole”).199 I employed key 
numbers with sub-parts, like 95k147 (“Intention of parties”).200 And I 
included terms that pulled all cases with key numbers that fall under two 
outline headings of the Evidence topic: to(157XI(D)) and 
to(157XI(A)).201 Finally, for my control search, I put in language that 
gathered all cases marked with any key number from the Contracts 
topic: to(95).202 
Overbreadth can create issues with any of those four types of 
searches. To illustrate, 157k451 is part of the Evidence topic. This key 
number concerns the relationship of patent ambiguities to extrinsic 
evidence and contains no sub-parts.203 But the number is used to classify 
                                                          
 194. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 1540. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1540-41. 
 198. See Silverstein, supra note 12, app. 1 at 313-16. 
 199. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 368. 
 200. Id. at 368. 
 201. Id. at 715-19. 
 202. Id. at 363. 
 203. Id. at 719. 
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rules of law relating to both contracts and wills,204 which are distinct 
legal subjects. Next, consider 157k449. That key number is entitled 
“Nature of ambiguity or uncertainty in instrument” and it contains 
sixteen sub-key numbers, including 157k451.205 Many of those sub-key 
numbers concern both contracts and wills.206 Thus, 157k449 itself relates 
to each of those fields of law. 
Key numbers 157k449 and 157k451 are contained in section XI.D 
of the Evidence topic.207 Section XI is entitled “Parol or Extrinsic 
Evidence Affecting Writings” and section XI.D is entitled “Construction 
or Application of Language of Written Instrument.”208 Like its 
component key numbers, section XI.D concerns the use of extrinsic 
evidence to interpret multiple types of documents, including contracts 
and wills.209 Finally, the Evidence topic encompasses several distinct 
legal fields, including procedural rules like those in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and substantive rules such as the parol evidence rule.210 
To minimize the impact of overbreadth in Study One, I conducted a 
thorough review of judicial opinions containing headnotes classified 
with the key numbers related to contract interpretation that were 
candidates for inclusion in my Westlaw searches. My goal was to place 
in the data-collection queries only key numbers that are exclusively or 
overwhelmingly about interpretation or the parol evidence rule. 
Accordingly, for every key number potentially related to those subjects 
in topics 95 (Contracts) and 157 (Evidence), I reviewed between twenty 
and forty cases. This analysis led to the exclusion of many key numbers. 
For example, 95k168 is contained in section II.A of the Contracts topic, 
which is entitled “General Rules of Construction.”211 Given its location, 
one might think that this key number is concerned with contract 
interpretation. But 95k168 deals primarily with the duty of good faith, a 
topic that is distinct from both interpretation and the parol evidence rule. 
                                                          
 204. Compare Nationstar Mortg. Co. v. Levine, 216 So. 3d 711, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) 
(applying the key number to legal rules concerning contracts in headnotes 7, 8, 10, and 11), with 
First Nat’l Bank of Mount Dora v. Shawmut Bank of Bos., 389 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (Mass. 1979) 
(applying the 157k451 key number to a legal rule concerning wills in headnote five). 
 205. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 718-19. 
 206. To see this, review some of the cases pulled by running the following two searches on 
Westlaw in the All States and All Federal databases. Search One: 157k449. Search Two: (157k449 
/p will) & TO(409). 
 207. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 718-19. 
 208. Id. at 715, 718. 
 209. To see this, review some of the cases pulled by running the following two searches on 
Westlaw in the All States and All Federal databases. Search One: to(157XI(D)). Search Two: 
to(157XI(D)) & to(409). 
 210. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 697-724. 
 211. Id. at 368. 
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I thus concluded that the key number does not belong in my data-
collection searches.212 Likewise, 95k353(6) applies to jury instructions 
addressing contract construction.213 But in the sample of headnotes I 
reviewed that employ this key number, only around half involved 
interpretation. Accordingly, 95k353(6) merited exclusion as well. By 
contrast, the caselaw review also resulted in my determining that the 
various Evidence key numbers discussed above that involve both 
contracts and wills214 belonged in the study. That is because only a  
tiny fraction of the cases marked with those classifications actually 
concern wills.215 
Note that a careful assessment of the cases tagged with a particular 
key number or group of key numbers is not always necessary before 
using the classifications in a research project. In Study One, for example, 
I analyzed a much smaller sample of decisions in crafting my control 
searches—the searches designed to find cases about contracts 
generally.216 That is because topic 95 is named “Contracts.” As a result, I 
felt that it was reasonably safe to assume that each key number under 
that topic sufficiently concerns contract law to warrant inclusion in the 
control search. 
The critical point is this: Because of the problem of overbreadth, 
many empirical projects using the Key Number System will require that 
the author test topics, sections of topics, and specific key numbers before 
incorporating them into the Westlaw searches that make up the study. 
Some research focuses on discrete legal subjects for which there are 
only a few relevant topics or specific key numbers. In those 
circumstances, reviewing cases classified with potentially applicable key 
numbers should take little effort. To illustrate, because I restricted the 
searches for interpretation cases in Study One to the core key numbers 
relating to contract interpretation and the parol evidence rule,217 the 
 
                                                          
 212. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 288. 
 213. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 375. 
 214. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text. 
 215. For example, two searches confirmed that only a tiny fraction of the judicial opinions 
classified with key numbers from section XI.D of the Evidence topic during the time period of 
Study One potentially concern the interpretation of a will. The first search was for all cases marked 
with an XI.D. key number that did not contain any key number from the Wills topic (topic 409): 
to(157XI(D)) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010) % to(409). This search returned 2718 
cases. The second search was for all cases marked with an XI.D. key number that did contain a key 
number from the Wills topic: to(157XI(D)) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010) & to(409). 
This search returned only eighteen decisions. And a number of those cases concerned both contracts 
and wills. 
 216. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 289. 
 217. Id. at 287. 
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analysis needed to select appropriate key numbers for those queries only 
required a few days. 
But other study designs will necessitate far more work. The goal of 
Study Three was to use all or virtually all of the key numbers relating to 
contract interpretation in my interpretation searches and all or virtually 
all of the key numbers relating to contracts generally in my control 
searches. Unfortunately, numerous key numbers involve contract 
interpretation, and even more relate to contracts generally. As a result, 
the amount of work needed to construct the searches for this project 
would have been extraordinary. Since the main point of using key 
numbers in empirical scholarship is to save time and money, I concluded 
that finishing the review necessary for Study Three was not worth the 
effort, requiring that I abandon this project. 
Let me offer some additional details to explain the scope of the 
problem. There are thirty-three topics in the general category of 
“Contracts.”218 At least fourteen of those topics have key numbers 
relating to interpretation or the parol evidence rule.219 And some of the 
topics, like Contracts and Insurance, have several dozen such key 
numbers.220 In addition, at least ten topics outside the Contracts category 
contain key numbers that encompass interpretation and the parol 
evidence rule, including Evidence (topic 157),221 Labor and Employment 
(topic 231H),222 Landlord and Tenant (topic 233),223 Mines and Minerals 
(topic 260),224 and Secured Transactions (topic 349A).225 Reviewing a 
representative sample of cases for every one of these key numbers to 
determine which should be included in the Study Three queries would 
require a great deal of work. 
 
                                                          
 218. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at XI. 
 219. For some examples, see supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
 220. See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 368-71 (topic 95, 
Contracts; key numbers concerning the construction and operation of contracts); id. at 977-78 (topic 
217, Insurance; key numbers concerning general rules of construction for interpreting insurance 
policies); id. at 981-94 (topic 217, Insurance; these pages contain key numbers relating to various 
types of insurance, and in each section there are key numbers concerning the interpretation of 
coverage provisions). 
 221. Id. at 715-19 (Section XI of topic 157 is entitled “Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings.”). 
 222. Id. at 1105 (231Hk437 and its associated sub-key numbers concern the interpretation of 
pension plans, which are generally contracts.). 
 223. Id. at 1149 (Section II of topic 233 is entitled “Leases and Agreements in General” and 
section II.B is entitled “Construction and Operation.”). 
 224. Id. at 1253-54 (Sections II.C.1 and II.C.2 of topic 260 concern the construction and 
operation of mining leases and oil and gas leases.). 
 225. Id. at 1586 (Section III of topic 349(A) concerns the construction and operation of 
security agreements.). 
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Now consider the control search. All thirty-three topics in the 
Contracts category relate to contracts. And numerous topics that fall 
under the categories of Persons, Property, Torts, Crimes, Remedies, and 
Government also concern contracts partly or in full. In fact, I examined 
at least forty-five topics contained in categories other than Contracts that 
involve contract law or contract litigation to a significant degree. Some 
are listed in the previous paragraph.226 Others include the following: 
Accord and Satisfaction (topic 8),227 Assignments (topic 38),228 
Copyrights and Intellectual Property (topic 96),229 Damages (topic 
115),230 Deeds (topic 120),231 Fraud  (topic 184),232 Infants (topic 211),233 
Limitation of Actions  (topic 241),234 Marriage and Cohabitation (topic 
253),235 Principal and Agent (topic 308),236 Public Employment (topic 
316P),237 and Specific Performance (topic 358).238 As these examples 
make clear, there is a staggering quantity of key numbers that are 
candidates for the control search. Analyzing even a sizeable portion of 
those subtopics would take months, if not longer. 
Recall that for Study One, I conducted only minimal testing of topic 
95 (Contracts) because I presumed that all key numbers in that topic 
sufficiently focus on contract law to warrant inclusion in the control 
                                                          
 226. See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. 
 227. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 6-7. Despite topic 8 falling 
under the Remedies category, an accord and satisfaction is essentially a contract. See 1 C.J.S. 
Accord and Satisfaction § 1 (2018). 
 228. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 131-32 (Section II of topic 38 
concerns modes of assigning property and section IV of that topic contains various key numbers 
relating to contracts, including 38K72 which is entitled “General rules of construction.”). 
 229. Id. at 383 (99k49 is entitled “Contracts relating to copyright.”). 
 230. Id. at 568-76. Several aspects of the Damages topic relate to contracts. For example, 
section IV of topic 115 is entitled “Liquidated Damages and Penalties.” Id. at 571. Section VI.C 
contains key numbers regarding the measure of damages for breach of contract. Id. at 572. And 
section VII.C contains key numbers regarding the amount awarded for breach of contract. Id. at 574. 
 231. Id. at 588-89 (Section III.A of topic 120 concerns the “General Rules of Construction” 
relating to deeds.); see also 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 3 (2018) (explaining that deeds are often contracts). 
 232. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 819-22. Fraud, of course, is a 
signature defense to the enforcement of a contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 159-72 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 233. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 921-22 (section III of topic 211 
is entitled “Contracts”). 
 234. Id. at 1183-84 (setting forth numerous key numbers regarding the statutes of limitations 
applicable to various types of contracts). 
 235. Id. at 1213 (Section IV.C of topic 253 involves contracts in the context of marriage.). 
 236. Id. at 1426-29 (Sections I and II of topic 308 concern the creation of and duties pertaining 
to the principal/agent relationship.). 
 237. Id. at 1481 (316Pk223 concerns the rights of public employees under employment 
contracts.). 
 238. Id. at 1653-56 (describing this topic as involving “[a]ctions to compel performance of 
contracts by parties thereto”). 
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search.239 One might think that I could make a comparable presumption 
for other topics in the Contracts category, limiting the amount of work 
required to verify which key numbers belong in the Study Three control 
searches. But that is not the case, since many—if not most—of those 
topics also cover subjects that are outside the field of contracts. For 
example, Customs and Usages (topic 113) concerns both contracts and 
torts;240 Frauds, Statute of (topic 185) concerns both contracts and 
property;241 and Insurance (topic 217) concerns both insurance policies, 
which are contracts, and the regulation of the insurance industry.242 
Indeed, some topics in the Contracts category actually appear to be 
primarily concerned with bodies of law other than contracts. To 
illustrate, based on a summary review of the caselaw, I concluded that a 
clear majority of opinions tagged with key numbers from topic Implied 
and Constructive Contracts (topic 205H) concern restitution or unjust 
enrichment rather than contract law.243 Finally, virtually every topic that 
involves the law of contracts, but that falls under one of the other Key 
Number System categories, also concerns other bodies of law. Classic 
examples include Evidence (topic 157)244 and Damages (topic 115),245 
which are in the Remedies category. Therefore, even if I could safely 
assume that every topic in the Contracts category largely focuses on 
contract law, I would still need to analyze the topics contained in  
other categories. 
Despite these logistical hurdles, I did begin a comprehensive review 
of the Key Number System in an effort to gather all key numbers 
relating to either interpretation specifically or contracts generally. I 
began by analyzing a minimum of twenty cases for most individual key 
                                                          
 239. See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 240. To see this, review the cases returned by the following Westlaw search: (to(113) /p 
negligence “standard #of care”) & to(97C) to(117) to(184) to(198H) to(272) to(313A) to(379). 
 241. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 822 (explaining that topic 185 
covers statutes that require a writing for certain types of contracts and statutes that require a writing 
for other methods of transferring real property); see also 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 84 (2018) 
(“Unless there are conditions taking the case out of the statute of frauds, a gift of land must be in 
writing.”). 
 242. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 963. 
 243. For example, of the 3353 cases classified with a topic 205H key number during the first 
decade of this century, only 1103 also contain a key number from topic 95. To see this, run the 
following two searches on Westlaw in the All States and All Federal databases. Search One: 
to(205H) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010). Search Two: to(205H) & da(aft 12/31/1999) 
& da(bef 01/01/2010) & to(95). In addition, 2575 of the 3353 cases contained the word “restitution” 
or the phrase “unjust enrichment” in the same headnote as the topic 205H key number. To see this, 
run the following search: (to(205H) /p restitution “unjust enrichment”) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & 
da(bef 01/01/2010). 
 244. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 697-724. 
 245. Id. at 568-76. 
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numbers/subtopics that were candidates for the study.246 But it quickly 
became clear that completing this review would take hundreds or even 
thousands of hours. So I discarded this approach. I next tried reviewing a 
minimum of fifty cases for each potentially relevant topic—for example, 
Release (topic 331) and Frauds, Statute of (topic 185). That sped up the 
process dramatically. Unfortunately, this protocol did not include a 
sufficient number of cases to plausibly constitute a representative sample 
of the opinions tagged with the key numbers from each topic. And the 
same was true when I attempted to go through fifty cases for various 
outline headings in each topic—for example, section II of Landlord and 
Tenant (topic 233) which concerns “Leases and Agreements in 
General.”247 As a result, I abandoned these approaches as well. 
2. Technical Challenges 
Even if I completed the work necessary to select the appropriate 
interpretation and contracts key numbers for Study Three, I would not be 
able to run Westlaw searches that contain all of those key numbers. That 
is because West restricts queries on its platform to 600 characters, 
including spaces. A search with all of the interpretation or contract key 
numbers would greatly exceed that limit. Thus, Study Three suffers from 
an insurmountable technical problem. 
To explain, a slightly modified version of the broadest 
interpretation key number search run in Study One contains 277 
characters.248 Section XIII.G of Insurance (topic 217) covers the general 
rules of interpretation applicable to insurance policies.249 That section 
contains an additional twenty-nine key numbers (not including sub-
parts). Adding those twenty-nine key numbers to the largest 
interpretation query from Study One increases the total characters in the 
search to 538.250 That leaves only sixty-two characters for additional 
search language. But there are at least twenty-one topics beyond 
Contracts, Evidence, and Insurance that contain key numbers focusing 
                                                          
 246. Some key numbers so clearly did or did not involve either interpretation specifically or 
contracts generally that I was able to confirm the appropriateness of their inclusion in the study after 
analyzing a smaller number of cases. 
 247. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 1149-50. 
 248. Note that the precise modifications I made to the search are not important for purposes of 
this discussion. In addition, 277 characters is the length when the search is seeking only state court 
decisions. An additional nine characters are needed to collect both state and federal authorities. For 
example, to retrieve state and federal cases in Indiana, the following language must be added to the 
search (including the space after the ampersand): co(in) & . 
 249. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 977-78. 
 250. Each insurance key number requires an additional nine characters: the actual key number 
(for example, 217k1805) and a space. Twenty-nine times nine equals 261. And 261 plus 277 from 
the original query equals 538 characters. 
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on interpretation. Adding only a tiny fraction of those numbers to the 
query will push the total over 600 characters. It is thus not possible to 
run a Westlaw search that contains all key numbers relating to the 
interpretation of contracts. 
One might respond that I could use outline headings in my Westlaw 
queries, as I did when searching for Evidence key numbers in Study 
One.251 For example, if every key number in section XIII.G of Insurance 
exclusively or overwhelmingly concerns the construction of insurance 
policies, then I could add to(217XIII(G)) to the search and avoid listing 
all twenty-nine key numbers in that section, saving over 200 characters. 
Employing section-based query language would allow for the 
inclusion of more key numbers in my interpretation searches; but such 
language can be used only when all of the key numbers in a topic section 
focus on interpretation. And numerous interpretation key numbers are 
grouped in topic sections with other classifications that have little or 
nothing to do with the construing of agreements. For example, section 
II.A of Contracts contains “General Rules of Construction.”252 However, 
four key numbers in that part primarily concern subjects that are distinct 
from interpretation: 95k144 (“What law governs”) and 95k145 (“Place 
of making contract”) deal with choice of law, 95k168 (“Terms implied 
as part of contract”) addresses good faith and other implied terms, and 
95k146 is principally about the moment a contract becomes effective.253 
Thus, I cannot use to(95II(A)) in my searches because that language will 
retrieve too many irrelevant cases. Likewise, section II of Vendor and 
Purchaser (topic 400) contains key numbers that focus on interpretation 
and numbers that address other legal concepts.254 That bars me from 
adding to(400II) to my interpretation queries. Given these  
key number grouping practices, section-based search phrases that 
encompass multiple key numbers cannot solve the problem of the 600-
character limit. 
Another way I might be able reduce the characters in my Westlaw 
searches is to exclude key numbers that are rarely used. To illustrate, 
400k51 is one of the subtopics concerned with interpretation in Vendor 
and Purchaser. But West’s classification attorneys did not tag a single 
headnote with that key number during the ten-year period of Study 
                                                          
 251. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 252. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 368. 
 253. Id. at 368. These conclusions are based on my analysis of a representative sample of cases 
tagged with these key numbers. 
 254. For example, 400k50 (“Construing instruments together”) and 400k51 (“Extrinsic 
circumstances”) focus on interpretation. Id. at 1812. 400k47 (“What law governs”) focuses on 
choice of law. Id. And 400k48 (“Place and time of making contract”) focuses on the point in time a 
contract becomes effective. Id. 
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One.255 Excluding 400k51 from Study Three, in which I intended to use 
the same time-period, would therefore not impact the search results. 
Unfortunately, omitting key numbers like 400k51 from the interpretation 
queries does not bring the total characters below 600 either because 
there are simply too many regularly-assigned key numbers that primarily 
concern contract interpretation.256 
This Part has focused on the technical barrier created by the 600-
character limit for searches employing all pertinent contract 
interpretation key numbers. The problem is likely even greater for my 
control queries. That flows from the fact that there are many more topics 
and key numbers concerned with contracts generally than with 
interpretation specifically.257 Note that employing search terms that 
cover entire topics or sections thereof is not a solution here either. There 
are at least seventy-five topics with key numbers involving contract law 
that are candidates for inclusion in the control queries. And the 
minimum number of characters necessary for adding most topics to the 
search is seven or eight, depending on whether the topic is two digits or 
three digits. For example, to include Contracts requires seven characters: 
to(95) and a space. To include Insurance requires eight characters: 
to(217) and a space.258 Roughly three-quarters of the topics relating to 
contracts are three digits. The average length for each search term would 
thus be seven and three-quarters characters. Multiplying that figure by 
seventy-five results in a total of 581 characters. But my analysis 
confirmed that the control searches cannot be limited to search language 
that covers entire topics. Remember that many of the relevant topics 
relate to both contract law and other legal subjects. Thus, more precise 
search language is required or else the queries will retrieve too many 
irrelevant judicial opinions. Once the searches must contain topic section 
headings and individual key numbers, the 600-character limit will be 
exceeded quickly. That is so even if an analysis of the cases tagged with 
various key numbers confirmed that multiple topics should be excluded 
from the control searches. 
Another potential solution to the character limit that I considered is 
subdividing the searches. For example, if a total of 1100 characters is 
needed to search for all interpretation-related key numbers, I could split 
                                                          
 255. To see this, run the following search on Westlaw in the All States and All Federal 
databases: 400k51 & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010). 
 256. This conclusion is based on extensive testing that I conducted. The testing is on file with 
the Author. 
 257. For some data supporting this conclusion, see supra notes 218-38 and accompanying text. 
 258. A few topics relating to contracts would require only six characters. For example, Accord 
and Satisfaction is topic 8. To include that subject in a search would require inserting to(8) and a 
space. 
1052 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1011 
the search language into two queries and then run two searches for each 
state in the study rather than one. But this approach is not workable. 
That is because some cases will be retrieved by both query one and 
query two. My research assistants would then need to compare the 
decisions pulled by the two queries to filter out duplicates.259 This would 
involve a great deal of effort, once again defeating the point of 
employing key numbers in empirical research. And the duplicates 
problem will be particularly severe if the total number of needed 
characters is over 1200, requiring three searches rather than two.260 
3. Methodological Challenges 
There are two types of methodological challenges specific to Study 
Three. Type one concerns problems that the Study Three protocol would 
generate even if the logistical and technical issues discussed in the prior 
two parts did not exist. Type two concerns challenges that would be 
created if I revised the Study Three protocol to account for those 
logistical and technical problems. 
Two type-one issues warrant attention here. The first is that it is not 
possible to gather every reported decision that addresses contract 
interpretation or contracts by crafting Westlaw searches comprised of 
key numbers that focus on those subjects. That is because some 
interpretation and contract cases are classified only with key numbers 
that primarily address other legal concepts or fields. Let me explain. 
Many propositions of law are related to numerous key numbers. 
And those numbers are often spread across multiple key number topics. 
However, West’s staff seldom classifies a headnote with more than five 
key numbers.261 And headnotes are frequently tagged with three, two, or 
just one key number, even though up to a dozen numbers are 
applicable.262 This results in significant under-coding in the reported 
                                                          
 259. To illustrate, if I place the interpretation key numbers from Contracts (topic 95) in query 
one and the comparable key numbers from Insurance (topic 217) in query two, multiple cases will 
be contained in both sets of results. For example, from 2000 through 2009, there are 8387 cases 
marked with the interpretation key numbers from topic 95 that I used in Study One. During that 
same period, there are 4611 cases classified with key numbers from section III.G of topic 217, 
which covers the general rules of interpretation applicable to insurance policies. Finally, 862 cases 
appear in both groups because they are tagged with at least one key number from each set. 
Decisions like those would need to be removed from the totals of at least one of the two queries, 
otherwise they would be double-counted, corrupting the study findings. 
 260. Perhaps there is software that can search for identical entries in Westlaw query results. 
But I decided not to investigate this possibility given all of the other problems with Study Three. 
 261. E-mail from Sara Haselbauer, Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters, to Author (Aug. 23, 
2018) (on file with author) (“[I]t is rare that more than five Key Numbers will be added to a 
headnote. However, in unusual circumstances, we will add more than five.”). 
 262. This conclusion is based on my many years of reading key number classifications of 
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caselaw. Consider two examples. In Batales v. Friedman, the portion of 
the opinion involving contract interpretation was tagged with a single 
key number from Limitation of Actions (topic 241).263 The West 
classification attorney apparently used that number because the case 
turned on (1) the meaning of a contractual provision setting a time limit 
to sue for breach of the agreement, and (2) whether that provision or the 
pertinent statute of limitations set the operative deadline.264 Likewise, in 
Perdue Bioenergy, LLC v. Clean Burn Fuels, LLC, a bankruptcy 
adversary proceeding, a section of the decision dealt with the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence offered to establish that a contract 
was ambiguous.265 But the associated headnote was only categorized 
with a key number from Bankruptcy (topic 51) that covers the 
admissibility of evidence in bankruptcy actions generally.266 Most 
headnotes tagged with the key numbers from Batales and Perdue 
Bioenergy do not concern interpretation.267 Thus, I cannot include those 
numbers in a search for interpretation decisions because they would 
retrieve too many irrelevant cases. As a result, a Westlaw search for 
interpretation opinions would not find Batales or Perdue BioEnergy 
even if the query contained every key number primarily concerned with 
that subject. This shows that even the most comprehensive key number 
searches often cannot fully account for under-coding. 
Fortunately, the type of under-coding discussed in the last 
paragraph will not impact the results of empirical studies employing 
datasets created with the Key Number System unless the under-coding 
varies across states lines, over time, or by key number topic. I 
encountered no such variation during my work on Article One and this 
Article (though my analysis of the issue was certainly not exhaustive). 
Accordingly, I believe that the exclusion of relevant published decisions 
from a dataset—because the cases contain no key numbers primarily 
focused on the legal issues addressed by the study—will normally not 
bias any research findings. 
 
                                                          
headnotes. 
 263. 41 N.Y.S.3d 275, 276, 277 (App. Div. 2016) (see, in particular, headnote four). The key 
number is 241k14 (“Agreements as to period of limitations”). WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 109, at 1183. 
 264. Batales, 41 N.Y.S.3d at 276-77. 
 265. 559 B.R. 130, 133-34 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 266. Id. at 131 (see headnote one). The key number is 51k2163 (“Evidence; witnesses”). 
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 171. For another case with the same 
structure as Perdue Bioenergy, see ML Manager, LLC v. Hawkins (In re Mortgs. Ltd.), 559 B.R. 
508, 508-09, 517-19 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2016) (see headnotes one through five). 
 267. I reviewed a representative sample of headnotes classified with each key number. 
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The second type-one challenge is that using key numbers from 
topics other than Contracts topic 95) and Evidence (topic 157) in the 
interpretation queries could introduce new confounding variables. In 
Study One, I restricted the interpretation searches to key numbers from 
one section of Contracts (II.A) and from three sections of Evidence 
(XI.A, XI.C, and XI.D).268 Additionally, the precise key numbers that I 
used focus on general principles of construction that apply to most 
classes of agreement.269 But virtually every interpretation-related key 
number from outside Contracts and Evidence addresses only one type of 
contract. For example, the key numbers in section XIII.G of Insurance 
exclusively concern the interpretation of insurance policies.270 Likewise, 
331k25 covers “[g]eneral rules of construction” for releases.271 Including 
such key numbers in a search for interpretation decisions could bias  
the search totals by exaggerating or understating the difference between 
textualist and contextualist states. This impact is best illustrated  
by example. 
Suppose that textualist and contextualist jurisdictions have adopted 
special rules for the interpretation of insurance policies that supplement 
the general principles of construction. Assume further that the insurance-
specific rules vary between the two sets of states. That difference could 
affect interpretation litigation levels. For example, suppose that the 
contextualist territories employ special rules that are more favorable to 
insureds than the rules in textualist states. That could increase the 
amount of litigation regarding the meaning of insurance policies in 
contextualist states in comparison to textualist jurisdictions. And if that 
is so, then adding the key numbers from section XIII.G of the Insurance 
topic to the interpretation queries will distort the search results. With the 
insurance key numbers included, any difference in the total number of 
interpretation decisions retrieved for the textualist and contextualist 
                                                          
 268. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 287-88, 295 tbl.3, app. 1 at 313-16. 
 269. Start with Contracts. Section II.A of topic 95 is entitled “General Rules of Construction.” 
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 368 (emphasis added). In addition, the 
introduction to topic 95 in WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW lists seventeen “[p]articular kinds 
of contracts” that are excluded from the Contracts topic and are instead covered by other topics. Id. 
at 364. Now consider Evidence. Section XI of topic 157 is entitled “Parol or Extrinsic Evidence 
Affecting Writings.” Id. at 715 (emphasis added). Section XI.D is entitled “Construction or 
Application of Language of Written Instrument.” Id. at 718 (emphasis added). And section XI.A is 
entitled “Contradicting, Varying or Adding to Terms of Written Instrument.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Technically, many of the individual key numbers in XI.A address only a single type of writing. But 
the section XI.A key numbers as a group cover virtually every type of instrument. And I used all of 
the key numbers from that section in query three of Study One. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 
295 tbl.3, app. 1 at 313-16. 
 270. See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 977-78. 
 271. Id. at 1540. 
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groups will now reflect both (1) the variation in general interpretation 
law (i.e., textualism versus contextualism), and (2) the variation specific 
to insurance policies (i.e., more favorable treatment of insureds versus 
less favorable treatment).272 
The example in the last paragraph concerned the impact of a 
hypothetical disparity in the interpretation doctrine across state lines that 
goes beyond the standard textualist/contextualist divide. Now consider 
an illustration where legal similarities among the textualist and 
contextualist groups would cause an analogous problem. Suppose that 
textualist and contextualist territories have adopted the same special 
rules concerning the interpretation of insurance policies. In that case, 
including Insurance key numbers in the interpretation queries would 
likely cause the search results to understate the differences between 
textualist and contextualist jurisdictions. For example, assume that the 
ratio of (1) cases tagged with Contracts and Evidence interpretation key 
numbers, to (2) cases classified with any Contracts key number, is 
slightly larger in textualist states than in contextualist states, as I found 
in Study One.273 Assume further that because both groups of states 
employ the same special rules regarding the construction of insurance 
policies, the ratio of cases tagged with Insurance interpretation key 
numbers to those tagged with any Contracts key number is identical in 
the two sets of states.274 In that situation, adding the Insurance key 
numbers to the interpretation queries will reduce the difference  
between the textualist and contextualist search results. For a  
hypothetical demonstration of this point, read the footnote at the end of 
this sentence.275 
                                                          
 272. Note that a divergence in interpretation doctrine that is separate from whether states use 
textualism or contextualism is not addressed by my control searches. Those searches are intended to 
control for inter-state differences that have the same basic impact on the number of interpretation 
cases specifically as they do on the number of contract cases generally—such as differences in 
population, rules of procedure, and opinion publishing practices. See supra text accompanying note 
127. But a disparity over something like the supplemental rules that apply to the construction of 
insurance policies does not have a comparable impact on interpretation and contract disputes. 
Instead, this type of variation affects the level of interpretation litigation far more. Accordingly, my 
control search is of no help in solving this potential problem. 
 273. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 295-98. 
 274. This is inconsistent with the testing I conducted in Study One. Id. at 292 n.471. But the 
example here is only intended to illustrate the problem. 
 275. Here is a simple example: Suppose that in textualist states there are ten cases tagged with 
a Contracts or Evidence interpretation key number for every twenty cases tagged with any Contracts 
key number. And in contextualist states there are eight cases tagged with a Contracts or Evidence 
interpretation key number for every twenty cases tagged with a Contracts key number. The 
textualist ratio is fifty percent and the contextualist ratio is forty percent. Finally, fifty is twenty-five 
percent higher than forty. In other words, the textualist ratio is twenty-five percent higher than the 
contextualist ratio. 
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To be sure, I do not know whether the existence of disparate and/or 
similar specialized interpretation caselaw is a serious problem. 
Answering that question would require extensive research and 
considerable testing that is not worth completing given the other issues 
with Study Three. But I felt it critical to include this discussion because 
there is certainly a real possibility that specialized doctrines could 
undermine many empirical studies employing key numbers that are used 
to classify distinct and technical legal subjects.276 
Let me now turn to the second type of methodological challenge. 
Given the logistical and technical problems presented in the prior two 
parts, I considered altering the Study Three protocol. Unfortunately, 
every change I examined raised serious methodological concerns. The 
rest of this Part explains one potential revision in order to demonstrate 
the sorts of problems that would result if I modified Study Three to 
address the logistical and technical issues. 
Recall again that in Study One I used only key numbers from 
Contracts (topic 95) and Evidence (topic 157) in the searches for judicial 
opinions concerned with interpretation.277 By contrast, the plan for Study 
Three was to include all key numbers that focus on that subject, 
regardless of which topic they fall under. This structure creates two basic 
problems. First, the effort needed to identify the complete list of 
appropriate key numbers for the searches would take too much time.278 
Second, including every relevant key number in the query will require 
more than 600 characters.279 To avoid these problems, I considered 
                                                          
  Continuing, assume further that (1) there are eight cases tagged with Insurance 
interpretation key numbers for every twenty cases tagged with any Contracts key number in both 
textualist and contextualist states, and (2) these Insurance cases do not overlap with the cases 
classified with Contracts or Evidence key numbers. Next, add the Insurance figures to the search 
totals for the Contracts and Evidence decisions. Now there are eighteen interpretation cases (cases 
tagged with insurance key numbers from Contracts, Evidence, and Insurance) for every case tagged 
with any Contracts key number in textualist states. And there are sixteen interpretation cases for 
every twenty cases tagged with any Contracts key number in contextualist states. The textualist ratio 
has risen to ninety percent and the contextualist ratio has risen to eighty percent. Finally, ninety is 
12.5 percent higher than eighty. In other words, the textualist ratio is 12.5 percent higher than the 
contextualist ratio. 
  In this example, adding the Insurance interpretation key numbers to the Westlaw searches 
for interpretation decisions cuts in half the difference between the ratio of interpretation cases to 
contract cases in textualist states and contextualist states. Prior to the inclusion of the insurance 
decisions, the difference was twenty-five percent (fifty is twenty-five percent larger than forty). 
After the inclusion of the insurance decisions, the difference dropped to 12.5 percent (ninety is 12.5 
percent larger than eighty). 
 276. See, e.g., CHARLES KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 409-10 (8th ed. 2016) 
(summarizing a jurisdictional split over a special insurance policy interpretation doctrine). 
 277. See supra text accompanying notes 109-16. 
 278. See supra Part V.B.1. 
 279. See supra Part V.B.2. 
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adding only selected interpretation key numbers from outside the 
Contracts and Evidence topics to the searches for interpretation cases. In 
essence, the plan would be to work on choosing relevant key numbers 
for the interpretation searches until I reach 600 characters, and then stop. 
This would require far less effort than identifying all of the key numbers 
that concentrate on interpretation, nullifying the logistical problems. 
Moreover, because the search would contain 600 (or fewer) characters, 
there would no longer be any technical barrier to running the 
interpretation queries on Westlaw. 
The problem with making this change to Study Three is that there is 
no methodologically sound way to decide which interpretation key 
numbers from outside the Contracts and Evidence topics belong in the 
searches. And the choice could have profound effects on the study 
findings. For example, adding only the interpretation key numbers from 
section XIII.G of Insurance (topic 217) to the broadest query in Study 
One would critically change the results from that project. In Study One, 
the ratio of interpretation cases to contract cases in state court was 5.0% 
higher in textualist states than in contextualist states using the broadest 
query.280 If the Insurance key numbers are added to that search, then the 
ratio is 7.0% higher in contextualist states.281 That is a dramatic shift. 
Other topics I reviewed would have less impact. But that just serves to 
illustrate the problem: selecting one group of key numbers for inclusion 
in the queries rather than another will almost certainly have a decisive 
influence on the study findings. Since there is no methodologically 
legitimate way to choose between the candidate key numbers, using only 
a subset of the numbers from outside Contracts and Evidence would 
fatally undermine the validity of Study Three.282 
 
* * * 
 
To summarize, the goal of Study Three was to execute a research 
protocol that addresses the under-coding weaknesses of Study One. The 
only way to accomplish that is to use, in my Westlaw searches, all or 
virtually all of the key numbers relating to contract interpretation and 
                                                          
 280. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 295 tbl 3, 292 n.471. 
 281. Id. 292 n.471. 
 282. One might ask why the Study One protocol—using only Contracts and Evidence key 
numbers in the interpretation searches—is appropriate. The answer is that the key numbers I 
included in Study One concern general principles of interpretation applicable to most types of 
agreements. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. The key numbers under consideration for 
inclusion in Study Three are different: They are all associated with a particular type of agreement, 
such as insurance policies or releases. For some examples, see supra text accompanying notes 181-
84, 218-25. 
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contracts generally. That creates three problems. First, as I explained in 
Part V.B.1, identifying the relevant key numbers would take too long. 
Second, as discussed in Part V.B.2, the 600-character limit applicable to 
Westlaw queries prevents me from including all of the relevant key 
numbers in my searches even if I took the time to select them. Third, as 
set out in Part V.B.3, modifying the Study Three design to address these 
challenges would result in fundamental methodological problems. Given 
all of those issues, Study Three is simply not feasible. 
C. Study Four: Interpretive Change Across Time 
Textualism is a “classical” contract doctrine and contextualism is a 
“modern” contract doctrine.283 The classical approach to contract law 
was dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.284 The 
modern approach emerged in the middle part of the last century and 
ultimately resulted in many changes to the American law of contracts.285 
One of those changes was the spread of contextualist interpretation.286 
The next project addresses whether the adoption of contextualism altered 
the level of interpretation enforcement costs in the states that embraced 
the new method of construing agreements. It entails comparing the ratio 
of interpretation litigation to general contract litigation in the five 
contextualist states from Study One287 during two distinct time periods: 
before and after each jurisdiction shifted from textualism to 
contextualism. The data for both eras would be gathered using 
essentially the same key number searches as in Study One. 
One critical benefit of this research design is that it eliminates the 
need to control for variations between states. The comparison in Study 
Four is not textualist jurisdictions versus contextualist jurisdictions 
during a single time period, as in Studies One, Two, and Three. Rather, 
it is a set of states at time one (the textualism era) versus the same states 
at time two (the contextualist era).288 
 
                                                          
 283. In fact, some authorities refer to them as the “classical approach” and the “modern 
approach” to contract interpretation. See, e.g., Grumman Allied Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 
F.2d 729, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 284. Jay M. Feinman, The Duty of Good Faith: A Perspective on Contemporary Contract Law, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 942 (2015). 
 285. CHARLES KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 31 (7th ed. 2012). 
 286. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 
643-45 & n.6 (Cal. 1968). 
 287. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286. 
 288. To be more precise, there is a distinct period one and period two for each jurisdiction 
since the states moved from textualism to contextualism at different points in time. See infra notes 
294, 420 and accompanying text. 
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The Study Four methodology does introduce new confounding 
variables—namely legal and social differences between the two periods 
in each jurisdiction. These disparities could be just as large as those that 
exist across state lines during a single era, though I suspect they are 
smaller. In either case, the control search for general contract decisions 
should address the temporal differences at issue here as effectively as it 
did the geographical differences at issue in Study One. And combining 
the findings of the new project with those from my first study will 
produce a more complete picture of the effects of textualism and 
contextualism on enforcement costs. Accordingly, I decided to complete 
Study Four.289 
Study One and Study Four are virtually identical in structure. 
Therefore, the strengths and weaknesses of the two projects—
methodological and otherwise—are substantially the same.290 However, 
two of the weaknesses manifest in somewhat different ways in Study 
Four. The rest of this Part addresses those differences. 
The first concerns the interpretation caselaw. Study One required 
that I identify five textualist and five contextualist states.291 I selected the 
jurisdictions for both groups by analyzing the jurisprudence.292 This 
process was difficult because the law of interpretation is exceptionally 
convoluted.293 As noted above in the first paragraph of this part, I chose 
to reuse the five contextualist states from Study One in Study Four. This 
time, rather than assessing the current state of the law, I needed to 
establish when each of those territories made the transition from 
textualism to the new approach. Once again, that necessitated a careful 
review of the decisional law because determining when a jurisdiction has 
completed the change to a new common law doctrine is often a 
complicated endeavor. Some territories, such as California, shifted from 
textualism to contextualism at a clear moment in time.294 The transition 
date for others, such as New Jersey, was much more difficult to identify. 
Nonetheless, I believe I was able to pinpoint the change for each of the 
five contextualist states with sufficient certainty to warrant conducting 
Study Four. 
The second problem involves the control search. To measure the 
impact of each interpretive approach on enforcement costs, Study One 
                                                          
 289. See infra Part VI. 
 290. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Study One, see supra notes 87-100, 
129-40, 145-53 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 301. 
 294. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643-
45 (Cal. 1968). 
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compared the ratio of contract interpretation litigation to general contract 
litigation in textualist and contextualist states—with the levels of each 
type of litigation being determined by the results of my key number 
searches.295 I used a search for all cases tagged with a key number from 
the Contracts topic as my control search in the denominator because I 
theorized that this would control for numerous differences between 
textualist and contextualist jurisdictions.296 But the search could not 
control for variations in contract law across states that impact the level 
of general contract litigation. That created a problem for Study One. 
States that use textualism also typically follow other classical 
contract doctrines. Likewise, jurisdictions that employ contextualism 
normally conform to modern contract principles.297 Classical contract 
law is marked by clear rules and strict adherence to legal formalities 
such as the statute of frauds. By contrast, modern contract law favors 
general standards, such as “good faith” and “unconscionability,” and 
shows greater sympathy for equitable precepts.298 Many scholars, 
especially those in the field of law and economics, contend that legal 
norms that take the form of general standards cause more litigation than 
narrow rules do.299 Suppose they are correct, and thus there is more 
contract litigation in contextualist states because these jurisdictions have 
adopted most modern doctrines. That would lower the ratio of 
                                                          
 295. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 286-90; see supra notes 109-26 and accompanying text. 
 296. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 289-91; see supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
 297. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, passim (2010) (discussing numerous differences between California’s 
“contextualist” contract law and New York’s “formalist” contract law, including differences 
regarding formation, defenses, interpretation, choice-of-law clauses, and arbitration clauses). 
 298. KNAPP, supra note 285, at 31. 
 299. See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal 
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 481-82, 481 nn.84, 85 & 88-90 (2008) (“The use of rules and 
standards, as law and economics scholars have shown, involves different costs and benefits[, and] 
standards usually entail higher enforcement and compliance costs than rules.”) (collecting 
authorities); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 32-33, 56-57 (2000) (concluding that combining behavioral analysis 
with economic analysis leads to the insight that “standards will be more expensive to apply [than 
rules] both because applying a standard usually will be more expensive than applying a rule and 
because more cases will be litigated in a standards regime than in a rules regime”); see also Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571-73 (1992) 
(explaining why rules should have lower enforcement costs than standards). But see id. at 573 n.35, 
575 n.41 (discussing various reasons why there might be more or less litigation under standards 
than under rules). There are two principal bases for this conclusion. First, standards increase 
litigation because they generate more uncertainty than rules. See Korobkin, supra, at 32 (“The ex 
ante certainty that rules provide should encourage more disputes to settle out of court and not 
require adjudication at all”). Second, when applying rules, adjudicators need merely decide whether 
the relevant facts are present. Id. But under standards, adjudicators must both uncover the facts and 
determine the precise content of the law since this was not done by the enactor ex ante. Id.; accord 
Kaplow, supra, at 570. The extra step requires the expenditure of additional resources. 
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interpretation cases to contract cases established by my key number 
searches for those territories, distorting any comparison between 
textualist and contextualist states. In sum, the Study One protocol could 
not account for the fact that the interpretive approach a state employs is 
generally correlated with other rules of contract law in that jurisdiction. 
Study Four likely suffers from the same weakness. The comparison 
in this project is across time rather that across borders. But the embrace 
of contextualism in my five states was probably accompanied by the 
adoption of other modern contract rules during the same era. Notably, 
this problem may not be as severe in Study Four as it was in Study One. 
The time period for Study One was 2000 through 2009.300 By the turn of 
the millennium, the transition to the modern approach to contracts was 
generally complete.301 In contrast, the contextualist time periods used in 
Study Four are generally before 2000.302 It is possible that some of the 
states used in Study Four adopted contextualism well in advance of 
incorporating the full panoply of modern doctrines into their law. If that 
is the case, then the distortive effect of modern contract principles will 
be lower here than in Study One. However, even if the distortion is 
equally severe in both projects, that does not invalidate Study Four. 
Since disparities in general contract doctrine were not sufficient to 
preclude the completion of Study One, they are no bar with respect to 
Study Four either. 
The rest of the discussion of Study Four—including further 
methodological points and the results—is set out in Part VI below.303 
D. Study Five: Two Interpretive Systems Within a Single State 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) contains 
several statutes and comments that appear to adopt principles of 
contextualist interpretation.304 And some commentators believe, in light 
of these provisions, that the Code embraces a full-blooded form of 
contextualism.305 If this is correct, then courts in textualist jurisdictions 
are required to apply the contextualist approach when construing 
agreements for the sale of goods.306 In other words, textualist states 
                                                          
 300. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 294. 
 301. Indeed, some states had started turning back towards the classical view by then. KNAPP, 
supra note 285, at 31. 
 302. See infra Tables 1-2. 
 303. See infra Part VI. 
 304. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) & cmts. 1, 3 (2001); id. § 2-202 & cmts. 1(c), 2; id. § 1-201(b)(3) 
& cmt. 3. 
 305. See sources cited infra note 363. 
 306. Article 2 only governs transactions in goods. U.C.C. § 2-102. 
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actually employ two different methods of interpretation: contextualism 
for goods-based contracts and textualism for most other contracts. The 
final proposed study takes advantage of this dual system. It involves 
comparing (a) the ratio of common law interpretation cases to common 
law contract cases, with (b) the ratio of UCC interpretation cases to UCC 
contract cases, in a set of textualist territories during a specified time 
period. To collect and code the common law decisions, I would use the 
Contracts (topic 95) and Evidence (topic 157) key numbers from Study 
One. And to collect and code the UCC opinions, I would use Sales (topic 
343) key numbers. Since the common law cases in the relevant 
jurisdictions employ textualism and the UCC decisions apply 
contextualism, the proposed comparison could highlight the impacts of 
each interpretive approach within a single group of states during a single 
time period.307 
This research structure has two critical advantages over the design 
of the other projects. First, unlike Studies One, Two, and Three, all data 
comparisons are intrajurisdictional, nullifying the need to control for 
differences across state lines. Second, because the textualist and 
contextualist data for each territory comes from the same era, there is no 
need to control for legal and social changes across time, something that 
is necessary for Study Four. 
Unfortunately, Study Five also suffers from several weaknesses. 
Some of these problems can be overcome, but one is fatal. Thus, I 
decided not to complete the project. In the rest of Part V.D, I briefly 
discuss four of the lesser problems and then turn to a full exposition of 
the disqualifying limitation. 
The first weakness is that the research protocol for Study Five 
introduces new confounding variables. There are numerous potential 
distinctions between contracts for the sale of goods and agreements that 
are regulated by the common law—such as those for services and real 
estate. Let me offer two possibilities. First, the types of parties that 
execute contracts for goods probably vary from those who enter other 
types of transactions. Second, common law litigation may differ from 
statutory litigation in crucial ways. Importantly, I suspect that the 
confounds for Study Five are smaller in number than those for Studies 
                                                          
 307. Note that I am using phrases like “UCC interpretation cases” and “UCC contract cases” 
only to refer to decisions applying the rules set forth in Article 2 of the UCC This study does not 
concern interpretation or contract opinions arising under other articles of the code, such as Article 9 
(which regulates secured transactions). Of course, one might design a study similar to mine that 
compares contract interpretation under the common law to contract interpretation under the entire 
UCC. But I suspect that such a study would face even more problems than the project discussed 
here. 
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One through Four. That is because variations among states and across 
time periods are likely more significant than the differences between 
common law contracts and UCC contracts. Therefore, since I believe 
that my control mechanism (search results for general contract cases)  
is sufficient for my other projects, I think it is sufficient for Study Five  
as well. 
Second, the common law of contracts in textualist states is 
generally classical in nature.308 But most provisions in Article 2 reflect 
the modern approach to contract law.309 Accordingly, using general 
contract litigation in the denominator reintroduces a problem that also 
applies to Studies One and Four: the distortive effect of variations in 
contract law beyond the subject of interpretation.310 Suppose that 
modern doctrines tend to result in more litigation than classical rules.311 
This would lower the ratio of UCC interpretation decisions to UCC 
contract decisions in the textualist states vis-à-vis the common law ratio, 
undermining the comparison of the two. However, this challenge is no 
more severe here than in Studies One and Four, and thus this concern is 
not disqualifying. 
Third, employing only the Sales key numbers to collect UCC 
interpretation decisions might result in critical under-coding bias. That is 
because a significant fraction of judicial opinions addressing contract 
interpretation under the Code contain interpretation-related key numbers 
exclusively from Customs and Usages (topic 113).312 And Customs and 
Usages key numbers cannot be included in Westlaw searches for Article 
2 interpretation cases because that topic is used to classify decisions 
applying both the UCC and the common law.313 But the potential bias 
from under-coding is likely no greater a problem for Study Five than for 
Studies One, Two, and Four. Therefore, this weakness does not preclude 
completing Study Five. 
Fourth, one of the general weaknesses of the Key Number System 
is that West’s staff do not always code opinions accurately. Sometimes 
                                                          
 308. See supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
 309. Moolenaar v. Co-Build Cos., 354 F. Supp. 980, 984 (D.V.I. 1973) (observing that Article 
2 of the UCC illustrates “the approach of the modern law, with its emphasis on reasonable 
commercial dealings and its rejection of technical requirements”). 
 310. See Silverstein, supra note 12, at 302-03; supra notes 295-302 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 312. This conclusion is based on (1) a manual review of nearly 100 cases tagged with 
interpretation-related key numbers from Customs and Usages, and (2) the results returned by 
multiple Westlaw searches. See also WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 562-
63 (setting forth the Customs and Usages key numbers). 
 313. This conclusion is based on the same manual review of cases tagged with Customs and 
Usage key numbers discussed in the immediately prior footnote. 
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they classify a headnote with the wrong key number. Study Five 
presented an interesting example of this problem. The Sales key 
numbers in topic 343 are supposed to be used only to categorize 
headnotes that concern Article 2 of the UCC.314 Despite this, I found 
several decisions with topic 343 key numbers that contained no 
reference to Article 2 and instead involved the sale of a business rather 
than the transfer of goods.315 In fairness, some of these lawsuits 
concerned asset purchase agreements—to which Article 2 often 
applies.316 But a number of the opinions with Sales key numbers 
involved contracts that are plainly outside the scope of the Code.317 
Based on a quick review of the caselaw, I do not think that this problem 
is disqualifying for Study Five. However, I did not thoroughly analyze 
the issue because the fifth weakness, discussed next, is indeed fatal to 
the project, making this classification issue moot. 
Fifth and last, the decisional law on contract interpretation in 
textualist states does not vary sufficiently between the UCC and the 
common law to make an empirical comparison of the two valuable. This 
is so for three reasons. First, at best, courts generally apply a limited 
version of contextualism when construing agreements that fall under the 
UCC. Second, at worst, courts often explicitly or effectively utilize 
textualism when interpreting contracts governed by the Code. Third, the 
common law rules of interpretation in textualist states frequently include 
exceptions to the four-corners rule that move the law in a contextualist 
direction. Given these three points, UCC contextualism and common 
law textualism are far more alike in practice in textualist states than 
contextualism and textualism are in their ideal forms. 
This weakness invalidates Study Five. And thus, I decided not to 
complete the project. But the similarities between the UCC and the 
                                                          
 314. WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 109, at 1497 (“Subjects Included[:] 
Transfers of ownership of personal property . . . for a price in money or its equivalent.”). 
 315. See, e.g., Rachal v. Luzader, 927 So. 2d 1286, 1286-87 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Metro. 
Ventures, LLC v. GEA Assocs., 688 N.W.2d 722, 723-24 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). 
 316. See Morgan Publ’ns, Inc. v. Squire Publishers, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 164, 167, 173-75 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000) (summarizing the caselaw regarding when Article 2 of the UCC governs the sale of a 
business conducted via an asset purchase agreement) (involving a contract for the sale of an ongoing 
newspaper business; holding that while goods of considerable value would be transferred under the 
contract, the predominate purpose of the agreement was not for the sale of goods, and thus Article 2 
did not apply to the transaction). 
 317. See, e.g., Metro. Ventures, 688 N.W.2d at 724, 726-27 (agreement for the sale of a 
business, primarily engaged in owning and operating a building and a parking garage; appearing to 
apply Wisconsin common law and failing to cite the UCC); Dierker Assocs., D.C., P.C v. Gillis, 
859 S.W.2d 737, 738-39, 741 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (agreement for the sale of a chiropractic clinic; 
the bulk of the purchase price was for the business itself, with a small additional sum set for 
equipment). 
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common law warrant exposition here because various aspects of those 
similarities have received only cursory treatment in the secondary 
literature and caselaw. Accordingly, the sub-parts below address in 
greater detail the three reasons why UCC contextualism and common 
law textualism are not sufficiently different in practice in textualist 
jurisdictions to justify the completion of Study Five. 
1. Partial Contextualism Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
The language of the UCC can be read to support either of two 
distinct versions of contextualism. I shall call these versions “full 
contextualism” and “partial contextualism.” Under full contextualism, 
the judge must consider all relevant extrinsic evidence in deciding 
whether a contract is ambiguous during the first stage of the interpretive 
process. Partial contextualism, as the name suggests, is narrower. 
According to this approach, at stage one, the UCC only mandates that 
courts review the text of the contract and evidence relating to what I will 
label the “incorporation tools”318—course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade.319 Other types of extrinsic evidence are 
governed by the general law of contracts (typically common law), and 
thus their role varies from state to state. If the Code endorses partial 
contextualism, then a court located in a jurisdiction with textualist 
common law may only consider the express terms and the incorporation 
tools in deciding whether an agreement is ambiguous. That is because (i) 
the Code requires that the judge review the incorporation tools, and (ii) 
supplemental principles of common law bar the judge from receiving 
any other categories of extrinsic evidence, such as preliminary 
negotiations. The additional classes of evidence are excluded unless and 
until the case reaches stage two—resolving the ambiguity. If the court is 
located in a state with contextualist common law, by contrast, then 
partial contextualism obligates the judge to examine all extrinsic 
evidence in making the ambiguity determination. That is because (i) the 
Code requires review of the incorporation tools, and (ii) the common law 
requires that the court consider the remaining types of evidence. 
                                                          
 318. I derive this phrase from the secondary literature analyzing the UCC. See, e.g., Lisa 
Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2015) (explaining that the UCC 
employs an “incorporation strategy—the interpretive approach that directs courts to look to course 
of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade to interpret contracts and fill contractual 
gaps”). 
 319. A “course of performance” is essentially the parties’ conduct in performance of the 
contract at issue. See U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (2001). A “course of dealing” is the parties’ conduct under 
prior contracts between them. Id. § 1-303(b). And a “usage of trade” is a practice or method of 
dealing in the industry or location where the parties operate that the parties should know about and 
should expect to be followed with respect to the contract at issue. Id. § 1-303(c). 
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As noted above, the Code contains language that is consistent with 
both full contextualism and partial contextualism. Starting with partial 
contextualism, support for that approach can be found in the provisions 
that (1) explicate the role of course of performance, course of dealing, 
and usage of trade, and (2) set out Article 2’s parol evidence rule. The 
two relevant statutes are sections 1-303 and 2-202.320 
Section 1-303 provides that the incorporation tools may be used to 
interpret, supplement, and even “qualify” the express terms of an 
agreement.321 The statute also states that the express terms and the 
incorporation tools “must be construed whenever reasonable as 
consistent with each other.”322 However, “[i]f such construction is 
unreasonable: . . . express terms prevail over course of performance, 
course of dealing, and usage of trade.”323 
Section 2-202 begins by setting out the contradiction prong of the 
parol evidence rule: “Terms . . . which are . . . set forth in a writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement . . . may 
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .”324 The statute then provides that 
a final writing may be explained or supplemented 
(a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . ; 
and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the 
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement.325 
In addition, official comment 1(c) to section 2-202 explains that 
this law “definitely rejects: . . . [t]he requirement that a condition 
precedent to the admissibility of the type of evidence specified in 
paragraph (a) [the incorporation tools] is an original determination by 
the court that the language used is ambiguous.”326 
Three arguments in favor of partial contextualism can be derived 
from these pieces of sections 1-303 and 2-202. First, comment 1(c) to 
                                                          
 320. See id. §§ 1-303, 2-202. 
 321. Id. § 1-303(d) (“A course of performance or course of dealing between the parties or 
usage of trade . . . is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give 
particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of 
the agreement.”). 
 322. Id. § 1-303(e). 
 323. Id. § 1-303(e)(1). The statute further provides that, among the incorporation tools, the 
order of priority is (i) course of performance, (ii) course of dealing, and (iii) usage of trade. Id. §§ 1-
303(e)(2), (3). 
 324. Id. § 2-202. 
 325. Id. §§ 2-202(a), (b). 
 326. Id. § 2-202, cmt. 1(c). 
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section 2-202 specifically exempts course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade from application of the four-corners rule—
the requirement that contractual language be facially ambiguous before 
the court may consider extrinsic evidence.327 But the comment says 
nothing about whether other types of extrinsic evidence are subject to a 
patent ambiguity requirement.328 Accordingly, given the canon expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius,329 the exemption should not extend beyond 
the incorporation tools.330 
Second, the statutory language of section 1-303 discusses only 
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade.331 The 
provision contains no references to alternative forms of extrinsic 
evidence.332 Section 2-202 also limits its discussion of interpretation to 
the incorporation tools,333 though it does address other evidence when 
setting forth the parol evidence rule limitations on contradiction and 
supplementation334 This means that the two principal sections of the 
                                                          
 327. Id.  
 328. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, 1 HAWKLAND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE SERIES § 2-202:1, at 2-167 to 2-168 (Frederick H. Miller ed. 2014) (“While the official 
comment to Section 2-202 provides that demonstrating a term is ambiguous is not a prerequisite for 
admission of evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance, whether 
ambiguity should be a prerequisite to other types of evidence being admitted to determine the 
meaning of the written terms is not addressed in the text or comments of Section 2-202.”). 
 329. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 120 (2018) (“Under the general rule of statutory construction 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one or more items of a class implies that 
those not identified are to be excluded.”). 
 330. Keep in mind, however, that courts generally view the official comments as constituting 
merely persuasive authority, rather than binding authority. See, e.g., Blue Valley Coop. v. Nat’l 
Farmers Org., 600 N.W.2d 786, 792 (Neb. 1999); Volvo Commercial Fin., L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 163 P.3d 723, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); see also LARY LAWRENCE, 1B LAWRENCE’S 
ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103:34 [Rev], at 53-54 (3d ed. 2012) (“The 
Official Comments are persuasive, although not controlling authority, and provide guidance in 
interpreting the UCC.”). 
 331. U.C.C § 1-303. 
 332. See id. 
 333. See id. § 2-202. 
 334. See id. § 2-202(b); see also 2 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 328, § 2-202:1, at 2-167 
(“The parol evidence rule as expressed in Article 2 does not directly address the question of whether 
other types of evidence (other than course of dealing, usage of trade, course of performance, or 
consistent additional terms) can be admitted to determine the meaning of the written terms.”). In 
fairness, note that section 2-202 provides that a final writing may be “explained or 
supplemented . . . by evidence of consistent additional terms . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (emphasis 
added). This suggests that the statute does regulate the role of evidence beyond the incorporation 
tools in the process of interpretation. But since section 2-202(b) states that such evidence may not 
be considered when the parties have executed a completely integrated agreement, id., the better 
reading of the statute is that the discussion of consistent additional terms in subsection (b) is 
concerned only with supplementation, not explanation (i.e., interpretation). After all, the very 
concept of “consistent additional terms” speaks to including separate terms in the contract, not 
interpreting those already written down. Moreover, if an agreement is ambiguous, then the court 
may review every type of extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity regardless of whether the 
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Code concerned with contract interpretation are silent on the interpretive 
role of extrinsic evidence beyond the incorporation tools. Accordingly, 
that role is governed by general rules of contract law. 
To elaborate, the UCC was not intended to displace all prior law 
governing commercial transactions.335 Instead, “it was drafted against 
the backdrop of existing bodies of law, including the common law and 
equity, and relies on those bodies of law to supplement it [sic] provisions 
in many important ways.”336 Put another way, for numerous subjects, the 
UCC does not prescribe an exhaustive set of rules.337 Instead, the Code 
only contains a limited group of standards designed to implement 
particular policies, and, in section 1-103(b), directs courts to fill the gaps 
with bodies of law beyond the UCC, namely the common law and other 
commercial statutes.338 
The Code adopts this approach with respect to contract 
interpretation and the parol evidence rule. Sections 1-303 and 2-202 are 
not comprehensive provisions. They address only selected aspects of 
interpretation and parol evidence.339 As a result, courts must employ 
general principles of contract interpretation derived primarily from the 
common law when construing agreements governed by the UCC.340 For 
example, the canons of construction, such as construe against the drafter, 
supplement the Code,341 as do the various exceptions to the parol 
                                                          
contract is set forth in a complete integration. Thus, since section 2-202(b) conditions the 
admissibility of consistent additional terms evidence on whether the parties have written “a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement,” id., the provision, properly 
understood, is about the parol evidence rule concept of supplementation rather than interpretation. 
 335. 1B LAWRENCE, supra note 330, § 1-103:208 [Rev], at 130-31. 
 336. U.C.C. § 1-103, cmt. 2. 
 337. See 1B LAWRENCE, supra note 330, § 1-103:3 [Rev], at 41. 
 338. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the UCC,] the 
principles of law and equity . . . supplements its provisions.”); id. § 1-103, cmts. 2, 3. See generally 
1B LAWRENCE, supra note 330, §§ 1-103:231 to 1-303:551 [Rev], at 142-257 (discussing the 
numerous bodies of law that supplement the UCC). 
 339. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.12, at 135 (6th ed. 
2009) (observing that “the UCC has very little to say about interpretation”). 
 340. 1B LAWRENCE, supra note 330, § 1-103:294 [Rev], at 164 (“Nothing in the UCC 
displaces the general principles governing the interpretation of contracts, except as particular 
sections of the UCC may produce a result that would be inconsistent with the ordinary contract law 
result.”); id. § 1-103:415 [Rev], at 210-11 (“Except as partly modified by the provision relating to 
sales contracts and contracts for leasing goods, the UCC does not displace the parol evidence 
rule . . . . When the UCC makes no provision as to the admissibility of parol evidence, the court 
must look to the non-UCC law.”); see, e.g., Travis Bank & Tr. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex. 
App. 1983) (explaining that general principles of contract interpretation apply to letters of credit 
governed by Article 5 of the UCC). 
 341. Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193, 220 (Jody S. Kraus 
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); see, e.g., Snelten v. Schmidt Implement Co., 647 N.E.2d 1071, 1074-
75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applying the canon that specific contractual language controls general 
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evidence rule, like the fraud exception.342 The standards governing the 
role of extrinsic evidence other than the incorporation tools—i.e., the 
rules of textualism and contextualism—are no different. Thus, they also 
supplement the UCC and apply to contracts subject to the Code. 
Third, the incorporation tools are exempted from the 
supplementation prong of the parol evidence rule. Under the Code, as 
under the common law, the general rule is that evidence of consistent 
additional terms is admissible only when the parties have not expressed 
their agreement in a completely integrated writing.343 But this limitation 
does not apply to course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of 
trade. Under the UCC, the incorporation tools may add consistent terms 
to a contract even when the parties have executed a complete 
integration.344 This means that a merger clause does not bar the court 
from examining these elements for purposes of supplementing an 
agreement.345 Instead, evidence of course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade is excluded from consideration only when 
“carefully negated” in the parties’ written contract.346 The privilege 
                                                          
language to an agreement governed by Article 2); Berry v. Lucas, 150 P.3d 424, 426-27 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2006) (applying construe against the drafter in a case governed by Article 2 of the UCC). 
 342. 1 WHITE ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3:15, at 244 (2012). 
 343. U.C.C. § 2-202 (“Terms . . . set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein . . . may 
be . . . supplemented . . . (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the courts finds the 
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the 
agreement.”) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981) (setting forth the same rule under the common law). 
 344. Section 2-202 provides as follows: “Terms . . . set forth in a writing intended by the 
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein . . . 
may be . . . supplemented (a) by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade; . . . .” 
U.C.C. § 2-202. By leaving out the “complete and exclusive statement” limitation contained in 
section 2-202(b), the intent of section 2-202(a) is clearly to exempt the incorporation tools from the 
restriction applicable to other evidence of consistent additional terms. See id.; JOHN EDWARD 
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 85[C][6], at 438 (5th ed. 2011) (“If the parties intended 
their writing to be not merely final but also a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of their 
agreement, evidence of consistent additional terms is excluded, but even with respect to such a 
complete and exclusive expression of agreement, evidence of trade usage, course of dealing, and 
course of performance is admissible.”); PERILLO, supra note 339, § 3.4(e)(2), at 118 (“Thus, under 
this rule [in 2-202(a)], even a total integration is treated as if it were a partial integration in relation 
to this triad of evidence [i.e., the incorporation tools] . . . .”); see also 1 WHITE ET AL., supra note 
342, § 3:14, at 238-239 & n.53 (collecting numerous case authorities endorsing this understanding). 
 345. 1 WHITE ET AL., supra note 342, § 3:16, at 247; id. § 4.3, at 276. 
 346. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (explaining that course of performance, course of dealing, and 
usage of trade “become an element of the meaning of the words used” in an agreement “[u]nless 
carefully negated”). It is not clear what constitutes “careful negation.” A specific clause disclaiming 
a particular usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of performance should be sufficient. Kirst, 
supra note 64, at 865. But a broad clause simply stating that the incorporation tools are “ineffective 
to explain, supplement, vary, or modify the contract” might not be. Compare S. Concrete Servs., 
Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 584 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (“The court recognizes 
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conferred upon the incorporation tools highlights the importance of these 
concepts to the structure and policies of the Code. Since the UCC 
provides for different treatment of course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade for purposes of adding to an agreement, it is 
reasonable to construe the Code as also providing for different treatment 
of these categories for purposes of interpretation. In other words, 
because only the incorporation tools are exempted from the 
supplementation prong of the parol evidence rule, it is plausible to 
believe that only the incorporation tools are exempted from the four-
corners rule, as set out in comment 1(c) to section 2-202.347 
Turning to the case for full contextualism, that position is most 
strongly supported by the UCC’s definition of “agreement,” which is set 
out in section 1-201(b)(3): “‘Agreement’ . . . means the bargain of the 
parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other 
circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or 
usage of trade . . . .”348 Because the code employs the word “including,” 
an agreement appears to be constituted by the written text, the 
incorporation tools, and other aspects of the commercial context.349 The 
                                                          
that all ambiguity as to the applicability of trade usage could be eliminated by a blanket condition 
that the express terms of the contract are in no way to be modified by custom, usage, or prior 
dealings.”), and Madison Indus., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 581 A.2d 85, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990) (explaining in dicta that the court would have enforced a general provision barring all 
incorporation tools evidence had the UCC governed the contract at issue), with Kirst, supra, at 865-
67 (arguing that general boilerplate language purporting to negate the effect of course of dealing or 
usage of trade should not be dispositive; if the parties continue to follow a given usage or course of 
dealing despite a boilerplate exclusion, then evidence of the incorporation tools is admissible in any 
later dispute over the particular usage or course of dealing). See also Bernstein, supra note 318, at 
71 (observing that “the enforceability and effectiveness of a general clause opting out of all trade 
usages is at best unclear”). 
 347. There is a fourth argument in favor of partial contextualism that is closely related to the 
third. Some commentators believe that section 2-202 exempts course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade from the contradiction prong of the parol evidence rule as well. See, e.g., 
2 LAWRENCE, supra note 330, § 2-202:168, at 656 (“By separately covering course of dealing, 
usage of trade and course of performance in U.C.C. § 2-202(a), the Code makes it clear that the 
limitation found in U.C.C. § 2-202(b) as to the admission of additional terms to those that are 
consistent with the writing does not apply to course of dealing, usage of trade or course of 
performance.”) (emphasis added). This means that the incorporation tools may override, at least in 
part, the express terms of a written contract, while other types of extrinsic evidence may not. If 
accurate, this further supports the conclusion that course of performance, course of dealing, and 
usage of trade should receive differential treatment at stage one of the interpretive process. 
However, I consigned this argument to a footnote because the claim that the incorporation tools are 
exempt from the contradiction limitation of the parol evidence rule is considerably more debatable 
than is the proposition that they are exempt from the supplementation limitation. See infra Part 
V.D.2. 
 348. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 349. “The word ‘includes’ is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation. . . . It, 
therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically 
enumerated . . . .” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
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official comment expressly endorses this construction by stating that the 
word agreement “is intended to include full recognition of usage of 
trade, course of dealing, course of performance and the surrounding 
circumstances as effective parts thereof . . . .”350 Since—by statutory 
fiat—both the incorporation tools and other aspects of the commercial 
context are equal parts of an agreement, they should play the same role 
in the construction of contracts. And thus, every type of extrinsic 
evidence ought to be examined by the court at both stages of the 
interpretive process.351 Indeed, because the Code considers all of the 
surrounding circumstances to be elements of an agreement, evidence of 
those circumstances can be thought of as concerning subjects that are 
intrinsic to a contract.352 Accordingly, it is a conceptual mistake to even 
refer to such evidence as “extrinsic.” 
If correct, this understanding of section 1-201(b)(3) creates 
problems for the partial contextualism arguments based on sections 1-
303 and 2-202. First, those arguments are generally premised on the 
claim that the Code is silent regarding categories of extrinsic evidence 
other than the incorporation tools.353 But that is not true. Section 1-
201(b)(3) addresses the other categories when it states that aspects of the 
commercial context beyond the incorporation tools are constituting 
elements of a contract.354 Second, the logic of section 1-201(b)(3) leads 
to the conclusion that all aspects of the surrounding circumstances are 
admissible at both stages of the interpretive process under the Code. 
That contradicts the principles of textualism. Therefore, those principles 
may not supplement the UCC because, pursuant to section 1-103, a  
                                                          
CONSTRUCTION § 47.7, at 310 (7th ed. 2014). 
 350. U.C.C. § 1-201, cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
 351. Professor John M. Breen explains the point this way when discussing the incorporation 
tools: 
First, the definition of agreement under section 1-201(b)[(3)] makes evidence of usage of 
trade, course of dealing, and course of performance necessarily relevant and 
presumptively admissible. Because these sources of contextual evidence are “effective 
parts” of the agreement itself, they cannot be excluded by other evidence of the same 
agreement. Instead, if an apparent conflict exists between the contextual evidence 
presented and the written terms of the agreement, then the question to be resolved is a 
question of determining [the parties’] intent from oral and written evidence. 
John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 
335 (2000) (quoting U.C.C § 1-201, cmt. 3) (other internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, if 
categories of evidence beyond the incorporation tools are “effective parts” of a contract governed by 
the Code, see U.C.C. § 1-201, cmt. 3, then they too are “presumptively admissible” at both stages of 
the interpretive process. 
 352. See Breen, supra note 351, at 328 (explaining that the Code regards the incorporation 
tools to be “intrinsic to the agreement itself”) (emphasis in original). 
 353. See supra notes 332-42 and accompanying text. 
 354. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3). 
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legal rule is barred from serving as a gap filler if it is inconsistent with  
the Code.355 
An additional basis for construing the UCC as adopting full 
contextualism can be found in comment 1 to section 1-303. This 
comment provides that “the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to 
be determined by the language used by them and by their action, read 
and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other 
surrounding circumstances.”356 While vague, the phrase “commercial 
practices and other surrounding circumstances” could be understood as 
referring to types of evidence beyond the incorporation tools.  
The comment is thus treating the incorporations tools, which are  
exempt from the four-corners rule, and other types of extrinsic evidence 
as equals.357 
A defender of partial contextualism could reply as follows. First, if 
the definition of agreement establishes that all types of extrinsic 
evidence are to be treated the same for purposes of interpretation, then 
why do other parts of the Code treat them differently? In particular, why 
does the statutory language of section 1-303 adopt rules for only the 
incorporation tools?358 And why does comment 1(c) to section 2-202 
                                                          
 355. Id. § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the UCC], the principles 
of law and equity . . . supplements its provisions.”) (emphasis added); id. § 1-103, cmt. 2 (providing 
that “the Uniform Commercial Code preempts principles of common law and equity that are 
inconsistent with either its provisions or its purposes and policies”) (emphasis added). 
 356. U.C.C. § 1-303, cmt. 1. 
 357. A brief note about section 2-202, comment 1(b) is in order. This comment provides that 
section 2-202 “definitely rejects: . . . (b) [t]he premise that the language used has the meaning 
attributable to such language by the rules of construction existing in the law rather than the meaning 
which arises out of the commercial context in which it is used . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-202, cmt. 1. Some 
scholars believe that this comment rejects the plain meaning rule in full. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, 
The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
407, 444 n.172 (1999) (stating that section 2-202, cmt. 1(b) rejects the plain meaning rule); John E. 
Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 882 & 
n.64 (2002) (citing section 2-202, comment 1(b) for the proposition that the UCC emasculates the 
plain meaning rule). That would mean that comment 1(b) endorses full contextualism. But I am 
skeptical of this reading of the comment. First, if comment 1(b) rejects textualism, then there would 
be no need for comment 1(c), which exempts the incorporation tools from the textualist plain 
meaning rule. See MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.17, at 170 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) (citing comment 1(c) for the proposition that the incorporation tools are 
exempted from the plain meaning rule); David G. Epstein et al., FIFTY: Shades of Grey—
Uncertainty About Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence After All These UCC Years, 45 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 925, 941 (2013) (“Official Comment 1(c) to UCC § 2-202 expressly rejects the plain meaning 
rule.”). Second, some of the canons of construction only apply at stage two of the interpretive 
process. As a result, the reference to “rules of construction” suggests that comment 1(b) is 
concerned with the resolution of ambiguity, not the ambiguity determination. Given these two 
points, comment 1(b) provides, at best, only weak support for the proposition that the UCC adopts 
full contextualism. 
 358. See U.C.C. § 1-303. 
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exempt only the incorporation tools from the patent ambiguity 
requirement?359 Second, sections 1-303 and 2-202 set out specific rules 
governing the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret, contradict, or add to 
a written contract.360 Section 1-201(b)(3), by contrast, is a general statute 
that does not directly address the use of evidence for any of those 
purposes.361 Accordingly, to the extent these laws are inconsistent,  
the definition statute must give way to the provisions setting forth 
operative standards.362 
 
                                                          
 359. See id. § 2-202, cmt. 1(c). 
 360. See id. §§ 1-303, 2-202. 
 361. See id. § 1-201(b)(3). 
 362. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“But it is a 
commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general . . . .”). 
  Note that when Article 2 of the UCC was revised in 2003, the drafters proposed three 
important changes to section 2-202 that concern the role of extrinsic evidence in deciding whether a 
contract is ambiguous. First, they elevated the incorporation tools’ exemption from the four-corners 
rule from a comment to the body of the statute: “Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of 
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary determination by 
the court that the language used is ambiguous.” U.C.C. § 2-202(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, Proposed Draft 2002). Second, the drafters deleted the language from comment (1)(b). 
Compare id. § 2-202 cmts. 1-5, with U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1(b). Recall that some commentators have 
read that comment as overturning the plain meaning rule and adopting full contextualism. See 
sources cited supra note 357. Third, the drafters added a new comment expressly endorsing partial 
contextualism: 
Issues of interpretation are generally left to the courts. In interpreting terms in a record, 
subsection (2) permits either party to introduce evidence drawn from a course of 
performance, a course of dealing, or a usage of trade without any preliminary 
determination by the court that the term at issue is ambiguous. This article takes no 
position on whether a preliminary determination of ambiguity is a condition to the 
admissibility of evidence drawn from any other source or on whether a contract clause 
can exclude an otherwise applicable implied-in-fact source. 
U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Proposed Draft 2002), cmt. 6 (emphasis 
added). While the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) 
and the American Law Institute ultimately withdrew Revised Article 2 after no state adopted it, 1 
HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 328, § 2-202:6, at 2-189, these amendments might shed light on 
the best reading of the current version of the Code. 
  For example, one could interpret the changes to section 2-202 as serving only to make 
clear that the UCC already embraces partial contextualism. Cf. Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003 
Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After 
Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 501-02 (2011) (describing the amendments to section 2-202 as 
constituting a “clarifying change”). This understanding is supported by the fact that the sole 
substantive alteration to the text of the provision was the addition of language previously in the 
comment. Alternatively, one could construe the three amendments as constituting a break from prior 
law. After all, since comments are merely persuasive authority and the statutory text is binding, 
moving language from the former into the latter might be a significant change. 
  Ultimately, arguments like those in the prior paragraph possess little force. As noted 
previously, Revised Article 2 was withdrawn by NCCUSL and the American Law Institute. And 
more importantly, the revision drafters’ understanding of section 2-202 has minimal bearing on the 
statute’s meaning because the law was drafted decades before the revision process began. 
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As a matter of statutory interpretation, the consensus among 
commentators is that the UCC adopts full contextualism.363 But the 
secondary literature also recognizes that courts favor partial 
contextualism over full contextualism.364 And I have come to the same 
conclusion based on my own research: Partial contextualism is the 
dominant approach to the Code in the decisional law.365 
In a textualist state, a court applying partial contextualism under the 
UCC must exclude everything but the text and the incorporation tools 
                                                          
 363. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 1, at 140-41 (“The UCC also does not require a finding of 
ambiguity before allowing extrinsic evidence of a contract’s commercial context—primarily, course 
of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade.”) (emphasis added); LINZER, supra note 58, 
§ 25.5 at 49 (“Why negotiations and preliminary exchanges of information are to be treated 
differently than the parties’ practice and the practices of their trade is not explained and is 
inconsistent with the overall approach of the Code and with Karl Llewellyn’s view of the parol 
evidence rule. . . . Article 2 should be applied identically to the Restatement (Second)’s broad 
contextual approach, and not be constricted artificially.”); id. § 25.13 at 146-47 & n.3; Robert E. 
Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1038-39 (2002) (“Rather, Article 2 
explicitly invites incorporation by defining the content of an agreement to include trade usage, prior 
dealings and the parties experiences in forming the contract. . . . The invitation to contextualize the 
contract in this manner is explicitly embodied in the Code’s definition of agreement . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). But see Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, 
“Express Terms,” and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C. 
L. REV. 777, 787 n.65 (1986) (“In effect, the Code gives priority to written terms with respect to 
evidence of prior negotiations or agreement but not with respect to evidence of trade usage.”). 
 364. See, e.g., 1B LAWRENCE, supra note 330, § 1-303:22 [Rev], at 606 (“The evidence of 
course of performance may show that the contract terms were ambiguous. That determination, when 
made, will then permit the admission of parol evidence to establish the meaning of the contract.”); 1 
WHITE ET AL., supra note 342, § 3:14, at 221-22 (“Most courts require that the terms to be 
interpreted be ambiguous or otherwise unclear on its [sic] face though 2-202 does not so provide”); 
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1501 (“If the contract provision appears ambiguous after evidence of course 
of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance has been admitted, other extrinsic evidence 
may then be admitted as well.”). 
 365. Cases from textualist states that endorse partial contextualism under the Code come in two 
forms. First, some expressly adopt partial contextualism, explaining that judges should consider 
only the text, course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade during the first stage of 
the interpretive process. See, e.g., Paragon Resources, Inc. v. Nat. Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 695 F.2d 
991, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying New York law) (Paragon Resources is probably the leading 
case endorsing partial contextualism under the Code); J. Lee Milligan, Inc. v. CIC Frontier, Inc., 
289 Fed. Appx. 786, 789-90 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Oklahoma law); Walk-In Med. Ctrs., 
Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law); Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1046-48 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying New York 
law); Dawn Enters. v. Luna, 399 N.W.2d 303, 306 n.3 (N.D. 1987); see also Mohave Valley 
Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Norton, 244 F.3d 1164, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001) (construing the UCC 
as a source of federal common law). Second, other decisions simply focus solely on the four corners 
of the contract at stage one when no incorporation tools evidence is implicated. See, e.g., W. 
Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. Vitalworks, Inc., 78 A.3d 167, 181, 183 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013); 
Shields Pork Plus, Inc. v. Swiss Valley Ag Serv., 767 N.E.2d 945, 949-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); 
Harper v. Calvert, 687 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). But note that some opinions in the 
latter group might have applied the plain meaning rule even if one party had submitted evidence 
regarding the incorporation tools. See infra notes 391-96 and accompanying text.  
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from the ambiguity determination. Most importantly, oral and written 
evidence regarding preliminary negotiations plays no role at stage one of 
the interpretive process. This means that the only difference between 
textualism and partial contextualism in such a jurisdiction is the role of 
the incorporation tools when deciding if a contract is ambiguous. 
However, course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade 
are extremely important types of evidence.366 As a result, an empirical 
study comparing litigation under the Code’s partial contextualism to 
litigation under the common law’s textualism would probably still 
possess considerable value. Thus, I would have completed Study Five if 
the dominance of partial contextualism over full contextualism were the 
only problem with the caselaw. But as I noted above, there are two 
additional problems. 
2. Quasi-Textualism Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
The arguments set forth in the prior section establish that 
reasonable minds can differ over whether the Code adopts full 
contextualism or partial contextualism. But given the language of 
sections 1-201(b)(3), 1-303, and 2-202, there is a compelling case that at 
least one of those two positions is correct. In other words, at minimum, 
the UCC appears to embrace a version of contract interpretation that is 
soundly on the contextualist side of the line. However, numerous 
reported decisions employ textualist methodologies when construing 
agreements governed by the Code. These cases create another problem 
for an empirical study attempting to compare common law textualism 
with UCC contextualism because they further diminish the practical 
distinction between those two approaches. 
Since most courts reject full contextualism,367 the judicial debate 
over the role of extrinsic evidence under the Code is focused on the 
incorporation tools. Commentators generally view the caselaw as 
endorsing three positions regarding the relationship of express terms to 
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade.368 
                                                          
 366. Kerry Lynn Macintosh, Liberty, Trade, and the Uniform Commercial Code: When Should 
Default Rules be Based on Business Practices?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1493 (1997) 
(“Most importantly, course of dealing, trade usage, and course of performance play important roles 
within Article 2.”); Murray, supra note 357, at 881-82 (“Trade usage, course of dealing and course 
of performance are so important that Article 2 insists that they are necessarily part of any contract 
and impervious to parol evidence rule excision.”); see also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 7.13, at 469 (4th ed. 2004) (“Such contentions [that a contract should be read in light 
of the incorporation tools] are especially common in disputes over commercial contracts”). 
 367. See supra notes 364-65 and accompanying test. 
 368. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 366, § 7.13, at 474-76; Kastely, supra note 363, at 
782-96. 
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According to position one, evidence regarding the incorporation tools is 
always relevant and admissible, even if the submitting party is offering 
the evidence to support an interpretation or supplemental term that 
completely overrides an express term of the contract. The classic 
example is Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.369 There, the 
parties’ written agreement provided that Columbia Nitrogen would 
purchase a minimum level of phosphate from Royster each year at a set 
price.370 When phosphate prices plunged, Columbia Nitrogen ordered 
only a fraction of the contractual minimum.371 In Royster’s lawsuit for 
breach, Columbia Nitrogen sought to introduce course of dealing and 
usage of trade evidence that the express price and quantity terms in their 
agreement were only projections and that the ultimate price and quantity 
would be adjusted at the time of sale to take into account prevailing 
market conditions.372 The trial court barred the evidence, but the Fourth 
Circuit reversed.373 The appellate court explained that section 2-202 
repealed the plain meaning rule for contracts involving the sale of 
goods.374 As a result, the existence of a patent ambiguity is not required 
before a judge may consider evidence regarding the incorporation 
tools.375 Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the extrinsic evidence 
can “be reasonably construed as consistent with the terms of the 
contract.”376 And the court held that Columbia Nitrogen’s course of 
dealing and trade usage submissions were sufficiently consistent with 
the express quantity and price terms to meet that standard.377 
Under position two, evidence concerning the incorporation tools is 
relevant and admissible when offered in support of an interpretation or 
supplemental term that, at most, qualifies an express term of the parties’ 
contract. Course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade 
may not be used to completely override one of the express terms. 
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co.378 is the archetype of this 
approach. Nanakuli, an asphaltic paving contractor, and Shell entered 
into a contract under which Shell was to supply asphalt to Nanakuli at 
                                                          
 369. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 370. Id. at 6. Actually, there was an escalation clause under which the price could increase. But 
there was no provision allowing for a decrease in price. Id. 
 371. Id.at 7. 
 372. Id. at 7-8. 
 373. Id. at 8, 11. 
 374. Id. at 8. 
 375. Id. at 8-9. 
 376. Id. at 9. 
 377. Id. at 9-10. 
 378. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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“Shell’s Posted Price at the time of delivery.”379 Nanakuli argued that 
the contract obligated Shell to provide Nanakuli with “price 
protection.”380 This means that after Shell raised its asphalt price, it was 
required to continue charging Nanakuli the old price for quantities 
Nanakuli needed to fulfill its obligations under construction contracts for 
which Nanakuli had made its bid using Shell’s original price.381 When 
Shell failed to provide such protection after a price increase, Nanakuli 
sued for breach.382 At trial, Nanakuli submitted both course of 
performance and trade usage evidence that price protection was a 
component of the parties’ contract, which the trial court admitted.383 On 
appeal, Shell argued that “price protection could not be construed as 
reasonably consistent with the express price term . . .” providing for 
sales at Shell’s posted price.384 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining 
that incorporation tools evidence is admissible when it does not “totally 
negate” an express term but instead merely qualifies the term.385 Here, 
including price protection in the contract only created a limited 
exception to the express provision that Nanakuli must pay Shell’s posted 
price.386 Most of Shell’s asphalt was indeed sold at the “posted price.”387 
Price protection merely mandates that Shell sell to Nanakuli at the old 
posted price rather than the current one for brief periods after a price 
increase. Thus, price protection only qualifies or “cuts down” the posted 
price term. It does not completely negate it.388 
Note that the Ninth Circuit employed the same standard as the 
Fourth Circuit in Columbia Nitrogen. The Nanakuli court held that the 
incorporation tools evidence was admissible because “the jury could 
have reasonably construed price protection as consistent with the 
express term.”389 The Fourth Circuit used exactly this locution.390 But 
the Ninth Circuit interpreted “reasonably construed . . . as consistent” in 
a narrower manner. Under Columbia Nitrogen, the incorporation tools 
may be used to completely negate an express term. Under Nanakuli, the 
incorporation tools may only qualify or limit an express term. 
                                                          
 379. Id. at 777-78. 
 380. Id. at 778. 
 381. Id. at 777. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 778 & n.5. 
 384. Id. at 779. 
 385. Id. at 780, 805. 
 386. Id. 
 387. See id. at 785. 
 388. Id. at 780, 805. 
 389. Id. at 780 (emphasis added); accord id. at 795 (Incorporation tools evidence is admissible 
unless it “cannot be reasonably reconciled with the express terms of the contract.”). 
 390. See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
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The final position is the most restrictive: evidence relating to the 
incorporation tools is relevant and admissible only if the evidence is 
offered to support an interpretation or additional term that does not 
contradict the express language of the contract. The cases adopting this 
position fall into two subgroups. In some, the judge considers the 
proffered extrinsic evidence when deciding whether an alleged 
interpretation or supplemental term conflicts with the written provisions. 
Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc.391 
exemplifies this approach. There, the court considered—but rejected as 
inadmissible—trade usage evidence that the quantity term in a contract 
for the sale of concrete was not binding on either party.392 Other 
decisions employ textualist methodology. In these, the court refuses to 
review any extrinsic evidence—including evidence relating to the 
incorporation tools—unless it finds that the contract at issue contains a 
patent ambiguity. For example, in Midwest Generation, LLC v. Carbon 
Processing & Reclamation, LLC, the court applied the four-corners rule 
in deciding that an agreement for the sale of oil was unambiguous.393 In 
the process, the court ignored evidence of industry standards offered by 
one of the parties.394 
Under the Southern Concrete Services approach, the judge 
considers both the express terms and the incorporation tools evidence in 
determining whether there is a prohibited contradiction. Under a true 
textualist approach, as reflected in Midwest Generation, the judge only 
reviews the face of the written contract in adjudicating the admissibility 
of any course of performance, course of dealing, or trade usage 
evidence. Some courts and commentators argue that this is a crucial 
difference, and thus that Southern Concrete Services and Midwest 
Generation constitute two different approaches to the relationship of 
                                                          
 391. 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (applying Georgia law). 
 392. Id. at 582-83, 586. 
 393. Midwest Generation, LCC v. Carbon Processing & Reclamation, LLC, 445 F. Supp. 2d 
928, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  
 394. Id. at 931-33 (applying Illinois law). Note that a substantial number of cases applying a 
four-corners approach to contracts governed by the UCC do so without citing to any of the relevant 
Code provisions and/or rely primarily or exclusively on common law authorities in their analysis. 
See, e.g., id. (doing both of these things); Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-Anim Health 
Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179-80 (D. Kan. 2007) (same); Cook Composites, Inc. v. 
Westlake Styrene Corp., 15 S.W.3d 124, 131-33 (Tex. App. 2000) (same); see also Epstein, supra 
note 357, at 926, 929-30 (“Too often, the reported opinions in post-UCC cases that involve a dispute 
over interpreting a term in or adding terms to a written contract for the sale of goods do not use the 
language of the UCC.”). There are many possible explanations for such opinions, including (1) the 
confusing nature of contract interpretation and the parol evidence rule; (2) poor or strategic 
advocacy on the part of the litigating attorneys with respect to the interpretation issues; and (3) 
parties and courts failing to consider choice of law questions, such as whether the common law or 
the UCC regulates a given agreement. 
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express terms and the incorporation tools.395 But when courts apply a 
robust understanding of “contradict”—as is the general practice among 
the cases following position three—the line between these two 
approaches breaks down. Let me elaborate. 
The notion of a “contradiction” as employed in decisions like 
Southern Concrete Services concerns the conceptual relationship 
between (a) the express terms and (b) the meaning or supplemental term 
advanced by the party seeking to introduce evidence of the incorporation 
tools. That relationship is not dependent on the content or weight of the 
evidence reflecting any course of performance, course of dealing, or 
usage of trade—again, pursuant to a robust understanding of 
“contradict.” That is because such evidence has no bearing on the 
conceptual question of contradiction or consistency. Instead, all that 
matters is whether the proposed interpretation or supplemental term is 
logically consistent with the standard meaning (or meanings) of the 
express terms. If the answer is “no,” then any related incorporation tools 
evidence is barred from further consideration in the case. 
Critically, such a contradiction assessment is substantively 
indistinguishable from the ambiguity determination under textualism. 
The latter requires the judge to determine whether the language 
contained within the four corners of a written agreement is reasonably 
susceptible to the interpretations asserted by both parties. But that 
simply means that the judge must decide whether one of the parties is 
trying to contradict rather than construe the contractual language with its 
alleged understanding of the agreement. If the answer is “yes,” then the 
incompatible interpretation is rejected and any supporting extrinsic 
                                                          
 395. For commentators adopting this view, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 366, § 7.13, at 474 
(“In contrast to a plain meaning rule, under which evidence is not considered for the purpose of 
interpretation until there has been an evaluation of the clarity of the written contract, a test of 
consistency requires a consideration of the evidence of usage in order to determine whether it 
comports with the language of the written contract.”); 5 KNIFFIN, supra note 357, § 24.17, at 174 
(“There is a distinction, however, between the prohibition of inconsistency and the plain meaning 
rule. Under both the UCC and the Restatement (Second) . . . a conflict with express language is 
identifiable only after the court has fully examined the proffered evidence of course of dealing or 
course of performance or trade usage. . . . Under the plain meaning rule, in contrast, a court would 
not examine the evidence of course of dealing, course of performance, or trade usage if the contract 
appeared unambiguous on its face.”). For cases adopting this view, see Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. 
Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods., Inc. 212 F.3d 373, 377-81 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the 
four-corners rule, finding the contract to be unambiguous, and thus rejecting all extrinsic evidence, 
including evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; then separately 
holding that the extrinsic evidence of the incorporation tools was inadmissible because the evidence 
was not reasonably consistent with the express terms, as required by § 2-202 and the precursor to 
§ 1-303); Bray Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. H-02-98, 2005 WL 
6792280, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2005) (employing essentially the same analysis as Brooklyn 
Bagel Boys to reject course of performance evidence on both contradiction and ambiguity grounds). 
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evidence for that reading is barred from use. In sum, both versions of 
position three are fundamentally concerned with whether one party is 
offering an interpretation or supplemental term that cannot be logically 
reconciled with the express language of the parties’ agreement. And 
thus, any differences between the two approaches are cosmetic rather 
than real, as recognized by at least two commentators.396 
Each of the three positions regarding the relationship of express 
terms to course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade 
finds support in the language of the Code. But unlike the debate over 
partial and full contextualism discussed in the prior section,397 the 
statutory arguments at issue in this controversy have been exhaustively 
addressed by other scholars.398 Thus there is no reason to discuss  
them here. 
The more important question for purposes of my empirical study is 
the status of the caselaw. To start with, it is not clear which position is 
the majority rule. Indeed, all three of the approaches have at least one 
champion in the secondary literature assessing the doctrine.399 That 
                                                          
 396. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 357, at 944 (explaining that when “extrinsic evidence 
cannot contradict express terms . . . that is the same result that would be reached by a court applying 
the common law.”); Kirst, supra note 64, at 869 (“The courts construing subsection 1-205(5) [the 
precursor to 1-303(e)] as a false parol evidence rule continue to employ the plain meaning rule.”). 
Some cases also implicitly reflect this understanding. See, e.g., Golden Peanut Co. v. Hunt, 416 
S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (analyzing whether proffered trade usage evidence 
improperly “contradicts” the express terms by focusing on whether the contract is ambiguous, and 
explaining that “[w]here the language of the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation, no other construction is permissible.”). 
  Two qualifying points are in order. First, because judges are humans, those who actually 
review the incorporation tools evidence might be more likely to find that the asserted interpretation 
or supplemental term is consistent with the express language than judges who restrict their 
contradiction analysis to the four corners of the contract. If that is true, then the two versions of 
position three operate differently in practice than they should in theory. 
  Second, some scholars maintain that the UCC adopts an understanding of “contradiction” 
and “consistency” in §§ 1-303(e) and 2-202 that focuses on whether the firms in the relevant 
industry generally treat as incompatible the express language and the alleged meaning or 
supplemental term at issue. In other words, “contradiction” and “consistency” are to be understood 
in empirical terms rather than conceptual terms. See Kastely, supra note 363, at 807-10; Kirst, supra 
note 64, at 830-31. That is a plausible understanding of the Code. But it is not the reading used by 
courts who follow position three, as both of those authors also recognize. 
 397. See supra Part V.D.1. 
 398. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 357; Kastely, supra note 363; Kirst, supra note 64. 
 399. For example, Professor Scott concluded that position one is the majority view. See Robert 
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. L. REV. 847, 872 (2000) (stating 
that courts “generally” resolve “interpretation questions by recourse to the contractual context.”); id. 
at 866-71 (explaining the relevant statutory provisions and the interpreting caselaw). In her study of 
the UCC jurisprudence, Professor Bernstein found that position two is the leading approach. 
Bernstein, supra note 318, at 69-70, 82, 84-85. (“Under the relevant case law, however, courts are 
inclined to find usages to be consistent with even seemingly contradictory express terms, as long as 
the asserted usage does not ‘totally negate’ the express term.”). And Professor Whitford concluded 
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would not pose a problem for my project if I could locate states with 
textualist common law that also consistently follow position one or even 
position two—both of which can fairly be labeled as contextualist—
when applying the UCC. Unfortunately, significant authority endorsing 
(or at least appearing to endorse) position three exists in virtually every 
textualist jurisdiction I analyzed that otherwise was a potential candidate 
for Study Five. This includes the following territories: Alabama,400 
Georgia,401 Illinois,402 Kansas,403 Minnesota,404 Missouri,405 New 
York,406 and Texas.407 While many of these states also contain decisions 
adopting positions one or two, none of them seemed sufficiently 
                                                          
that judges most often follow position three. Whitford, supra note 7, at 938 n.18 (“[M]ost courts 
find that if the written terms have a clear or plain meaning, summary judgement is appropriate, and 
jury consideration of the meaning of extrinsic evidence is not necessary. Once the terms contained 
in a writing are privileged, extrinsic evidence can be considered only if the writing is deemed 
ambiguous or incomplete . . . .”). 
 400. See, e.g., McLarty Constr. & Equip. Co. v. Mining, Ore & Equip. Co., 428 So. 2d 629, 
633-34 (Ala. 1983); Port City Constr. Co. v. Henderson, 266 So. 2d 896, 899 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972). 
 401. See, e.g., S. Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 582-86 
(N.D. Ga. 1975); Golden Peanut Co. v. Bass, 563 S.E.2d 116, 119 (Ga. 2002); All Angels Constr. & 
Demolition, Inc. v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 539 S.E.2d 831, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); 
Golden Peanut Co. v. Hunt, 416 S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
 402. See, e.g., Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods, Inc. 212 
F.3d 373, 377-81 (7th Cir. 2000); Advance Process Supply Co. v. Litton Indus. Credit Corp., 745 
F.2d 1076, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1984); Midwest Generation, LLC v. Carbon Processing & 
Reclamation, LLC, 445 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Midwest Builder Distrib., Inc. v. 
Lord & Essex, Inc., 891 N.E.2d 1, 19, 27-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 403. See, e.g., Tri-State Commodities, Inc. v. GSO Am., Inc., 18 F. App’x 737, 742-43 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Fisherman Surgical Instruments, LLC v. Tri-Anim Health Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 
1170, 1179-80 (D. Kan. 2007); Speth v. Whitham Farms Feedyard, L.P. (In re Sunbelt Grain WKS, 
LLC), 406 B.R. 918, 928-30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009); Higginbotham Mgmt. Co. v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co., No. 106,345, 2012 WL 3135995, at *6-9 (Kan. Ct. App. July 27, 2012). 
 404. See, e.g., Prakita Design & Projectos LTDA v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., Civil No. 
06-957 (JRT/RLE), 2006 WL 2788182, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Sep. 26, 2006); Mies Equip., Inc. v. NCI 
Bldg. Sys., L.P., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082-84 (D. Minn. 2001); Bib Audio-Video Prods. v. 
Herold Mktg. Assocs., 517 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 405. See, e.g., HHCS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-1169 RLW, 2017 
WL 6493168, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2017); J.R. Waymire Co. v. Antares Corp., 975 S.W.2d 
243, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); SAB Harmon Indus., Inc. v. All State Bldg. Sys., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 
476, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 406. See, e.g., Summer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Three A’s Holding, LLC, No. 97-9095, 1999 WL 
106216, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); Kologel Co. v. Down in the Vill., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 727, 
728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Kolmar Ams., Inc. v. Bioversal Inc., 932 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div. 
2011); Korseska v. United Cargo Corp. 258 N.Y.S.2d 432, 437 (App. Div. 1965). 
 407. See, e.g., Global Octanes Tex., L.P. v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., Inc., 154 F.3d 518, 522 
(5th Cir. 1998); Bray Int’l, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. H-02-98, 2005 WL 
6792280, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2005); James L. Gang & Assocs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 198 
S.W.3d 434, 437-38 (Tex. App. 2006); Cook Composites, Inc. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 15 
S.W.3d 124, 131-33 (Tex. App. 2000); Atl. Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777, 
783-84 (Tex. App. 1989); Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., 679 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex. 
App. 1984). 
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contextualist in their approach to interpretation under the Code to 
warrant inclusion in my empirical study. Indeed, Virginia was the only 
state that met my study parameters and also appeared to contain no 
substantial authority endorsing position three. To be sure, my research 
was not exhaustive. A more comprehensive review might identify 
additional textualist states where positions one and two dominate the 
caselaw applying the UCC. But given the ubiquity of judicial opinions 
adopting a “no contradiction” approach to the relationship of express 
terms and the incorporation tools under the Code,408 I concluded  
that further research is not justified. This necessitated abandoning  
Study Five. 
3. Partial Contextualism Under the Common Law 
The last two subparts identified two aspects of the UCC caselaw 
that create critical problems for Study Five. First, liberal approaches to 
extrinsic evidence generally apply only to the incorporation tools.409 
Second, many decisions use interpretative practices that are effectively 
or explicitly textualist.410 This Subpart discusses a third and final 
problem: numerous cases in jurisdictions with generally textualist 
common law hold that some or all of the incorporation tools are exempt 
from the plain meaning rule. In other words, many common law 
decisions in these states embrace partial contextualism rather than a 
strict four-corners approach with respect to stage one of the interpretive 
process. This allows the judge to review course of performance, course 
of dealing, and/or usage of trade evidence without a prior finding that 
the contract is patently ambiguous and permits such evidence to alter the 
apparent plain meaning of an agreement.411 That is precisely what the 
                                                          
 408. See 1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 328, § 2-202:4, at 2-181 (“Many courts have 
interpreted the phrasing ‘explain or supplement’ [in § 2-202] to mean that the evidence cannot 
contradict the written terms, or in other words, if the usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of 
performance contradicts a written term, it should not be admitted into evidence.”); id. at 2-181 to 2-
182 n.10 (collecting authorities); KNIFFIN, supra note 357, § 24.13, at 122 (“Cases abound in which 
trade usage has been held inadmissible because it ‘conflicts’ with express terms.”); id. § 24.16, at 
155 n.342 (collecting cases stating that course of performance is subject to the four-corners rule and 
cases stating course of performance is an exception to the plain meaning rule). 
 409. See supra notes 364-65 and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra notes 391-408 and accompanying text. 
 411. Of the three incorporation tools, usage of trade has been discussed the most in the 
secondary literature. See, e.g., 12 LORD, supra note 43, § 34.5, at 45-50 (“[N]umerous cases have 
been decided in which words with a clear normal meaning were shown by usage to bear a meaning 
which was not suggested by the ordinary language used. . . . Therefore, evidence of usage may be 
admissible to give meaning to apparently unambiguous terms of a contract when other parol 
evidence would be inadmissible.”) (collecting authorities, including many from textualist 
jurisdictions); see also Robert A. Hillman, Comment: More in Defense of U.C.C. Methodology, 62 
LA. L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2002) (“I would wager that a rigorous empirical survey of common law 
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Code permits according to the more liberal positions discussed in the 
prior subpart.412 Therefore, the application of partial contextualism to the 
incorporation tools under the common law in otherwise textualist states 
further breaks down the line between the Code and the common law on 
the subject of interpretation. 
New York and Texas exemplify this final problem. Most decisions 
from state courts in the former jurisdiction hold that the incorporation 
tools are subject to the four-corners rules.413 But there is an extensive 
line of federal authority applying New York law that permits the judge 
to consider course of performance or trade usage when deciding whether 
a contract is ambiguous.414 In Texas, the caselaw is also deeply divided 
on whether the incorporation tools are exempt from the plain meaning 
rule. And the split is probably worse there than in New York because 
significant Texas state court authority exists on both sides of the issue.415 
 
                                                          
cases would show that, on the whole, courts are quite receptive to evidence of custom and the 
parties’ course of dealing.”). 
 412. See supra notes 369-90 and accompanying text. 
 413. See, e.g., OSFI Fund II, LLC v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 920 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Milonas v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 648 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1996); 76 N. Assocs. v. Theil Mgmt. Corp., 518 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); 
Salzman v. Bowyer Prods., Inc., 344 N.Y.S.2d 755, 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). 
 414. The source of this line of authority appears to be Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, 
Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 989-90, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that evidence of “surrounding 
circumstances, common usage, and custom” as well as “subsequent conduct of the parties” could be 
submitted at a preliminary hearing to determine whether a patently unambiguous contract contained 
a latent ambiguity, but rejecting “evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties,” including 
oral testimony regarding the preliminary negotiations and correspondences sent as part of such 
negotiations). Subsequent decisions in the line include the following: World Trade Ctr. Props., 
L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 184 (2d Cir. 2003); Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC 
Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1992); Deutsche Bank AG v. Ambac Credit Prods., 
LLC, No. 04 Civ. 5594 (DLC), 2006 WL 1867497, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006); Random House, 
Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 618, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Time Warner Cable v. 
City of New York, 943 F. Supp. 1357, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Apparently, older state court decisions 
from New York are also split on whether a patent ambiguity is required before the court may review 
trade usage evidence. See Joseph H. Levie, The Interpretation of Contracts in New York Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 N.Y.L.F. 350, 366-67 (1964). 
 415. Compare Tex. Gas Expl. Corp. v. Broughton Offshore Ltd. II, 790 S.W.2d 781, 785 (Tex. 
App. 1990) (“Custom and usage of trade are not relevant where the contract language is, like the 
language before this court, clear and unambiguous.”), and Corso v. Carr, 634 S.W.2d 804, 808 
(Tex. App. 1982) (adopting essentially the same understanding as the prior case), and Commercial 
Union Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 635 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. App. 1982) (same), and Hildreth v. Merle 
Norman Cosmetics, Inc., No. 08-02-00402-CV, 2004 WL 736991, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr. 6, 2004) 
(explaining that the conduct of the parties, which includes course of performance, is “immaterial” if 
the contract is unambiguous), with XCO Prod. Co. v. Jamison, 194 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. App. 
2006) (noting that trade usage should be considered in determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous); and Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Hunt Petrol., 157 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(same); and GTE Sw., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 102 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App. 2003) (same). 
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This last problem is not as serious as the one discussed in the prior 
subpart—the problem of courts employing textualism to construe 
contracts governed by the UCC That is because decisions applying 
partial contextualism to the incorporation tools under the common law in 
textualist states appear to be less pervasive than decisions in those same 
states that utilize textualism under the Code. As a result, there are some 
textualist jurisdictions with divided common law authority that clearly 
favors the position that the incorporation tools are subject to the four-
corners rule.416 And in other states, the decisional law overwhelmingly 
supports the conclusion that a judge may not consider course of 
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade prior to a finding of 
patent ambiguity.417 But the existence of so many opinions in textualist 
states permitting courts to review incorporation tools evidence when 
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous is still an important  
problem for any empirical study that seeks to compare the UCC to the 
common law. 
 
* * * 
 
Let me recap. The goal of Study Five was to assess interpretation 
litigation levels under the common law and the UCC in a set of textualist 
states. The critical assumption underlying such a study is that courts in 
these jurisdictions employ a reasonably pure form of textualism when 
interpreting contracts governed by the common law and a reasonably 
pure form of contextualism when interpreting contracts governed by the 
UCC. Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. 
 
                                                          
 416. Missouri fits into this category. See Heiden v. Gen. Motors Corp., 567 S.W.2d 401, 404-
05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“The statement that the admissibility of custom and usage is not limited to 
ambiguities also finds some support in a few older Missouri cases. . . . However, the majority as 
well as the more recent of the Missouri cases state a more narrow view and restrict application of 
custom and usage to only those contracts which are ambiguous.”); see also Cordry v. Vanderbilt 
Mortg. & Fin., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 923, 928 (W.D. Mo. 2005) (“As noted, however, the Court 
does not find the term ambiguous and thus does not need to examine the prior course of dealing.”); 
J.S. DeWeese Co. v. Hughes-Treitler Mfg. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 638, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) 
(“Further, custom and usage may be used only to remove ambiguities, not to contradict the plain 
meaning of a written contract.”). 
 417. Oklahoma fits into this category. See, e.g., Pitco Prod. Co. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc., 63 
P.3d 541, 547 n.25 (Okla. 2003) (“A finding of ambiguity must be made before the court can look at 
the custom of the industry to determine the parties’ obligations.”); Cook v. Okla. Bd. of Pub. 
Affairs, 736 P.2d 140, 147 (Okla. 1987) (same); Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. Home Builders Assoc. of 
Realtors, Inc., 554 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Okla. 1976) (noting that “[i]f there is an ambiguity or 
uncertainty as to the meaning of the terms used in a written contract between the parties, usages and 
customs may be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting them and to fix and explain the meaning 
of the expressions and words of doubtful and various meaning.”). 
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Part V.D.1 established that decisions from textualist states applying 
the UCC generally exempt only course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade from the ambiguity requirement. That is 
because courts most often construe the Code as adopting partial 
contextualism rather than full contextualism. Part V.D.2 established that 
much of the UCC caselaw in these jurisdictions goes further: it subjects 
the incorporation tools to the same textualist-style principles that 
regulate other classes of extrinsic evidence. Finally, Part V.D.3 
established that many decisions in textualist states employ a form of 
partial contextualism with respect to some or all of the incorporation 
tools when construing contracts governed by the common law. 
In short, courts in textualist jurisdictions normally employ a 
combination of partial contextualism and textualism under both the Code 
and the common law. While the precise allocation of contextualist and 
textualist authorities may differ between the UCC and the common law 
in these states, the jurisprudence does not vary sufficiently to justify an 
empirical study comparing litigation levels under the two bodies of 
law.418 Thus, I decided not to complete Study Five. 
VI. STUDY FOUR: TEXTUALIST INTERPRETATION VERSUS 
CONTEXTUALIST INTERPRETATION IN STATES THAT 
SWITCHED FROM TEXTUALISM TO CONTEXTUALISM 
A. Study Methodology and Results 
Study Four has the same purpose and employs essentially the same 
research protocol as Study One. It is designed to address the textualist 
hypothesis that contextualism results in higher enforcement costs and the 
contextualist counter-hypothesis that textualism results in higher 
enforcement costs. For each hypothesis, the independent variable is the 
school of contract interpretation employed by the courts and the 
dependent variable is the level of enforcement costs. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no difference between textualism and contextualism in 
their impacts on litigation expenses. 
There are two basic components to enforcement costs: (1) the 
number of lawsuits filed, and (2) how long those lawsuits last. As in 
Study One, these elements were measured here via three Westlaw  
 
                                                          
 418. See also Hillman, supra note 411, at 1159 (“In general, my hunch is that the Code and the 
common law are not as distinct [regarding contract interpretation] as [Professor Robert] Scott 
believes.”); Whitford, supra note 7, at 938 n.18 (“This account of the law suggests that application 
of the PER under the Code is not much different from the common law.”). 
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searches for judicial opinions classified with key numbers that concern 
interpretation from the Contracts (95) and Evidence (157) topics. 
There are only two differences between Studies One and Four. 
First, I made one minor adjustment to the three queries designed to 
retrieve interpretation cases. In particular, I added one key number that I 
mistakenly excluded from Study One.419 
Second, rather than running the searches in textualist states and 
contextualist states, I ran the searches in five contextualist states—
Arizona, California, Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington—during 
two different time periods: a textualist period and a contextualist period. 
In Study One, I used the same ten-year block for both the textualist and 
contextualist groups: January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2009. All 
Westlaw searches included a date restriction limiting the dataset to cases 
decided during the first decade of this century.420 In the current project, I 
ran the searches in two distinct ten-year periods for each state. That is 
because the five territories adopted contextualism at five different points 
in time. 
To control for the impact of other social and legal variations 
between the relevant eras that might confound the results, I ran a search 
in each state during the textualist and contextualist time periods for all 
cases tagged with any key number from the Contracts topic. As in Study 
One, the results of this search served as a proxy for the level of contract 
litigation.421 If textualism and contextualism—in relation to each other—
do not impact how many lawsuits are filed and the length of those 
proceedings, then one might reasonably expect the ratio of contract 
interpretation cases to general contract cases to be roughly the same in 
each state during the textualist and contextualist periods. In other words, 
if the ratio of cases returned by my three interpretation queries to the 
cases returned by the control query is constant for the textualist and 
contextualist eras in the five states, then the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Alternatively, if the fraction of contract decisions that are 
interpretation decisions is higher during the contextualist periods by a 
statistically significant amount, this suggests that (i) parties file more 
interpretation lawsuits when contextualism is the law, (ii) interpretation 
lawsuits last longer under contextualism, or (iii) some combination of 
the two. And the reverse is true if the fraction is higher during textualist 
eras by a statistically significant level. 
                                                          
 419. Details regarding how I created the search queries while conducting Study One are 
presented supra at notes 109-22 and accompanying text. And the precise searches I used in Study 
Four are set forth in the Appendix to this Article. See infra Appendix. 
 420. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 294. 
 421. Id.; see also id. at 289-91. 
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Several additional aspects of the time periods used in Study Four 
are worth noting. First, the textualist and contextualist periods for each 
of the five jurisdictions were determined via a detailed review 
of the local caselaw. I conducted this review with aid from my  
research assistants.422 
Second, I set the textualist and contextualist time periods for each 
state close to the transition point in order to minimize the number of 
legal and social differences between the relevant eras beyond the shift in 
interpretation doctrine. For example, California adopted contextualism 
in 1968.423 I thus set the two time periods for that state at 1958 to 1967 
(the textualism era) and 1970 to 1979 (the contextualism era). Those two 
decades are probably much more alike than, for example, 1950 to  
1959 and 1980 to 1989. Keeping the textualist and contextualist  
periods in close temporal proximity thus reduces the impact of 
confounding variables. 
Third, I used a slightly larger gap between the textualist and 
contextualist periods than appeared justified by the research to take into 
account operational aspects of American common law. For example, 
when the supreme court of a state adopts a new doctrine, it can take 
some time for the ruling to filter down to the lower state courts and into 
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction over disputes governed by 
local law.424 Likewise, state intermediate appellate and trial judges 
sometimes endorse new legal rules before their supreme court makes a 
change to the state’s jurisprudence. I employed a small cushion around 
the transition point from textualism to contextualism to filter out the 
effects of these types of phenomena. 
Fourth, the gap between the textualist and contextualist time 
periods varies for each of the five states. The California and Colorado 
gaps are only two years because both of those jurisdictions quickly 
shifted in their approach to contract interpretation. The Washington gap 
is nine years and the Arizona gap is eleven years. In each of those states, 
the caselaw was in flux for about a decade before the local courts fully 
embraced contextualism. Finally, the New Jersey gap is twenty-five 
years. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted contextualist 
interpretation in 1953.425 But based on my analysis of the jurisprudence, 
                                                          
 422. The research is on file with the author and most of it will not be detailed here. 
 423. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 
643-46 (Cal. 1968). 
 424. In my experience, local federal courts are often slower to cite state supreme court 
decisions constituting major breaks in precedent than lower state courts bound by the new ruling. 
Thus, the aspects of Study Four that are restricted to state courts might be more reliable than the 
aspects that focus on both state and federal cases. 
 425. Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1953). 
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the courts in that state did not begin to consistently use contextualism 
until 1978. From 1953 through 1977, the caselaw was divided between 
the two methods of interpretation. 
The next two tables set forth the raw totals from Study Four. The 
first table contains the data that is exclusively from state courts. The 
second table contains the data from state and federal courts combined.  
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Table 1: State Court Cases Only 





























Arizona (1973-1982) 59–36.4% 70–43.2% 86–53.1% 162 
California (1958-1967) 198–29.7% 305–45.7% 368–55.2% 667 
Colorado (1980-1989) 68–35.8% 83–43.0% 96–49.7% 193 
New Jersey (1943-1952) 80–30.7% 91–34.9% 119–45.6% 261 
Washington (1980-1989) 50–24.5% 70–34.3% 77–37.8% 204 
Total—Weighted* 456–30.7% 619–41.6% 746–50.2% 1487 
Total—Unweighted** 31.4% 40.2% 48.3%  
Contextualist Periods 
Arizona (1994-2003) 23–28.8% 26–32.5% 29–36.3% 80 
California (1958-1967) 113–34.2% 148–44.8% 165–50.0% 330 
Colorado (1992-2001) 99–48.5% 107–52.5% 117–57.4% 204 
New Jersey (1978-1987) 31–27.0% 35–30.4% 38–33.0% 115 
Washington (1999-2008) 93–40.4% 110–47.8% 112–48.7% 230 
Total—Weighted 359–37.4% 426–44.4% 461–48.1% 959 
Total—Unweighted 35.8% 41.6% 45.1%  
Contextualist minus Textualist 
Weighted 6.7% 2.8% -1.5% 
 
 
Unweighted 4.4% 1.4% -3.2%  
 
*“Weighted” means the sum of the interpretation cases from all 
five states divided by the sum of all contract cases from the same five 
states. Larger states have more impact under this measure. 
**“Unweighted” means the sum of the percentages in each column 
divided by five. Each state has the same impact under this measure. 
                                                          
 426. Included with each group is a brief description of the key numbers that constitute that 
group using terminology from West’s outline of the topic. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 295 n.482. 
The precise key numbers that constitute each group are identified in the Appendix. Id.  
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Table 2: State and Federal Court Cases 





























Arizona (1973-1982) 64–36.4% 77–43.8% 93–52.8% 176 
California (1958-1967) 220–30.4% 331–45.7% 396–54.7% 724 
Colorado (1980-1989) 95–36.7% 109–42.2% 125–48.4% 258 
New Jersey (1943-1952) 86–30.5% 99–35.1% 130–46.1% 282 
Washington (1980-1989) 59–26.0% 81–35.7% 93–41.0% 227 
Total—Weighted 524–31.4% 697–41.8% 837–50.2% 1667 
Total—Unweighted 32.0% 40.5% 48.6%  
Contextualist Periods 
Arizona (1994-2003) 32–27.1% 39–33.1% 44–37.3% 118 
California (1958-1967) 133–33.6% 173–43.7% 193–48.7% 396 
Colorado (1992-2001) 139–44.6% 148–47.4% 161–51.6% 312 
New Jersey (1978-1987) 49–28.5% 56–32.6% 61–35.5% 172 
Washington (1999-2008) 113–39.5% 136–47.6% 139–48.6% 286 
Total—Weighted 466–36.3% 552–43.0% 598–46.6% 1284 
Total—Unweighted 34.7% 40.9% 44.3%  
Contextualist minus Textualist 
Weighted 4.9% 1.2% -2.0%  
Unweighted 2.7% 0.4% -4.3%  
 
Some additional explanation of the data is in order. First, the 
percentages listed in the tables for each state reflect the ratio of cases 
recovered by queries one, two, and three to the cases recovered by the 
control search. For example, in Table 1, query one returned fifty-nine 
decisions in Arizona during the textualist period (1973-1982). The 
control search for that jurisdiction and time period returned 162 
opinions. Fifty-nine is 36.4% of 162. Second, I combined the numbers 
for the five textualist time periods and the five contextualist time periods 
in two ways—a weighted total and an unweighted total. To illustrate, in 
Table 1, the combined weighted total for the states during the textualist 
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periods and under query one is 30.7%. That figure was created by adding 
up all of the query one results for each state (456) and dividing that 
number by the sum of all the control search results for those states 
(1487). Using this measure, the states with more cases have greater 
impact on the ultimate percentage. By comparison, the combined 
unweighted total for the states during the textualist period under query 
one is 31.4%. That number was created by adding all of the query one 
percentages (36.4%, 29.7%, 35.8%, 30.7%, and 24.5%) and dividing  
by five. Using this measure, each state has equal impact on the  
ultimate percentage. 
Turning to analysis of the data, and focusing first on the raw 
numbers, during the time periods in which states used a textualist 
approach, they had less interpretation litigation as a fraction of contract 
litigation than during the contextualist period under queries one and two, 
but had more under query three. Most relevant are the weighted and 
unweighted combined totals for each group of time periods. Consider, 
for example, the unweighted figures in Table 1. For the ten-year periods 
in which Arizona, California, Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington 
employed textualism, interpretation litigation constituted 31.4%, 40.2%, 
and 48.3% of total contract litigation, depending on the measure used for 
interpretation cases (queries one, two, and three). For the ten-year 
periods in which those five states used contextualism, the numbers are 
35.8%, 41.6%, and 45.1%. 
Table 3 lists all of the differences between the combined textualist-
era percentages and the combined contextualist-era percentages. 
 
Table 3: Differences Between Combined Totals from Tables 1 and 2 
Table 1: State Court Cases Only 
 Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 
Contextualist minus Textualist 
Weighted 6.7% 2.8% -1.5% 
Unweighted 4.4% 1.4% -3.2% 
Table 2: State and Federal Court Cases 
 Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 
Contextualist minus Textualist 
Weighted 4.9% 1.2% -2.0% 
Unweighted 2.7% 0.4% -4.3% 
 
Applying a t-test methodology to each of the twelve measures, none of 
the differences are statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, the 
ultimate conclusion of this study is that the null hypothesis cannot be 
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rejected: The study cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no 
difference between textualism and contextualism in their impacts on the 
number of contract interpretation lawsuits filed and the length of those 
cases. In other words, the study finds no support for either the textualist 
hypothesis that contextualism has higher enforcement costs or  
the contextualist counter-hypothesis that textualism has higher 
enforcement costs. 
B. Discussion 
In Study One, there was no statistically significant difference 
between textualism and contextualism under thirteen of fourteen 
measures.427 Near the end of Article One, I offered several 
methodological and substantive explanations for these findings,428 which 
are summarized above.429 Because Study One and Study Four are nearly 
identical in structure and results,430 all of those explanations are 
applicable to Study Four as well. In this subpart, I review the most 
significant explanations and then discuss what those points suggest more 
generally about the Key Number System and contract interpretation. 
The most straightforward explanation for my failure to find a 
statistically significant difference between textualism and contextualism 
in Studies One and Four is that enforcement costs are substantially the 
same under the two approaches. In Article One, I offered three reasons 
why this might be so.431 Most crucially, I proposed that “the countless 
other factors that influence whether a lawsuit is filed and how long it 
lasts swamp any impact resulting from the interpretive approach in use 
by the courts.”432 I have long been skeptical that there is a consequential 
variation between textualism and contextualism when it comes to 
litigation expenses. Indeed, that view was one of my principal 
motivations for beginning work on Article One and this Article. But 
while substantive explanations that take my study findings at face value 
are appealing to my theoretical commitments, the methodological 
limitations of my research protocol indicate that considerable caution is 
in order. 
In Article One and in several sections above, I addressed numerous 
methodological problems inherent in (1) using the Key Number System 
                                                          
 427. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 299-300. 
 428. See id. at 300-07. 
 429. See supra text accompanying notes 144-61. 
 430. See supra text accompanying notes 290-303. 
 431. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 305-07. I summarized that discussion in Part IV. See supra 
text accompanying notes 155-61. 
 432. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 307. 
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as a tool for empirical work, and (2) the precise research design I 
employed in Study One and Study Four.433 The most important 
limitations are as follows. First, Studies One and Four attempt to draw 
inferences about the population of all cases from a sample of reported 
decisions.434 But published opinions are likely not a representative 
subset of lawsuits generally.435 Second, over-coding, overbreadth, and 
foreign law might have corrupted my datasets.436 Third, under-coding 
could have biased my results because the interpretation and 
contract/control datasets in both studies excluded numerous published 
decisions involving those subjects.437 Fourth, there are many differences 
between the states in Study One and across time in Study Four that the 
control search for contract cases probably did not control for.438 And the 
search certainly could not account for geographic and temporal 
variations in general contract law.439 Fifth, sophisticated parties might be 
altering their contracting and litigation practices based on their 
perceptions about which interpretive approach is superior; such behavior 
could alter the level of interpretation litigation in textualist and/or 
contextualist states, critically undermining any attempt to measure the 
impacts of the two systems of contract construction.440 Sixth, the 
caselaw regarding contract interpretation is a labyrinth of complexity 
and inconsistency.441 As a result, the jurisprudence in most states is a 
hybrid of textualism and contextualism rather than a pure version of 
either school.442 It is thus possible that the textualist and contextualist 
territories and periods in my studies are too similar in their methods of 
contract construction for the differences that do exist to result in a 
measurable variation in enforcement costs.443 Given this list of 
methodological limitations, the findings of Studies One and Four are 
certainly open to dispute. 
Some of the problems discussed in the prior paragraph actually do 
more than cast doubt on my study results. They also raise two broader 
issues: (1) whether the Key Number System is an appropriate tool for 
                                                          
 433. See supra Parts III, IV, V.C. 
 434. See supra notes 109-28 and accompanying text (Study One); supra note 419 and 
accompanying text (Study Four). 
 435. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 96, 98, 136-39 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra notes 97, 131-32, 181-90, 261-67 and accompanying text. 
 438. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 300. 
 439. See supra notes 149-51, 295-302 and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra notes 44, 147 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 45, 147 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
1094 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1011 
conducting empirical research relating to contract interpretation; and (2) 
whether some of the hypothesized differences between textualism and 
contextualism are empirically measurable at all. 
Starting with the first issue, recall the problem of overbreadth: 
Many Key Number System topics and subtopics are expansive in scope, 
encompassing what are normally considered distinct legal subjects. 
Recall also the problem of under-coding: There is significant overlap 
among numerous topics and subtopics; as a result, headnotes are often 
classified with only a subset of the relevant key numbers. These two 
limitations are particularly severe in the context of contract 
interpretation. A large number of topics and subtopics concern both 
interpretation and other fields of law, creating overbreadth issues.444 
Under-coding is an even bigger difficulty. There are a myriad of topics 
and key numbers that address the construction of agreements.445 That 
makes under-coding ubiquitous in this area. In fact, a substantial 
majority of the interpretation opinions I reviewed while working on 
Article One and this Article suffer from under-coding.446 Given these 
points, I now believe that the Key Number System is not as useful for 
empirical research on contract interpretation as I previously thought.447 
The challenges created by under-coding and overbreadth are best 
illustrated via a recap of Study Three. There is only one way to ensure 
that under-coding does not invalidate an empirical study conducted 
using the Key Number System when the study addresses a broad subject 
such as which approach to contract interpretation has higher 
enforcement costs: include all of the topics and subtopics that are 
pertinent to the research hypothesis in the Westlaw searches used to 
create the datasets.448 In other words, the project must have a structure 
approximating that of Study Three, where I planned to use all or 
virtually all of the interpretation and contracts key numbers in my 
Westlaw queries.449 Employing merely a subgroup of the relevant topics 
and subtopics creates a high likelihood of biased datasets.450 
Unfortunately, Study Three suffers from insurmountable logistical 
and technical issues. To minimize the impact of overbreadth in that 
                                                          
 444. Several examples from the Evidence topic (topic 157) are identified in the discussion of 
Study Three above. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra notes 181-84, 218-25 and accompanying text. 
 446. See also supra notes 261-67 and accompanying text (discussing how West’s classification 
practices result in under-coding). 
 447. I suspected this might be the case by the time I completed Article One. See Silverstein, 
supra note 12, at 293 n.476. 
 448. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 449. See supra the text in the paragraph immediately following note 192. 
 450. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. 
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project, I would need to review a representative sample of judicial 
decisions classified with key numbers that are candidates for inclusion in 
the Westlaw searches. But given the quantity of key numbers that relate 
to interpretation and contracts, such an audit would take far too long.451 
And even if I completed the review, I could not use all of the qualifying 
key numbers in the searches because of Westlaw’s 600-character  
query limitation.452 
In sum, the problems of under-coding and overbreadth, combined 
with the 600-character limit, create the following dilemma for any 
expansive study conducted via the Key Number System—whether the 
study addresses contract interpretation or a similarly broad subject: 
either complete the project despite potentially fatal under-coding that 
undermines the validity of the findings, or abandon the project on 
grounds of feasibility. 
Note that the Key Number System remains a useful tool for studies 
that are narrower in scope. For example, one might measure how often a 
particular rule of construction is used by courts in textualist and 
contextualist jurisdictions. Designing a project like this to account for 
under-coding and feasibility concerns will usually be rather easy. The 
same is true for studies addressing any of the countless legal subjects 
that are not nearly as broad as contract interpretation writ large.453 But 
for projects like mine, which attempt to comprehensively assess one or 
more of the general impacts of textualism and contextualism, the Key 
Number System is not as useful as I had hoped. 
Turning to the second issue, the complexity and confusion in the 
contract interpretation jurisprudence engender doubt about the value of 
expansive empirical studies comparing textualism to contextualism. The 
fundamental problem is this: In most states, the caselaw appears to be a 
hybrid of the two schools of thought. As a result, an empirical study 
comparing a significant number of “textualist” and “contextualist” 
                                                          
 451. See supra Part V.B.1. Note that if I used an alternative method to control for differences 
across state lines—a method that does not involve key number searches—this would limit the scope 
of the review to cases tagged with the candidate interpretation key numbers. There would be no 
need to analyze cases marked with the contracts key numbers. (For some discussion of potential 
alternative controls, see Silverstein, supra note 12, at 290 & nn.464-65.) However, even this more 
circumscribed review would require far too much effort. 
 452. See supra Part V.B.2. Study Three also suffered from critical methodological problems. 
See supra Part V.B.3. For example, using all of the interpretation key numbers raises the danger of 
an alternative type of bias in the dataset potentially as problematic as that created by under-coding. 
See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text. 
 453. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 121, 123-30 (2007) (empirical study of piercing the corporate veil using the Key 
Number System). For my summary of this article and a related piece by Professor Georgakopoulos, 
see Silverstein, supra note 12, at 224-26. 
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jurisdictions is not actually a comparison of pristine versions of 
textualism and contextualism. Instead, it is a comparison of two mixed 
approaches to the construction of agreements. Such research might have 
real scholarly value, as I believe is true for Studies One and Four. But 
given the state of the caselaw, it is hard to see how the results of projects 
like mine, whether completed via the Key Number System or using 
some other technique, could come close to definitively answering 
questions such as which approach to contract interpretation best 
minimizes enforcement costs, transactions costs, or error costs.454 The 
law in most territories is simply too impure to allow for a genuinely 
reliable assessment of whether textualism or contextualism is superior 
across these and various other dimensions.455 
Perhaps more American states follow an unadulterated approach to 
interpretation than I realize. A comprehensive review of the caselaw 
might uncover a greater number of such jurisdictions than I found during 
my work on Article One and this Article. But the consensus among 
scholars and judges is that the law governing the construction of 
agreements is deeply confused in most states. If that consensus is 
correct, then it will be exceedingly difficult to design empirical studies 
that effectively address the issues at the center of the debate over 
contract interpretation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I had two general purposes in writing this Article. The first was to 
contribute further to the academic debate regarding the optimal method 
of contract interpretation by executing new empirical studies analyzing 
the relationship of interpretive approach and enforcement costs. The 
second was to provide additional insights regarding how to use the West 
Key Number System as a data collection and coding device. While I 
believe the piece accomplished both purposes, I had considerably less 
success with the first. 
 
                                                          
 454. The debate over which method of construing agreements leads to more accurate 
interpretations is often conceptualized in terms of which school best reduces “error costs.” See, e.g., 
George M. Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 125, 147 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2011). 
 455. Indeed, sometimes “textualist” and “contextualist” doctrine is so similar in content that a 
proposed study is clearly not worth completing at all. Study Five is illustrative. For that project, I 
planned to compare textualist common law interpretation with contextualist UCC interpretation in a 
set of textualist states. But I terminated my work on this study because in jurisdictions that subscribe 
to textualism, common-law and UCC interpretation overlap too much to make a comparison fruitful. 
See supra Part V.D. 
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As with Study One, the results of Study Four conflict with what is 
perhaps the signature claim advanced by textualist courts and 
commentators in defense of their position: that contextualism increases 
the level of interpretation litigation from the textualist baseline. But 
Studies One and Four together are only weak evidence against 
textualism because of the methodological limitations inherent in my 
research protocol. As a result, we remain a long way from answering 





WESTLAW SEARCHES USED IN THE STUDY 
 
This Appendix sets forth the searches I ran on Westlaw to 
collect the data for Study Four. Recall that I organized the key numbers 
chosen for the study into three groups: (1) contract interpretation key 
numbers from the Contracts topic (topic 95), (2) contract interpretation 
key numbers from the Evidence topic (topic 157), and (3) parol evidence 
rule key numbers from the Evidence topic. The search terms for each 
group are listed below. 
Next, I constructed three search queries for each state. The first 
query contained only the key numbers in group (1). The second 
contained the key numbers in groups (1) and (2). And the third contained 
the key numbers in all three groups—(1), (2), and (3). The three queries 
were run in (a) the relevant state database, and (b) the relevant state and 
federal databases together. Thus, there were six searches in total for each 
jurisdiction during both the textualist time period and the contextualist 
time period. The results of these searches served as proxies for the level 
of contract interpretation litigation. 
The three queries were run in exactly the same form in every 
state database and each of the three is presented below. Running the 
queries in the state and federal databases together required additional 
search language to limit the cases retrieved to the appropriate 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, I have set forth the three queries as run in the 
Arizona state and federal databases to highlight the limiting language 
that was necessary. 
I also ran a control search for all cases classified with a contracts 
key number. This search served as a proxy for the total level of contract 
litigation in each state during the time periods of the study. Like the 
three interpretation queries, the control required additional restrictive 
language when it was run in both the state and federal databases. I thus 
have set forth both versions of the control search—state and 
state/federal—again using Arizona as an example of the latter. 
Finally, all queries were run with a ten-year date restriction that 
limited the dataset to cases decided during the designated textualist and 
contextualist periods for each state. The search language restricting the 
results to the appropriate time periods is not contained in the queries  
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below because it varies for each jurisdiction. Instead, I have included the 
letter x where the numbers setting out the dates would otherwise be. 
 
Group 1: Topic 95 (Contracts), Section II, Subsection (A)—
Selected Key Numbers. 
95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160 
95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170 
95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 95k190 
 




Group 3: Topic 157 (Evidence), Section XI, Subsection (A)—All 
Key Numbers and Subsection (C)—Selected Key Numbers. 
157XI(A) 
 157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 157k444457 
 
Query 1—State (Group 1). 
(95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160 
95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170 
95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 95k190) & da(aft 
xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
 
Query 2—State (Groups 1 & 2). 
(157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 
95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 
95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 
95k190)) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
 
Query 3—State (Groups 1, 2, & 3). 
(157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 
95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 
95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 
95k190) (157XI(A) 157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 
157k444)) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx)458 
                                                 
 456. Using this term in a search will retrieve all cases with any key number contained in this 
section of the Evidence topic outline. 
 457. These are the selected key numbers from topic 157, section XI, subsection (C). 
 458. Note that some of the parentheses in these searches are superfluous. I included them when 
I ran the searches because they make it easier to see precisely what I was searching for without 
altering the results retrieved. 
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Query 1—State & Federal (Group 1). 
Here is the search I ran for Arizona state and federal cases: 
co(az) & (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 
95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 
95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 
95k190) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
 
Notice the italicized language at the start of the search, which was 
not included in query 1 when I searched only for state cases. A search 
using query 1 without the italicized language would have retrieved 
numerous cases that did not originate in Arizona, such as Ninth Circuit 
cases that were initially filed in California or another state within that 
circuit. The italicized language (substantially) restricted the search to 
cases arising in Arizona. 
Comparable language was used in all state/federal searches. For 
example, I included “co(co)” for the Colorado queries and “co(#ca)” for 
the California queries.459 
 
Query 2—State & Federal (Group 1 & 2). 
co(az) & (157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 
95k150 95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 
95k167 95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 
95k190)) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
 
Query 3—State & Federal (Group 1, 2, & 3). 
co(az) &(157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 
95k150 95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 
95k167 95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176 
95k190) (157XI(A) 157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 
157k444)) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
 
Control Search—State. 
to(95) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx)460 
 
Control Search—State & Federal. 
co(az) & to(95) & da(aft xx/xx/xxxx) & da(bef xx/xx/xxxx) 
                                                 
 459. Note that Westlaw uses the letters “ca” to refer to California and to courts of appeal. 
Thus, to restrict a search to federal cases arising in California, the appropriate court restrictor is 
co(#ca). The pound sign insures that Westlaw reads “ca” as referring to a state rather than a type of 
court. 
 460. This search retrieves all cases tagged with any topic 95 (Contracts) key number in the 
relevant database. 
